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Abstract
Nigeria is faced with the problems and challenges of pluralism in respect of its
ethnic, social, political and religious diversity. This thesis argues that in order to reconcile
the conflicting interests and tendencies in the country, an integrated approach to moral
education is required.
The first chapter clarifies the current situation in Nigeria by showing historically the
roots of the present diversity. The second chapter is an introduction to some concepts -- of
morality, education, moral education and moral development — which are essential to the
later discussion.
The third chapter describes and analyses approaches to moral education in traditional
Nigerian society, including both content and methods. The fourth chapter is premised on the
argument that moral education for national cohesion in Nigeria needs to take account of
features of Nigerian society which, while being aspects of the problem, also contain the
resources through which a solution can be approached. More is said on the current
diversity, including its political and religious aspects, and it is pointed out that both
Nigeria's political ideals, as enshrined in its constitution, and the predominantly religious
orientation of its people, are resources on which moral education can build.
The fifth chapter asks how far theoretical approaches developed in the West can be
adapted to Nigeria's situation. Consideration is given to major political, especially
democratic, theories; to ethical theories, especially where they focus on virtue; to
conceptions of the nature of religion; and to psychological developmental theories. In each
case it is argued that there are valuable features in such theories but they cannot be
transferred wholesale to the Nigerian situation.
The sixth chapter, accordingly, seeks to show how a distinctively Nigerian approach
might be developed. This will allow for the possibility of a non-Western form of
democracy; for a form of moral education which incorporates what is most valuable in
traditional Nigerian practices; and for a religious education which takes account of common
factors within a situation of diversity.
Finally, an attempt is made in the seventh chapter to sketch a model of an effective
and integrated moral education for Nigeria, in terms of the role of the school; the qualities
required on the part of the teacher; the qualities of the student; the content of what is
taught; and the methods to be used.
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1INTRODUCTION
Uprightness makes a nation great,
By sin whole races are disgraced.
—Proverbs 14:34.
But such is the Irresistible nature of truth,
that all it asks — and all it wants —
Is the liberty of appearing.
—THOMAS PAINE, The Rights of Man.
This dissertation was embarked upon on grounds of three basic presuppositions: a)
that in Nigeria there is a need to be met by a programme of moral education; b) that
such a moral education is achievable in real life rather than in the world of ideas alone;
C) and that it is not just any moral education, but one that will be effective in rendering
those so educated worthy citizens who have acquired sound moral habits and dispositions
to enable them live and work together in harmony with others for the good of all.
There is a certain unanimity among Nigerians in desiring a more moral, more just,
and a better-organised society than what they currently experience. Thus most
conversations among Nigerians tend to veer towards issues about Nigeria's situation, and
they are mostly complaints about injustice, underdevelopment, and corrupt leadership.
A number of books by Nigerian authors have given full expression to these complaints.
Among the best known are those by Nigeria's best-known writers Wole Soyinlca and
Chinua Achebe. Wole Soyinlca's The Man Died is a complaint about a decadent Nigeria
whose corrupt leadership tends to thrive on stepping on the toes of the common people
with arrogant impunity. Chinua Achebe's The Trouble with Nigeria is an indictment of
the double standards with which the rich and powerful turn everything to their favour
and against the interests of the ordinary citizens.
This dissertation is in a way a "joining-in° in this discussion about Nigeria, but this
time at the level of moral education. It tries to take account of the entire situation in
Nigeria with a view to working out a general framework for bringing about a moral
environment through an effective moral education. It tries to identify the historical,
moral, religious, and socio-political points of reference for any present or future
discussion of the question of moral education in Nigeria. In pursuance of this end it
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embarks on wide-ranging discussions about the roles that can possibly be played by
Nigeria's historical antecedents, traditional education, and political landscape in the light
of some ethical theories and principles.
This work consists of seven chapters. The first chapter is a detailed background
information about the situation of education in general in Nigeria. It serves to place the
analysis in the ensuing chapters in perspective especially for those who might be
unfamiliar with the Nigerian situation. It is certainly a useful reminder as well for one
who is more familiar. Through the unfolding of this introductory chapter, one is quickly
confronted with the ever-present problems and challenges of pluralism on the ethnic,
social, political and religious levels, and their implications for moral education.
The second chapter analyzes some of the basic concepts in moral education discourse
-- morality, ethics, education, moral education and considers the scope and methods of
moral education.
The third chapter analyzes approaches to moral education in traditional Nigerian
society dealing with such issues as motives, means and methods for action.
The fourth chapter discusses moral education in the context of cultural, ethno-
linguistic, and religious pluralism in Nigeria, and how it can pave the way for national
cohesion.
The fifth chapter highlights the rich legacies provided Western political, religious and
ethical theories as possible stepping stones for Nigeria's bid to meet her own unique cir-
cumstances.
Mindful of Nigeria's own resources and considering the possible benefits of Western
theory the sixth chapter proposes a distinctly Nigerian approach to moral education.
The concluding seventh chapter proceeds to propose a model course content for
moral education that is capable of catering to Nigeria's special circumstances.
3CHAPTER ONE
NIGERIA: AN OVERVIEW
I will make the most splendid race the sun has ever shone upon,
I will make divine magnetic lands
With love of comrades.
I will plant companionship thick as trees...
—WALT WHITMAN, For You, 0 Democracy.
You can be a Finn or a Dane and an American.
You can be a German or French and an American.
Jew, Bohunk, Nigger, Mick — all dirty names
We call each other — and yet an American.
—STEPHEN VINCENT BENET, Nightmare at Noon.
The country now called Nigeria has only been under one government during the
present century, since 1914 to be exact. The word Nigeria, had only been thought of
some twenty years earlier.' Geographical influences have indeed made the area a
natural region which could be considered by itself.
1. Sources of Information
The Portuguese came to the Nigerian coasts in the 15th century AD, and have left
records of that part of the country as they observed it. Writings in other European
languages, including English, deal with later periods. Writings in English, both by
Europeans and by Africans who know the language, are very numerous about compara-
tively recent events, and are the chief sources of modern Nigerian history. The use of
written sources in general, including those that are not Nigerian, can only take us back
about 500 years into the past. In any case, oral tradition among some of the Nigerian
peoples extends back at least five hundred years earlier than the written evidence.
Naturally, as a historical source its limitations are only too obvious.
Nigerian languages were not reduced to the written form until relatively recently.
According to M.C. English, of the main languages in Nigeria, only Fulani, Kanuri,
and Hausa have been reduced to writing for more than a hundred and fifty years.2
Those three were first written in Arabic letters about five hundred years ago, (Kanuri
was a little earlier.) Only very few people could write them, and none of the actual
4writings of the age survive today. This was due to a Fulani rebellion in 1804 in which
many of the ancient records are said to have been destroyed. Later writings, undoubt-
edly based on earlier ones, naturally give only an incomplete outline of the history of
the larger states of the Hausa country.
The bulk of early writings on Nigeria was in languages other than those of the
country. Arab travellers from North Africa visited the lands on the southern side of the
Sahara desert, and there are some writings in Arabic describing the countries near
Nigeria between the 10th and the 16th centuries AD. Unfortunately none of the
travellers who wrote about their journeys actually came into what is now Nigeria,
though they make some references to it. According to M.C. English, Hausa was the
first Nigerian language written in Roman letters in 1843, and ICanuri was written in
1853, while others came much later.'
Climatic conditions are also a factor in obscuring the Nigerian past to researchers.
M.C. English suggests that the dry climate in the north of Nigeria preserves things
longer than the wetter conditions of the south. For this reason archaeology has been
able to provide greater knowledge of the remote past of the north than of the south of
Nigeria. It seems reasonable to suggest, however, that the scantiness of information
could well have been as a result of a paucity of archaeological ventures rather than
from the definitive lack of archaeological findings!
2. The Peoples of Nigeria: Diversity of Origins
All the tribes of Nigeria have unwritten traditions about their own history and the
origins of their tribes. In particular, each clan can tell the names of its founder and
members of his family who set up separate homesteads, and something of the quarrels
or other reasons which led to these separations. There are also traditions about the
origins of the tribe as a whole. However, no one could put a date to these events.
People rely mostly on the oral information from the older folk.
Almost all the traditions of Nigerian tribes have one thing in common: they suggest
that the tribe migrated to its present home from somewhere in an easterly direction,
even if the exact times and places are a matter of speculation. The Hausas claim to
come from Baghdad, while the Yorubas, especially those of them that have adopted the
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Mohammedan religion, have a tradition that Mecca was the place of origin of their
tribe. The other tribes like the Igbos, Ibibios and Jukuns believe they originally came
from Egypt, while yet others like the Borgu name Arabia as their first home. Most
Fulanis believe they came originally from Persia.5
The process of the formation of the tribes naturally took several centuries.
According to historians, during the period when the present Nigerian tribes were being
formed and taking up their present abodes, the only practical routes for large numbers
of people to travel were through the open country of Sudan, which covers all of
Northern Nigeria. It is a type of country favourable not only to migrations connected
with wars and conquests, but to the wanderings of the nomadic tribes in search of
pasture for their herds.
The immigrants (between A.D. 700 and 1000) came through the savannah country
of Sudan from the east. Their movements are traceable not only in Nigeria but in Chad
to the North-east. They were generally described as the Berbers, a name which in
Nigerian tradition applies to any of the non-negro inhabitants of Northern Africa. That
they were a pagan people -- not practising either Christianity or Islam — was proved by
their conversion to Islam at a later date. 6 Thus, over a period of five hundred years or
so, wave after wave of more or less civilized people were displaced from their homes
in the Nile valley and North Africa to take refuge wherever they could, mostly in the
desert fringe. Some historians believe that the newcomers to Nigeria included
descendants of these exiled people, possibly mingled with the nomadic tribes already
living in the desert.
After the drying up of the Sahara, migrants could only reach Nigeria from the east
or west. They could not come from the north because it is only in fairly recent times
that people have learned how to cross the Sahara desert in small parties by, camel
caravans, and to this day, it is hardly possible for whole tribes to move into Nigeria by
that route. Migrants could hardly have entered Nigeria from the south either, since that
would have meant crossing the sea, and no one could build ships strong enough to make
such daring voyage until very recently indeed.'
During the two or three centuries before the arrival of the Berbers in Nigeria, there
had been series of disturbances in North Africa and particularly in the upper Nile
valley. Whole populations were displaced and sought safety elsewhere. By about AD
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350 already, the kingdom of Nubia had been completely destroyed, probably by the
Abyssinians, and its peoples were driven out. It is conceivable that some of them could
have found their way into what is now Nigeria.
3. European Contacts
The first recorded contact between Nigeria and Europe was in the 15th century.
Credit goes to a Portuguese prince, Henry, who later became known as Henry the
Navigator, as the first European to land on the West coast of Africa. In 1472, there
was a Portuguese expedition commanded by a man named Sequeira. This expedition
landed in Lagos which was the first natural harbour that ships coming from Europe
would reach after passing the estuary in Sierra Leone beside which Freetown now
stands. Lagos was a colony of Benin, and through the people Sequeira sent messages
to the Oba of Benin. He did not go inland himself. It was with Benin that the
Portuguese established trade relations in Nigeria in 1483. An expedition commanded
by one Aveiro sailed up the creeks as far as Ugwato and from there travelled overland
to Benin. Friendly relations were made with the Oba, and when the expedition returned
to Portugal, it carried a cargo of pepper, then very scarce in Europe. The Oba of Benin
was favourably impressed by the strangers, and sent the chief of Ugwato with them as
his ambassador to the King of Portugal. As a result the Portuguese set up a permanent
trading post at Ugwato in 1486.
Further contact with Europe came largely from the slave trade. In the Niger delta,
many small communities and their chiefs, though not controlling large areas like Benin
or Ward, obtained their wealth and fame from their position as traders who collected
slaves for resale to Europeans. Such were the chiefs of Brass, the Kalabara, and Bonny.
Calabar owes its foundation to the European trade. Its site was selected by the Efik
branch of the Ibibio people in about the year 1600 for its suitability for controlling the
(slave) trade of the Cross River.
A chief source of the slaves exported through Calabar was Arochukwu. Even before
the building of Calabar, the Portuguese are said to have entered the Cross River, and
to have visited Arochukwu.' As a matter of fact, the articles of trade from Europe were
usually guns and gunpowder, which were exchanged for slaves. These enabled the
7coastal people to make war successfully against the tribes of the interior, who had no
guns, and so to obtain many slaves for sale to the Europeans. In other words, one
could claim that the slave racket had some direct bearing with the souring of
neighbourly relations between the coastal peoples of Nigeria and the peoples of the
hinterland. Instead of peaceful coexistence the coastal peoples assumed a belligerent and
predatory stance against each other. It was definitely in the interest of the racketeers to
maintain this state of affairs. A new, albeit negative, dimension -- greed — was thus
introduced to the moral environment. It was the loss of scruples over human values in
pursuit of lucre. This development was later to act as a boomerang, for the fact that by
the massive shipment of captives who, in view of the purpose for which they were being
bought, generally had to be young, strong and healthy. There removal from their native
land therefore constituted to the latter an inestimable loss of human resources, a
devastating blow on political cohesiveness, and a general fraying of the social and
cultural fabrics that constituted them into a people that could hold their own among
other peoples. One result of this situation is that they were practically powerless to fight
off the inroads of colonialism when it came because they were not united. It was there-
fore easier to contain and subdue them in their little pockets of resistance than it would
have been had they been able to constitute a united and cohesive fighting force to resist
the incursions of foreign colonial powers.
4. Colonial Administration
In the 18th century, Britain was the dominant slave-trading power in West Africa.
By the turn of the 19th century, precisely the period after 1808, it shifted its attention
to abolition, maintaining a large naval squadron off the West African coast. In the
meantime, Britain also sponsored explorations of the interior and approved missionary
activities. West African explorers concentrated on the Niger river. First Mungo Park,
and then Hugh Clapperton, Dixon Denham, and Walter Oudney explored regions
adjacent to the river, and in 1830, Richard and John Lander traced its course through
the delta.
British occupation of Nigeria was triggered by French and German expansionism
which in the 1880's challenged British supremacy in Africa. Direct political control
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eastward from the Niger delta was accomplished by the declaration of the Oil Rivers
Protectorate in 1885. Slowly British influence permeated the Ibibio and Ijaw areas.
Jaja of Opobo was defeated in 1887, Nana of Brass was overthrown in 1895, and Benin
was conquered in 1897. Final occupation of the eastern areas was made possible in 1902
when Sir Ralph Moor, the British governor, sent the Aro Military expedition into
Igboland.
A second phase of British occupation occurred thanks to Sir George Goldie's
commercial company, the Royal African Company, which gained near monopoly of
interior trade, bypassed native traditional traders and established posts along the Niger
river. A royal charter granted to the company in 1886 empowered its representatives to
act as political agents. These agents signed agreements with Igbo, Bini, and Hausa
rulers, giving the company protectorate rights over a vast area. 9 Later, the British
government bought out the company and assumed direct jurisdiction over its territories
on January 1, 1900.
Prior to the period 1906-1912, the British governed what is now Nigeria as two
separate Protectorates -- one in the South and one in the North. These two protec-
torates were administered at completely different levels. The North was mostly Muslim,
and the South practised African traditional religion. While the Muslims resisted any
form of Westernization, those in the South were more susceptible. In the North, the
colonial administrators applied the system of indirect rule whereby they commissioned
the Emirs -- the traditional rulers among the Muslims — to govern the people while
remaining responsible to them. No such system existed in the South, and so indirect
rule was difficult to apply. The British government tried to introduce indirect rule in
the South by appointing the so-called "warrant chiefs". Southerners, particularly the
Igbos were not in the least interested in warrant chiefs and relentlessly opposed the
policy. They despised the warrant chiefs for at least three reasons: most of them were
of low stock; 93
 they saw them as agents of a foreign power out to take away their auto-
nomy; finally, they believed that their presence and operation would be disruptive of the
way of life they had been used to.
At that point in time, Nigeria was technically two separate entities. Then the colonial
administration thought it was a good idea to merge the two entities to form one.
Michael Crowder assesses the situation:
9(It) is one of the most crucial (periods) in the history of Nigeria,
for it marks both the beginning of the rejection of standards and
customs that had endured for centuries. It was the first time that
Nigerians were subjected in any large measure to Western
influences, which in the next fifty years were to have such a great
effect on the Nigerian society.'
The immediate reason for the decision to amalgamate the two Nigerias was
economic expediency. The Northern Protectorate was running at a severe deficit, which
was being met by a subsidy from the Southern protectorate, and an Imperial (British)
grant-in-aid of about 300,000 pounds a year. 12 This disequilibrium has never left
Nigeria and whenever it has been addressed some Nigerians have always felt cheated
while those subsidized have a field day.
The colonial administration remained in office until 1960, when Nigeria attained
independence. By the time of independence, however, the two protectorates had given
birth to three regions: the North, the East, and the West. The Northern Region, even
with its massive land area, remained intact while the South was split in two, to form the
Eastern and Western Regions. Soon a fourth Region, the Mid-West, was carved out of
the Western Region. The various regions had very little in common save the Federation
of Nigeria. The peoples were practically going their separate ways. In 1967 the split
was further carried on when out of the existing four regions twelve states were created.
Nine years later five more were added, and in 1988 the number was brought to twenty-
two, including the new Capital Territory of Abuja.
Some people think the creation of states removed the problem of minority groups,
accelerates development, and increases opportunities. Others point to the polarizing
effect of the splitting-up and the severe erosion of national consciousness in favour of
"state-ism", a new dimension of ethnicity and tribalism. What the forgers of Nigeria
intended in the act of amalgamation has thus been thoroughly reversed and the centre
constantly gives the impression of caving in.
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5. Christianity and Missionaries
Portuguese traders had been doing business in Nigeria and some of them had been
resident in Benin during the 16th and 17th centuries. But when they ceased to reside
in Benin, the priests and missionaries continued to visit from Sao Tome. There is a
record of Spanish missionaries staying at Benin from 1654 to 1655, when they were
driven out by the Portuguese because of the enmity existing between their two nations
at the time.' It must be pointed out, however, that neither the Portuguese nor the
Spanish missionaries made any impression whatever on the Binis at that stage. At
Warn, the only other part of Nigeria which Portuguese Missionaries are known to have
visited, they had very slightly more success. Thus the two successive kings of Warni
were Christian until the second of the two was deposed by a pagan rival."
Between about 1839 and 1845, several hundred former slaves returned from Sierra
Leone to their own people. They had become Christians in Sierra Leone, and at their
request missionaries came over to keep them in touch with their churches. The first
such visitor in 1842 was Thomas Birch Freeman, a half-caste born and brought up in
England, and a Methodist. The first to settle permanently was Henry Townsend who,
having set up a station in Badagry in 1842, visited Abeokuta in 1843 and resided there
from 1846. Other missionaries included Samuel Ajayi Crowther, who was later to be
appointed bishop. He was a native Nigerian but among the freed slaves. There was
also J.C. Taylor, an Igbo freed slave who had been ordained in Sierra Leone.
The Roman Catholics were first represented in Nigeria by one Borghero, an Italian
priest. In 1865, Onitsha was visited by the Holy Ghost Fathers from Fernando Po (now
Equatorial Guinea), but they likewise were handicapped by the unreliable communica-
tions, so that the continuous history of the Roman Catholic Church in Onitsha dates
from the arrival of Father Joseph Lutz, a French Holy Ghost Missionary, in 1885.
Religious and moral teaching was the first concern of the missionaries, but not to
the exclusion of other needs that would improve the lives of the people. Adeniji
Adaralegbe powerfully summarizes their role:
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All the missions agreed with the dictum of Thomas Buxton that
"the missionary, the school-master, the plough and the spade
should go together." Thus the missionaries, as early as 1864,
had started a policy of agricultural education in the schools. The
CMS (Church Missionary Society) had tried, not too successfully,
to establish industrial institutions at Abeokuta and later at Onitsha
and Lokoja to encourage the cultivation and export of cotton.
Similarly, the CMS started brick fields in Ebutte Metta (1866),
and the RCM (Roman Catholic Mission) established a large scale
programme of agriculture at Topo Industrial School, near Badagry,
in 1876 where gari was being made from cassava by means of a
simple machine.'
Among the contributions of missionaries through Christian and other teaching
include bringing an end to such practices as human sacrifice, slavery, and the killing
of twins. They also brought about the conversion of Nigerian languages into the written
form'. The teaching of English opened the way to learning of the modern world.
Finally, a general broadening of the mind was achieved among the Nigerian population.
Not to be ignored, however is the bitter rivalry that developed among the religious
groups, a phenomenon that has never departed from the scene.
6. Missionaries and Beginnings of Western Education
The beginnings of Western education in Nigeria are usually linked with the efforts
of Christian Missionaries. According to Christopher C. Ifemeje, the missionaries of the
Wesleyan Methodist Church were the first to arrive in Nigeria with the intention to
spread Western Education". In 1841, a Yoruba liberated slave called Ferguson returned
to his home in Badagry and began to persuade the chiefs to bring into Badagry
missionaries from Sierra Leone who would bring them European civilization.
On September 24 1842, Thomas B. Freeman, a descendant of a negro slave,
accompanied by two others, Mr and Mrs de Graft, arrived in Badagry and started at
once to establish missions. When the Bntish and the king and people of Lagos signed
the treaty following British conquest of the city in 1852, the Wesleyan School in
Badagry was transferred to Lagos. The number of their schools in Yorubaland
increased. In 1878, Wesleyan Boys High School was built in Lagos. By 1879 the
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Wesleyan Mission had completed the building of a Girls High School in Lagos. In
1905 they had build the Wesleyan Training College in Ibadan.
Educational activities of the Church Missionary Society (CMS) or Church of
England, began in the West by 1843, but spread to the East in 1857 with the arrival
of Ajayi Crowther.
The Missionaries of the Church of Scotland arrived in Calabar in 1846 and soon
their educational influence spread along the Cross River.
The Missionaries of the African Mission of South Baptist Convention began
educational work in Nigeria in 1853. It was not until 1860 that the Catholic
Missionaries entered the scene in 1860 when they started work at Whydahu.
There were several missionary bodies with their political, economic and denomi-
national sympathies, working as hard as they could to establish as many schools as they
thought possible with the resources at their disposal. Severe competition existed
between each missionary body and its neighbours." The early schools were make-shift
and improvisorial in their operation but were geared towards the production of specified
skills as Ifemeje graphically describes:
Most of the schools, because of lack of teachers, used the
monitorial system, a system in which older students were made
to teach younger ones... The mission schools served both rich
and poor. The pupils of the missions were therefore expected,
after their schooling, to become assistants to the missionaries and
government or company officials. Consequently, such subjects as
English, Arithmetic and certain trades such as carpentry were
taught'.
Elizabeth Isichei attributes the success of Western education through the mission
schools to two main factors, namely, the people's thirst for education on the one hand,
and the colonial government's need for educated African personnel on the other21 . There
were, however, certain aspects of missionary education that brought it in conflict with
traditional systems, values and practices. E.U. Akusoba focuses on some of them:
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With the advent of Christianity and formal education in Africa,
some of the roles of (traditional trainers, leaders and educators),
were challenged. Firstly, the Christian religion challenged the
monopoly of these leaders to knowledge and set out to train their
own leaders and teachers. After some years of training, these were
pushed back to the community to teach the reading of the Bible to
the Youth and the community at large. After their training, these
men came back to their communities and soon showed knowledge
and skills which the community youth trainers and leaders had
not. They could talk and discuss with the Whiteman, they could
read, and sometimes write."
The Church leaders questioned and ridiculed the existence, the very nature and role
of the initiation centres. In some places the centres were proscribed as pagan and anti-
social. And instead of the native way of life and style of worship, the Bible (and,
where applicable, the Koran), became and were gradually accepted as the only means
to the good life and to morality. The resulting denigration of traditional values and
customs, and the loss of moral authority by those who traditionally wielded it in the
community, has remained a source of resentment in many quarters, and created a crisis
of values, of conscience, of loyalties, and even of identity for a great many Nigerians.
The question of methods and goals of missionary school education has also been a
point of criticism. The Catholic Missionaries are often criticized for "making educa-
tion their sole means of proselytization"", a charge which has been repeated in many
different quarters of Nigeria in such other words as indoctrination, imperialism, neo-
colonialism.
Another characteristic of the new system was the appointment of people from outside
the community to train the youth, and without any consultation with the people. At first
this generated a revolution and conflict of ideas in which the initiation leaders gradually
surrendered to the more forceful religious groups. This marked, in Akusoba's words,
"the quenching of the fire of cultural transmission by those who were perhaps better
qualified to teach them."' The result was that the early teachers, apart from being
religious leaders, soon became the link between the colonial government and the local
people as scribes, tax-collectors, dispensers of justice; in short they soon became
masters of everything else.
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7. Contact With Islam
According to Basil Davidson, records of Africa South of the Sahara could be traced
to Walib Ibn Munnabeh who wrote in 738. 25 Peter Clarke and I. Linden, however,
trace the presence of Muslims in Bomo to the second half of the 11th century?' Our
knowledge of the ancient kingdoms of Kush, Kumbi, Saleh, Timbuctu, Bomu, Mali,
Songhay, Sokoto, etc, was derived largely from Arab travellers and historians. From
Walib ibn Munnabeh in 738 to Leo Africanus in 1526, at least a score of notable Arab
and Berber histonans and geographers wrote of these Negro states; and to this must be
added the writings of Western Sudan itself.
Islam reached the savannah region of West Africa in the 8th century AD, the date
from which written history of West Africa begins. As Islam spread in the savanna of
West Africa commercial links with North Africa developed. Trade and commerce also
paved the way for the introduction of material culture, and made possible intellectual
development and the introduction of literacy. According to Babs Fafunwa, at about
1257, a college and hostel were established in Cairo for the scholars of the Kanem-
Bomu region who came there in search of lmowledge.22
Islam was brought to Hausaland in the early 14th century by traders and scholars.
About forty Wangarawa traders are thought to be responsible for introducing Islam to
Kano during the reign of 'Ali Yayji (1349-1385). A mosque was built, and Imams
Muezzin and Qadi were appointed. During the reign of Yaqub (1452-1463) some Fulani
scholars migrated to Kano, bringing with them books on Islamic theology and jurispru-
dence. During the reign of Mohammed Rumfa (1463-1499), Islam became firmly rooted
and Islamic principles were taught in different places. It was during this period that
Muslims from Timbuctu came to Kano to teach and preach Islam.
Islam spread steadily and by the middle and later 17th century, Katsina which had
also become a centre of Islam had produced its own native scholars like Muhammadu
Dan Masina (d.1667) and Muhammadu Dan Marina (d.1655). Learning developed
among these ulaina or learned men through contacts with centres of learning like
Timbuctu. A group of these mallams or teachers, most of whom seem to be interre-
lated, formed an intellectual community, and among them the state of learning was
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much higher. Thus at the time of the colonial administration or established Christian
missionary activity, and at least four centuries before the amalgamation that gave birth
to Nigeria as known today, Islam was already flourishing in Northern Nigeria. The
North was thus unquestionably culturally more advanced than their southern counter-
parts. J.S. Trimingham notes:
Through the system of intellectual and material culture, Islam
opens new horizons... the Religion of the Book, and from this
stems the superiority Muslims display when confronted with
pagans.'
By 1900, when Frederick Lugard with the British forces moved into the Muslim
heartland of the North, he did not meet a homogeneous Muslim community. There
were substantial pockets of non-muslim communities. For this reason large non-
Muslim populations were interspersed with Muslims in emirates where emirate authority
was weak. The term "Maguzawa" was used by Muslims for these communities who
were permitted to live in peace alongside Muslims."
In its areas of influence Islam orchestrated and preached Islamic world-view with
specific injunctions on marriage, the role of women, the nature and seriousness of
certain sins, the Hajj or Pilgrimage, the Sharia or Islamic Law.
Of the three major religious groups in Nigeria m -- Christianity, Islam, and
Traditional Religion -- Christianity seems, by the last decade of the 20th century, to
have been decisively gaining the upper hand. As a result there has occurred a situation
where the influence of traditional religion seems to wane, and Islam's area of influence
in Nigeria seems to continually shrink. The aggressive proselytising methods
adopted by Christian missionaries rapidly depleted the numbers of adherents to
Traditional Religion, and the gods of the tribal religions seemed, in the words of E.I.
Metuh, "in retreat". 32 The retreat has been so sweeping that the membership has
dwindled from 100% in pre-colonial, pre-Christian, and pre-Islamic incursions to a
mere 5.6% of the total population. [See Table 1 below].
A breakdown of the figures showed that the Catholics made more converts than the
protestants. As David Abernethy shows, by 1921 RCM schools accounted for over 16%
of school enrollment in the West and over 33% enrollment in the East; 29% of Nigerian
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Protestants were Igbos, 30% Yorubas, while 66% of Catholics were Igbos and 10% of
Catholics were Yorubas."
Christianity fared better than Islam with respect to winning over new adherents.
Part of the reason was that while the colonial protection of Islam in the Northern part
of Nigeria made it strong and assertive there, it also had the negative effect of insulating
people from the Islamic parts of the North against the influence of western-style
education which their Christian counterparts, eagerly embraced. The majority of
Northern Nigerians outside the Islamic areas embraced Christianity and benefited from
Western education. In Yorubaland, a lot of Muslim children had to convert to
Christianity in order to benefit from the western education made available in the
Christian Missionary schools. This situation has not been a source of amusement for
the Muslims who, at the present moment, are making every effort to stem the tide of
Christianity. The following graphic representation will illustrate the rapid growth of
Christianity in Nigeria in the 20th century:34
Table 1:
Year Afr Religion Islam Christianity
1900 73.0% 25.9% 1.1%
Mid-1970 10.8% 44.0% 44.9%
Mid-1975 8.0% 44.5% 47.2%
Mid-1980 5.6% 45.0% 49.0%
AD 2000 3.0% 45.4% 51.2%
Source: World Christian Encyclopaedia (1980), p.257.
8. Rivalry: Pluralism's Occupational Hazard
Northern Nigeria was not merely a region, it was a vast country in its own right.
Over twice the size of the United Kingdom, it had a population larger than any other
country in the whole of Africa with the exception of Egypt. 35 The majority of the people
were Muslims, but there were little pockets of non-Muslims — probably remnants of the
original owners of Nigeria. (The dominance of Islam in Northern Nigeria persists till
the present time, but what the adherents to Christianity and Traditional Religion lack in
numbers, they make up in enthusiasm and commitment).
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In four of the provinces of the Northern Region -- Sokoto, Katsina, Kano and Zaria -
- live the Hausas. Their stubborn will to resist was strong enough to turn aside, or
retreat from and yet return, the invasion of powerful armies. But no matter who
conquered them, or brushed them aside, the Hausas remained.
The Hausas had as their neighbours the Fulanis. The latter had many admirable
qualities, but perhaps because of their religion they had a shocking attitude towards
suffering in others. As Williams puts it, "theirs was the slave trail to Tripoli, a trail
paved with human bones"!6 Very little is known about the Fulani, in common with
so many of Nigeria's peoples. Long before they appeared in the role of conquerors,
they had begun to infiltrate peacefully as migrants. For a long time they intermingled
with, and intermarried with the Hausas among whom, by reason of their keen intelli-
gence, they usually managed to obtain high office.
In the Eastern Region were the Igbos. Williams describes them as "tough, hard-
working, slightly dour, and great individualists." Unlike among the Hausa-Fulanis with
the Emirs and Sultans, unlike the Yorubas with their Alafins, Obas, Oonis, the Igbos
were, and still remain, thoroughgoing republicans. They had no chiefs except perhaps
at Onitsha. They were devoted to the family ideal, and lived in a network of villages
and walled compounds.
The Igbos were by far the largest tribe living in the Eastern Region. Aba, Owerri,
Onitsha, Oldgwe, constituted the Igbo heartland. They numbered (1962) about 8 million
(now 18 million)' in 30,000 square miles as against the 6 million (now 21.3 million)
Yoruba' in 30,000 square miles of the Western Region."
In the Western Provinces the Yorubas occupied a position of even greater
predominance. In the Provinces of Abeokuta, Oyo and Ijebu there were no non Yoruba
groups of any size. In Ondo Yorubas represented 89% of the population, in Lagos they
represented 83%. Beyond the regional boundary they were the dominant group in the
population of forin Province (76%), and constituted an important minority group in
ICabba (13%). There were, in addition, important Yoruba groups beyond the Nigerian
frontier in Dahomey (now Benin Republic).
'It is striking that the population of the Yoruba seems almost to quadruple in just
over two and a half decades, while that of the Igbo barely doubled within the same
period of time. See note 26 for some explanation.
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The Yorubas were a clever, humorous, volatile people who were by nature more
addicted to town-dwelling than the majority of Africans. They still held to the chieftain
principle, and were contemptuous of the slowness of their "neighbours over the water",
ie the Igbos across the River Niger. Another factor in this feeling of superiority felt by
the Yorubas over the Igbos was the curious fact that townsfolk inevitably regarded
villagers as rustics.
The predominance of the three major ethnic groups is almost absolute as the figures
reveal. According to a 1988 estimate the figures (in millions) based on an estimated
population of 100 million are as follows:m
Table 2:
Hausa 21.3 Yoruba 21.3 Igbo 18.0
Fulani 11.2 Ibibio 5.6 ICanuri 4.2
Edo 3.4 Tiv 2.2 Ijaw 1.8
Bum 1.7 Nupe 1.2 Others 8.1
Total: 100 Millions.
Source: Encyclopaedia Britannlca Book of the Year 1989 p.671.
It is quite interesting to try to compare the figures above with the 1931 figures
shown in K.M. Buchanan & J.C. Pagh in Table 3 below. The total of 19.896 millions
of 1931 represent approximately 20% of Nigeria's present population of an estimated
100 millions a quintupling of the population in about 60 years. Displaced as a result of
the discrepancies with the population figures are the Igbo by the Yoruba; the Kanuri by
the Ibibio; and the Tiv by the Edo.
Table 3:
Hausa 3.630 Igbo 3.185 Yoruba 3.166
Fulani 2.027 ICanuri 0.931 Ibibio 0.750
Tiv 0.577 Edo 0.508 Others 5.122
Total: 19.896 Millions
Source: K.M. Buchanan & J.C. Pagh, Nigeria and Its Peoples, p.84.
There is considerable truth in the remark of the old Fulani Emir who said that "God
did not make Nigeria; the British did."" It is not by any means a united country. By
long tradition, and a long record of struggles in the past, the Western Region detested
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and despised the East, feelings most heartily reciprocated by the latter. But what the
West and East — Yorubas and Igbos — felt for each other was nothing compared to the
loathing both felt for the Northerners, the Fulanis and the Hausas. For their part, the
Northerners regarded the people of the South as inferiors, slaves in the past, and if
many of them had their way, slaves in the future. These sour feelings were kept muted,
but would soon erupt in the violence of unprecedented proportions in the mid- and until
the end of the decade of the 1960s.
9. Nigeria in Crisis
Nigeria attained political independence on October 1, 1960 and Nigerian politicians
took over the reins of power. Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe became Governor General and later
President. By 1963 Nigeria became a Federal Republic and opted for a Westminster-
style Parliamentary Government. The moments of exultation were short-lived as wide-
spread corruption in the high places led to all kinds of excesses. Politicians played up
ethnic feelings that soon corroded the entire fabrics of national life by increasing inter-
and intra-ethnic rivalries. Soon the marriage of convenience created by the amalgama-
tion of 1914 was beginning to rock dangerously. Things began to happen in breath-
taking succession: First there was the split along regional lines of the ruling coalition
NCNC-NPC following disagreements over census figures; in the West there were violent
riots which culminated in conviction and a ten-year sentence for treason of some
prominent leaders of the Western Region and the Midwest for planning a violent over-
throw of elected government. Everything came to a head on January 15, 1966, when
a group of junior military officers violently overthrew the government and seized power.
Many politicians were killed in the process. Elizabeth Isichei summarizes the situation
as follows:
By the end of 1965, the malaise of Nigerian political life was
universally recognized. In the West, all political authorities to be
breaking down. The discontent and disillusion with the use the
politicians had made of their autonomy were universal. This was
the background to the coup of 15 January 1966.4°
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The plotters were more concerned to overthrow the corrupt government than to
rebuild in its stead. There were assassinations in Kaduna, lbadan, and Lagos. There
was no coup in Benin, and the coup in Enugu was abortive. The casualties were
concentrated in the North and West. There were none in the East and Mid-West, and
this led to suspicions, sparked up by the British Broadcasting Corporation, that the
Easterners, mostly the Igbos, had after all planned it in order to take over complete
control of the country. This suggestion quickly caught on for the fact that most of the
plotters turned out to be Igbo-speaking, while the victims turned out not to include even
a single Igbo politician. That was indeed to provide the long-sought excuse to perpetrate
violence against the Igbos throughout the North and West: Ethnicity was about to
assume its worst character.
Contrary to speculations, the coup was not designed as a way to take control of
Nigeria, but to purge Nigeria as a whole of corruption. In a radio broadcast sequel to
the seizure of power, the leader of the coup, Major Chulcwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu stated
reason for the coup:
Our enemies are the political profiteers, swindlers, the men in
high and low places that seek bribes and demand ten per cents.,41
those that seek to keep the country permanently divided so that
they can remain in office as ministers and VIPs of waste, the
tribalists, the nepotists...42
The coup received country-wide welcome and Nigerians manifestly sympathetic with
the reasons given by the mutineers for their action. When Nzeogwu fell in battle, his
body taken to Kaduna where he was buried with full military honours. Before long,
however, things began to take a new turn as the fact that no Igbo politician was killed
in the coup began to be construed as a conspiracy to get rid of other politicians and
establish Igbo domination. This view of things has not completely left the people of the
North, and contributed in no small measure to the way in which the Hausa-Fulani held
and continue to hold the Igbos. It was also an important factor in the bitterness with
which the Nigeria-Biafra war was fought.
Mutual confidence never returned to Nigeria after that. More coups were planned,
and more people killed. Analysts believe that the planners of the bloody counter coup
had a secessionist intent for the North, but they were apparently dissuaded by
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Northerners working in Lagos. Wole Soyinlca describes the secret motives behind the
counter coup:
The Northern Mafia got together with the Lagos counterparts and
contributed the necessary investment for self-preservation. Cold-
bloodedly the pogrom was planned, every stage plotted and the
money for operations distributed to the various centres of may-
hem. The Ibos, twice victims, were again the most obvious, the
most logical victims of this new profit-motivated massacre. But so
that the lesson would be complete, so that no danger remained of
a return to the old inter-regional interference in the affairs of this
base for all reactionary conspiracies, the "trouble-making" south-
erners, no matter from what region, were included in the mas-
sive sweep.'
According to Walter Schwarz, the idea behind the pogrom was to drive the
Easterners out of the North — perhaps out of Nigeria. Both goals were achieved. It
was the ex-politicians, civil servants, local government officials, and former party
stalwarts that stage-managed the pogroms. The army, of course joined them.
The carnage was so incredible and the events that unfolded were not surprising.
Prior to September 29 when the greatest numbers were massacred, no one talked of
secession, but after that date, no one talked of anything else. Negotiations failed to
resolve the problem, and agreements for a loose form of federation arrived at Aburi in
Ghana were unilaterally reneged by Gowon who declared a twelve-state structure for
Nigeria, apparently to weaken the influence of the Igbos in the East. The East declared
secession on May 30, three days after Gowon's creation of twelve states.
In the bid to end the secession, Gowon declared a police action, later upgraded to
a full-scale war against the East (now Biafra). For three gruesome years the cruel war
raged on. Biafrans were convinced in the justice of their cause but lacked the backing
of any foreign power. Nigeria pressed on fully backed by Britain, the Soviet Union,
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria. Biafra managed to receive diplomatic recognition from
Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Haiti.
Biafra gave up the struggle in 1970 and Gowon declared: No victor, no van-
quished! It was a true manifestation of magnanimity in victory. Isichei was highly
impressed both by the Igbos and the Nigerians:
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But in the event, just as the Igbos had won the admiration of
Nigeria, and the world, by their gallantry in war, so Nigeria won
the admiration of the Igbos, and the world, by her magnanimity
in victory."
John St de Joffe is no less impressed by this amazing
switch-over from hostility to amity:
When one considers the brutality, the proscription, the carefully
maintained, immensely durable hatred that so often followed wars,
in the "civilized" West, it may be that when history takes a longer
view of Nigeria's war it will be shown that while the black man
has little to teach us about making war, he has a real contribution
to offer in making peace.'
Scars of the war, what went before and what followed after, will probably take
generations to heal. People still remember in graphic detail the losses they bear, the
heavy penalties they pay, the stigma of defeat, the remoteness of help, the envies, the
rivalries, the rhetoric, all take their toll. Nigeria still has a problem trying to find a
way out of the situation.
10. Nigeria's Present Predicament
Nigeria was an agglomeration of about 250 ethnic, tribal and linguistic groups.
These groups suddenly found themselves banded together as a nation where "what is
sauce for the goose was made to be sauce for the gander." This has meant considerable
crisis of spirit among the groups. Soon dominant groups emerged and quickly over-
shadowed the rest and by sheer tyranny of the majority forced them to play the second
fiddle in practically all national affairs. Then came Christianity (and Islam too!) with a
brand new code of morality, which was supposed to supersede all others, and which was
supposed to be valid in all circumstances for all peoples.
What ensued was a period of polarization among the tenets of Christianity cum
Islam, the relentless intrusion of Western values, the ascendancy of the dominant ethnic
groups, and morality as understood and practised by each people. The polarization is
still far from resolved.
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When Christianity established itself, it quickly carried the up-coming generation
with it, thereby digging into the future. Unfortunately, it was not free from bitter
rivalries between Catholics and Protestants -- conflicts which were transferred to their
new adherents. In the recent years, this religious conflict has moved bases from Catholic
versus Protestant to Christian versus Muslim. The issue is whether or not to have a
Federal Sharia Court of Appeal in Nigeria, effectively giving the Nigerian secular
judicial system an Islamic tinge.
An explosive controversy started when the 1979 Constitution was in the drafting
stage, it was recommended by the Sub-Committee on the Judicial System that there be
"a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal which shall be an intermediate Court of Appeal
between the State's Sharia Courts of Appeal and The Supreme Court of Nigeria!'" The
ensuing debate on the necessity of a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal was rancorous and
tension-packed. While Christians thought it was a ploy for a systematic Islamization of
the country, Muslims insisted that the existing constitutional provisions have been
mightily influenced by Chriitian values. Later on Christians would point to the huge
government subsidies for Muslims making their annual Haii to Mecca to the tune of
$130.80 million in 1981." Meanwhile the Christians who also made pilgrimages to
Rome and Jerusalem received no such subsidies and wondered why one religion was
being sponsored contrary to the provisions of the Constitutions.
To further complicate matters, Nigeria was in January 1987 committed to the full
membership of the OIC. As a full member, as against an observer status which Nigeria
has had since the founding of the Conference in May 1971, Nigeria had to be fully
committed to the objectives of the Conference. The Objectives include the promotion of
Islam by all member states, and justice and love to member States. In due course more
details have been emerging, which were kept secret because of their obviously explosive
tone. The stated objectives of the OIC as contained in a recent document include:
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1. To ensure the appointment of only Muslims into strategic national and
international posts of member nations.
2. To eradicate in all its forms and ramifications all non-Muslim religions in
member nations (such religions shall include Christianity, Ahmadiyya and other
tribal modes of worship unacceptable to Muslims).
3. To ensure that only Muslims are elected to all political posts of member
nations.
4. To ensure the declaration of Nigeria (the 24th African and 46th World
member of the OIC) a federal Islamic sultanate at a convenient date any time
from 28th March, 1990, with the Sultan of Sokoto enthroned the Sultan and
Supreme Sovereign of Nigeria.
5. To ensure the ultimate replacement of all western forms of legal and judicial
systems with the Sharia in all member nations before the next Islamic Con-
ference.'
In March 1987 at the College of Education in ICafanchan, a female Muslim student
physically attacked a young male student recently converted from Islam to Christianity
during a Christian Fellowship Rally. The ensuing violence snowballed to engulf the
whole city and twenty five people lost their lives. But for the timely intervention of the
police, the casualties would have been a lot higher. A total of 40 Christian churches, 3
mosques, 30 hotels, and 46 private homes were burnt down in what President Babangida
described as "a civilian equivalent of an attempted coup d'etat organized against the
Federal Military Government and the Nigerian nation. "3
Nigeria has experienced twenty-nine years of political independence under eight
successive governments. Only eight out of twenty-nine years and two out of eight
governments have been under democratically constituted leadership. The rest have been
under successive military dictatorships who came to power by force. Since the military
governments were not elected, one great problem has been to be able to hold them
responsible for how they govern. A central source of concern for most Nigerians is why
the military are quick to seize power, promote themselves to the highest ranks, reap all
benefits and then quit. Some people are even beginning to consider it a possibility to
have the armed forces as a political party with guaranteed cabinet posts in some future
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arrangement called diarehy, a Greek concept which roughly means "two- [power]-
sources" here proposed for Nigeria by its former President, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe.
There is also an overall disenchantment over the ability or disposition of the armed
forces to govern the country effectively. Is it not high time that they stepped down and
concentrate on the business of defence for which they were established.
Nigeria is also faced with the problem of Islamic Fundamentalism seeking to take
over the whole country, carrying out killings and arson against non-Muslims, secretly
registering Nigeria as an Islamic State. A self-styled spokesman for Muslims, Abubakar
Gumi stated bluntly his goal of islamization, failing which the country should split up:
If we want Nigeria to be a great country, to join hands, we have
to follow one faith... I don't think we can accept a Christian to
be our leader unless we are forced... Nigerian unity, if I am to
do my best, is to try to convert Christians and non-Muslims as
much as possible — until the other religions become minority and
will not affect our society. Question: What if Christians do not
accept Muslims as their leader? Answer: Then, we have to divide
the count,- y.si
Nigeria fought the civil war in the midst of unprecedented economic prosperity from
petroleum. This prosperity continued for nearly one more decade after the war. Today
it has all been wasted. The Armed Forces must take the blame since they governed the
country for all but four of the fifteen or so years of bounty.
After the war, Nigeria missed a golden opportunity to become a great industrial
nation. Gowon's declaration of general amnesty was robbed of its fruit by the fact that
it was not followed up by positive effort to reinstate Biafrans in the mainstream of
Nigerian life. Instead, a variety of devastatingly punitive measures were taken against
those on the Biafran side of the war: The families of war casualties were simply
ignored, the bank accounts in Nigerian banks were frozen and all former high-ranking
military officers were dismissed. Those on the Biafran side were therefore effectively
excluded from the mainstream of national life. They were, at the same time indirectly
forced both to begin life from the scratch and to shoulder the immense burden of post-
war reconstruction of their homes and businesses all on their own. Nigeria therefore
lost the opportunity to make them feel welcome and at home in post-war Nigeria 52. They
remained alienated from the mainstream of Nigerian social, cultural and political life for
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a period rather too long for comfort. As a result of this alienation the now legendary
Biafran technology that served them so impressively during the war was lost to Nigeria
for good as the scientists behind it all quietly went their separate ways.
The situation was exacerbated by the thorny issue of "Abandoned Property"
whereby the houses and establishments belonging to Biafrans — there were a whole lot
of them all over the country -- were by decree sold off at token prices to pre-arranged
buyers, while it was decreed an offence punishable by ten years imprisonment without
option of fine for any previous owner to seek to reacquire it". That strained confidence
even further.
Soon after the war, some state governments decreed to take over all schools without
consultation with the proprietors, and without offering compensation whatever. Given
the fact a good number the schools belonged to the Catholic Church, one is scarcely in
any doubt as to the vindictively punitive undercurrent behind the decree and its intended
results. This measure sadly shut up without warning one of the most time-honoured and
uplifting instruments placed at the service of the emerging Nigerian society. Soon, due
to bad management the schools were turned to shambles as neither students nor teachers
had any incentive or any challenges that would impel them to perform at their best.
About 1973 Religious Instruction was removed from the school curriculum. By
1976, after such a protracted period without religious instructions the negative results
were so evident that people associated the negative traits manifested in students with
the absence of religious instruction and began to call for its restoration to the school
programme. It was already getting too late as many critics of the Church had taken the
time to think things over and decide that religious instruction as practised by the Church
was unacceptable to them. They proposed moral instruction instead, but none of the
policy-makers seemed to have any clear idea as to the scope of such a programme, or
its content, or the methods to be adopted in giving these instruction, or the specific
fruits that these instructions were expected to yield. There followed a period of lull as
people toyed around with all kinds of experimentation.s`
In the face of all these facts Nigeria has a great task to restore the waning
confidence of its citizens in the system and in one another, to redirect her citizens to the
cherished moral values, and while recognizing the importance of religion, to seek ways
religion could contribute to harmony in society rather than create division.
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The challenge now is to determine what kind of morality is to prevail; whether it
must necessarily be connected with religion. In the event of a necessary connection,
which religion is to prevail — Christianity, Islam, or Traditional Religion? It is a
question without a ready answer. While the question lingers, children are being born
and bred in what might be described as a state of confusion. This challenge will not
be met merely by finding alternative channels for moral formation; there is the corollary
of seeking to establish a healthy moral environment free from destructive contention and
controversy. In addition there must be a rational, realistic reappraisal of the contents
of Christian, Islamic and Traditional values in order to establish or restore good rapport
between them. There are, for instance, some common areas of human and social
concern like 00integrity, human rights, family, marriage and sexuality, human rela-
tions, justice and peace, life, and human work. Many renowned philosophers, social
theorists, critics and commentators have provided a rich variety of proposals and theor-
ies that will enable any searcher find his or her feet.
Happily, Nigeria it is not going to be a question of "starting from the scratch".
Nigeria already has a fairly functional school system that only needs revamping. The
latest available figures55
 show that as of 1984 the Nigerian educational system had to
its credit the following:
Table 4:
[Types of] Schools [No. of] [No. of] [No. of] •St-TchrRatio
Schools Teachers Students 40.0
Primary (Age 6-12) 38,211 359,701 4,383,487 38.3
Secondary (Age 12-17) 5,498 82,749 3,169,624 24.9
Vocational, Teacher 475 15,738 391,588
Higher [Education] 80 101,558
Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica Book of the Year 1989, p.671.
* St-Tchr Ratio = Student-Teacher Ratio.
The chapters ahead will explore from various angles the question of how moral
education can be carried out so as to be capable of bringing about an ethical en-
vironment in Nigeria. Account will be taken of some of the more important factors -
- historical, political, socio-cultural religious, ideological, psychological — in Nigeria's
national life that could bring about the desired harmony in Nigerian society.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE CONCEPT OF
MORALITY AND MORAL EDUCATION
For within her (Wisdom) is a spirit intelligent, holy, unique, manifold, subtle, mobile,
incisive, unsullied, lucid, invulnerable, benevolent, shrewd, irresistible, beneficent,
friendly to human beings, steadfast, dependable, unperturbed, almighty, all-surveying,
penetrating, all intelligent, pure and most subtle spirits. For Wisdom Ls quicker to move
than any motion; she is so pure, she pervades and permeates all things.
— WISDOM 7:22-24.
It would seem, then, that there is no point in the process of moral education where the
train of the argument enters a line which is not also a religious line. And moral
education, the process of preparation for moral autonomy, is never far away from being
at the same time religious education. The reverse is not necessarily true. Religious
education will presumably contain some experience of the numinous, man's sense of awe
before the mystery of life, which may or may not have moral content.
— HAROLD LOURES.
Before proceeding on any extended discussion of the subject of moral education, it
is needful to briefly highlight, and try to explain, the basic recurrent concepts so as to
aid the focus of the discussion. By indicating their intended meaning the possibility of
muddled understanding or expression would be hopefully minimized in the overall
unfolding of the argument.
Among the key concepts are included "ethics", "moral", "morality", "education",
and their combination in "moral education". The next step will be to apply the meanings
linking the concepts to the task of effective moral education as situated in Nigeria.
1. Morality and Ethics
The term morality is closely linked with the term ethics such that it is quite difficult
to try to distinguish between them. The need to distinguish between them rarely arises,
however, and when it does, it is often merely for the purpose of subtle academic or
other discussion. In ordinary daily language both concepts are used interchangeably
without distortion or loss of meaning. The term ethics is derived from the Greek root,
the verbal form of which is elotha, the corresponding noun, to ethos. It meant
originally "dwelling" or "stall". To this word, to ethos, the Latin translation mos,
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moris was given; and from the Latin mos, the word "morality" was derived.' Ethics
in its root meaning therefore has to do with the stability and security which are neces-
sary if one is going to act at all. According to Paul Lehmann, the word was first applied
to animals and not to humans, and the germinal idea in the word to ethos is the stability
and security provided by a stall or dwelling for animals.' The verb root elotha means
"to be accustomed to" or "to be wont to". Hence the relationship between stability and
custom was a kind of elemental datum of experience. It was really the primary office
of custom to do in the human area what the stall did for animals: 3 i.e., provide secu-
rity and stability.
As reflection upon the stability and security fundamental to human behaviour
continued, a certain distinction came to be made between "ethics" and "morality".
Diogenes Laertius for example, speaks of ethics as that part of philosophy which has
to do with all that concerns us. 4 Ethics according to Diogenes, is concerned with the
foundations of human behaviour, while morality is concerned with actual practice or
behaviour based on these foundations. Indeed the paramount importance of ethics was
evident from the example of the precepts of the philosophers as well as from the
customs of living practised by such schools as the Cynics, Pythagoreans and Stoics.
And so the word "morality" came gradually to be reserved for behaviour according to
reason, that is, reflection upon the foundations and principles of behaviour.
The German language distinguishes between Sitte or custom, and Ethik, which is
the reflective consideration of the foundations and guidance of behaviour (Tugundlehre).
Ethics is concerned with that which holds human society together. Theophilus Okere
explored to great advantage this relationship between custom and morality. Applying the
etymology of mos moris he focused on the whole idea of mores. He drew attention to
the fact that the mores of a society are the customs and conventions embodying the
fundamental values of that society. To reflect this vividly in his discussion he came up
with the onomatopoeic Igbo neologism bmere-Ida — literally, the "maker-of-society";
that which gives society its raison d'être!
There seems to lurk within every human being an irresistible but natural proclivity
to judge, or assess, or take a stand about anything. This tendency is itself traceable to
a natural tendency of the judgment to go for truth, correctness, balance and harmony,
at least as subjectively perceived by the individual. I once had the occasion to touch on
these natural tendencies in the human make-up when I wrote:
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Everyone wants everyone else to behave, to co-operate, to sit up.
Everyone wants order and shows concern over instances of disor-
der. Everyone talks of decency, probity, accountability, honesty,
equity, discipline. Everyone sits in judgment over everyone else,
and over every situation — adept at diagnosing and denouncing
ills...6
Aquinas calls this inner "sense" syukresis or the habit of operative reason.
According to Aquinas, such a knowledge does not come about by discursive investi-
gation but rather is presented all at once to the intellect. Just as reasoning in the
speculative area goes deductively from certain self-evident principles (for which the
habit is called understanding), so also must practical reasoning make its deductions
from self-evident principles. For example, the axiom that good must be done and evil
avoided is arrived at through synderesis.7
The propensity to judge, whether it is well used, or misused, or underused, is a
fundamental factor in any meaningful moral discourse, and consequently in any process
of moral education. Moral education's task can be said to consist in trying to establish
within the human agent a sense of proportion and balance between all the natural
tendencies and right reason, with the latter governing, co-ordinating and moderating the
operations of the former. In every area of human action wherever reason is the guide,
there is order, restraint, co-operation, understanding, prudence and the like. And where
emotions and feelings reign, the chances of acrimony, bigotry, coarseness, glibness of
speech and rashness of action are increased.
2. The Concept of Education
Education can roughly be described as the process whereby the best in the student
is correlated with the best in the educator. The term "education" evokes the idea of a
duke (English), duc (French), dux (Latin); and implies both a status and an activity of
leading. (Such cognates conducting, induction and the like underscore further the aspect
of "leading" in the nature of education). The blind are led so that they may not stumble;
and the toddler is taken by the hand and led along until he is able to establish his own
poise. The idea of "leading on" would match an etymology that links education with
educare, meaning to lead away from.
Many conceptions of education have followed that track by focusing on the educator
as the light and guide. Education so conceived consists in a process of instructions
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whereby knowledge is transferred or transmitted from the educator to the educand. This
conception is not without its setbacks for, as Canon F.C. Carpenter points out,' no two
people agree entirely about the nature of education. Attempts to analyze the subject on
the basis of educare which focuses on the educator can be more confusing than helpful.
Education, he argues, is one of the "consent" words, since no one can be educated in
any true sense against his or her consent. Therefore it sometimes seems better that the
concept be left unscrutinized, except in so far as we try to make a list of the things
which shelter under its umbrella.
It is possible, on the other hand, that the educand can be the point of focus. In this
case the meaning of education can be linked with another Latin word, educere, to draw
out of -- as water is drawn out of a well. Education in this case assumes the meaning
of "upbringing", "rearing", "nurturing", "fostering" -- "helping the student to bring
forth that which he is already pregnant with." Socrates's reference to himself as a
midwife powerfully underscores the element of "drawing out" that is part of the task of
education.
Both meanings are not exclusive of each other. They can and do occur together in
every situation of education. When applied to the field of moral education the com-
bined meaning is an inculcation of the principles for distinguishing between the right
and the wrong, the good and the bad, with respect to human conduct. It also means a
nurturing of the disposition to prefer the right to the wrong, the good to the bad, as
the norm of action. It is therefore concerned with those principles which, when adhered
to in the prosecution of action, have the overall goal of producing good, well-ordered
individuals. Since society is made up of individuals within it, a well-ordered society will
result when each individual member can be credited with possessing a well-formed
character. In a word, moral education is all about seeking to establish a conducive
climate whereby human conduct is conformed to the rational nature of man considered
in itself and in relation to other realities whether superhuman, human or subhuman. In
so far as human conduct conforms to that nature, it is morally right or good, and in so
far as human conduct deviates from that nature, it is morally wrong or evil.
It is moral principles that constitute the standards for determining and judging human
action. These principles are judgments which, when accepted by the agent become the
standards for directing his or her action and behaviour. They are rules or laws
governing proper relationships in a given field. The application of these principles
constantly and habitually give constancy to human conduct. As William Kelly points
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out, moral principles are ethical standards based upon the moral law and, (as the case
may be), supernatural revelation, which become the sources for motivation and directing
man's conduct.' The acquisition and consistent application of moral principles to life's
situations are outcomes of the learning process.
The whole process of education, like many a habitual human enterprise, is fraught
with assumptions some of which are not subjected to critical scrutiny. James Gaffney
observes that in all civilizations people tend to be under the assumption that moral
judgment, like other kinds of judgment, is a function of age and experience." Kinds of
moral thinking which we consider normal and acceptable in young children, for
example, we tend to regard as disgraceful and intolerable in grown-ups. We take for
granted, in other words, that there are moral aspects to growing up. We do not suppose
that ethical maturity is automatically and inevitably achieved, for it is all too clear that
arrested development and delayed development are possible in moral mentalities as in
other dimensions of mental life. In other words, time and experience are considered
necessary conditions, but not sufficient ones, for the emergence in adulthood of morally
mature thinking.'
3. Morality and Education
From the analysis of the nature of morality Okere gives two meta-ethical defini-
tions of morality: A. the theory of what is right or wrong in human conduct; and, B.
the body or system of what is regarded as right or wrong in human action, "and espe-
cially what is wrong"." The source of this category of right and wrong, he suggests,
is possibly due to the nature of man as a moral being, in keeping with his dignity. It is
curious to note Okere's emphasis on "what is wrong" as constituting an important part
of morality's concern as though it were possible to isolate what-is-wrong from what-
is-right. This emphasis creates an artificial dichotomy such as could lead to conflicting
theories and therefore to confusion. Besides this dichotomy, Okere's attempt could have
gone somewhat deeper and more precise in providing the foundation for a single-, rather
than a double-pronged ethical theory.
Furthermore, when one considers the two proposals in the light of the famous
chicken-and-egg dilemma of which one came first, they will be seen to be no more
than versions of each other. Thus, for example, is it theories that reflect what is right
or wrong or is it what is right or wrong that reflects theories? Or further still, could
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there be any kind of separation, even if only mental, between right and wrong conduct
on the one hand, and theories about them on the other?
Clearly, Okere seems to give priority to theory over action in A., and to action
over theory in B., and the two could be said to cancel each other out. A single-pronged
approach like that of Kant and most other moral theorists would provide a more sure-
footed stance when applied in the field of moral education. In conventional academic
terms, A. would give priority to the educator and his or her knowledge and skill, and
would favour the transmissory method over any other. B. would be student-oriented and
would emphasize the student's ability to discover and analyze things for himself over the
teacher's ability to instruct him. It would stress autonomy above other values and favour
the Socratic model where the educator is like a midwife delivering a baby.
The alternative proposal would be in line with Kant who gives the term ethics a
restricted meaning. He thought it was concerned with motives and intentions of the
individual moral agent. At the centre of morality there lay, in his view, the concepts
of good will whereby one subjectively wills the action one judges to be right for oneself
alone, and not for any ulterior purpose." Since one judges things according to certain
parameters, which one did not necessarily define, and since one's actions affect other
people, it is obvious that the agent should look beyond himself as point of reference for
action, given the fact that an individual's own bona fide judgments sometimes prove to
be mistaken.
4. Content of Moral Education
One of the most urgent practical difficulties about moral education, especially in its
close association with religion, turns on the question, whereabouts in the school does it
actually go on? In the past it has been assumed there were two broadly distinguish-
able elements: There was the conception of the moral learning as coming from growing
up in a moral community: the school was to be a moral place, staffed by moral people,
sustaining moral rules. Then there was the conception of moral learning as arising from
the study of religion. It was a deliberate attention paid to the highest ideals of the
human race, a powerfully emotive force towards their acceptance, and some transcen-
dental help towards their realization.
It would now be widely agreed that whatever religious education and moral
education are, they are not precisely the same thing. The question is beginning to arise
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whether they are not two entirely distinct things. If they are, then there should
presumably be two different places for them in the school curriculum, taught by
different teachers, with different content and different criteria for success. Experience
has shown that it is in no way easy to try and separate them entirely from one another.
The two factors seem better suited as companions to each other rather than strangers.
As a matter of pure history, "Christianity" has given the Western world and its
satellites a great deal of its moral insight, and some Christians rightly argue that even
the modern humanist is living on Christian capital. The same can be said of Islam for
those more directly connected with its history. But it is by no means clear that the best
way to do morals nowadays is to study the origins of our Christian or Islamic inheri-
tance. It could equally be argued that modern science is a Christian inheritance, indeed
western education, literacy itself. But this proves nothing about the content and methods
of modern science and modern education. For the Christian or Muslim, 'science" is in
the end a statement about God; but the Christian doing science does not seek to derive
it from his theology.
The Bible or Koran did set out "how men should live and behave", but there is not
only one way in which men actually do behave. Modern anthropology has revealed a
variety of ways in which men actually do behave, without, apparently, being much
worse for it; and certain highly unscriptural activities in some societies strike us as quite
attractive. Nigerians, along with peoples everywhere are involved in a highly regulated
society, full of specific rules and sophisticated ways of behaviour, to which a biblical
morality is difficult to apply. Therefore, even though historically moral education has
been interrelated with religious education, it being assumed that God is the author of
goodness, religion is not of the essence of morality. It is, in fact, quite possible to
distinguish the two things logically. God may demand the good of us, but only if the
good has some independent status. If God were not thought to demand the good of us,
but rather it was thought that the good is whatever God demands of us, then it would
not be clear why we should wish to do the good or indeed be commended for doing it.
Robin Barrow and Geoffrey Milburn therefore conclude:
It would be more a matter of power — to do things because God
is powerful and commands it -- than morality — do this because
it is good, a fact that God in his wisdom can see.°
Morality is not a neutral term either, but grows out of socio-cultural experience
among which is religion, or for that matter non-religion, as a conscious choice. It might
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be possible that moral education could be conducted without reference to religion, both
through lessons specifically devoted to it and through the medium of other subjects. In
the case of the former, moral education would be too abstract and ill-adapted to address
experiential situations which arise in the normal process of socio-cultural relations of
which religion is an important factor. In the case of the latter, moral education could
not claim any autonomy, and would only remain an adjunct to others. Its effect, if any,
could only be marginal and indirect.
Education is, admittedly, a preparation for life. As such its goal must be to prepare
the one educated not for life in the abstract, but for life as it ought to be lived in any
given circumstance. And since morality also concerns social relationships, the special
circumstances of each social organization must have a bearing with the goals of morality
in that society. In Nigeria's case, it must deal, not with some Aristotelian "natural
man", but with Nigerians in the various ways in which they experience pluralism in the
country. This pluralism has already been identified in the areas of religious traditions -
- Traditional Religion, Islam, and Christianity; ideological persuasions -- Humanism,
Atheism, Agnosticism, Skepticism; and of economic orientations -- Capitalism,
Socialism, Welfarism. Within this pluralist setting they desire to live and operate in
harmony.
A further point can be made in connection with religion. Theoretically, morality can
be considered to be independent of religion, but in real life situations, more often than
not, the moral attitudes which prevail in any living socio-cultural environment is often
directly or indirectly influenced by the tenets of the various traditions (including
religious ones), operative in that society.
Since education implies promoting understanding, to provide moral education is to
give people understanding of the moral domain — an understanding of the way in which
moral language works; in the words of Robin Barrow and Geoffrey Mulburn, "what
makes behaviour and people moral as opposed to, say, prudent, popular, or selfish.'
Being morally educated does not necessarily mean being educated in the empirical,
academic sense of the word. It is quite possible to have a sound moral education
without having been through a formal school. If that were not so, the implication would
have been that the fruit of moral education — and even morality itself -- would have
been the exclusive preserve of those who went through school. It is true, on the other
hand, that being morally educated in the true sense does imply having acquired a moral
understanding, but it does not necessarily imply being moral or acting morally.
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To promote moral behaviour may well be considered an aspect of socialization, and
will certainly satisfy one aim of early moral training, which is the cultivation of morally
desirable habits prior to any attempt to offer reasoned justification for them.
Humanists and their like are understandably suspicious of any approach which allows
any place to religion in state schools under whatever pretext, because they fear that
some people might take advantage of it for indoctrination. Mindful of that fear, religious
teaching and practices would be integrated into moral education not to provide
normative standards but to exemplify the various types of answer which have been given
to moral questions. In some instances religious teaching would exemplify moral attitudes
which contemporary humanism would wish to commend, like the concern shown in
parts of the New Testament for the underprivileged. Even in cases which would offend
modern sensibility, like the possibility of stoning the woman taken in adultery, can be
used to demonstrate the changing attitudes in contemporary society.
5. Approaches to Moral Education
In general, two main methods are used: the transmissory method and the ethics of
principles. A third possibility might be added, namely, a mixture of both. The
transmissory method, as the term suggests, is characterised by a handing-on to succeed-
ing generations, of customs and practices of the community. The ethics of principles for
its part involves the conceptual analysis of ethical theories prior to their being put into
practice. The two approaches roughly correspond to the two types of virtue described
by Aristotle — the virtues of character which come about through habits, and the virtues
of intellect which are acquired through teaching. Both methods complement each other
in the process of moral education. The one functions by exposing the student to an
environment where he or she learns to do by actually doing and by imitating the actions
and examples of others; the other for its part would challenge his or her intellect to
work out from theories how best to comport him or herself as situations arise.
a. The Transmissory Approach
Being a Christian or Muslim or practitioner of Traditional Religion involves a
sharing in a tradition. The tradition often constitutes, in a substantial way, the basis of
the morality obtainable within the community, and may have been communicated either
directly by word of mouth or indirectly by family atmosphere. At times it may have
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been communicated by a whole community's way of life, or by the example of certain
individuals', or by a combination of such influences.
The tradition of religion or morality does not stand alone, but is usually accom-
panied by the traditions of criticism. There are, for example, people who want certain
things changed or modified in one form or other. There are also traditions of class and
regional attitudes — of sympathy or enthusiasm, or apathy or indifference. Also to be
reckoned with are individual prejudices and practices, socio-political circumstances, and
the torrent of events, personal, local and general, all of which combine to form the
outlook that the individual eventually adopts and personalizes. The word "tradition' does
not always refer to past or archaic practices, for there are certain practices that belong
to living traditions. These have to do with general human attitudes and with respect to
timeless and fundamental things that everyone has to face: birth, death, suffering, joy,
love, and the whole range of questions about human being and doing.
The transmissory method finds an extension in the use of fictional characters as
well as in parables, fables and novels, where the characters are portrayed for the
purpose of putting across some moral lesson.
In some special circumstances, the transmissory approach involves the teaching of
precepts -- a code or codes of conduct where do's and don'ts are organized as a guide
for moral conduct. The biblical Decalogue is an example of its application in Chris-
tianity and Judaism. On the secular level, varieties of codes of conduct are applied in
fraternities and clubs. One of the ways of knowing a morally good person is by seeing
how far he or she has been able to order his or her life in accordance with the accepted
norms of conduct. One who is beyond reproof in this regard is often regarded as an
example to be emulated. The life of such a one features as an example of how the
demands of norms and precepts are realized in real life.
b. The Ethics of Principles
The ethics of principles provides the grounds for justifying or condemning an action.
It can occur either as grounds of objective validity which apply universally in all cases,
or it may be construed along the line of ICant's notion of maxims or "subjective
principles of volition,"" for example, one's personal motto or rule of life. The question
arises then as to which principle should be operative in, say, a case of abortion, or
Refer to the discussion of the Paradigmatic Individuals in Chapter
Five.
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murder, or suicide, or any such act where an individual's perceived sense of what is
right is sometimes at odds with what the generality of people would rather judge to the
contrary. Or, further still, whether the validity of an act is solely a matter of consensus.
In daily living, because my personal maxims often conflict with those of others, they are
usually expected to defer to objective principles especially when it is a question of the
common good. An objective principle is a basis for evaluation, invested with a
privileged status or authority, quite apart from (my) personal acceptance or non-
acceptance of the same." In both cases, however, principles have an important role to
play in ethical deliberation. As Aiken points out, their authoritative status is contingent
upon the conscientious submission of the persons who adopt them."
Some points of clarification are needed here: to begin with it is not being claimed
that the transmissory method and the ethics or principles are by any means the only or
even the best methods; it is possible that there are others. Furthermore, the use of
examples and the appeal to fictional characters are, strictly speaking, not a class apart
by themselves, but seem to be based on the precepts and principles of conduct. Thus
they can be regarded more as applications of each other than as separate methods. The
reason for treating them separately is because many theorists have treated them
separately and one can more effectively comment on their approach if one stood on the
same plane. They tend to suggest themselves and evoke each other more readily than
they suggest others in any process of teaching.
c. A Mixture of Both
Sometimes the two approaches are taken in combination. For example, in the
Catechism of some Christian Churches, the primary purpose is to hand-on to the young
or the neophytes the deposits of faith. Yet the same programme of catechesis treats at
the same time themes that are centrally theological — God, grace, mysteries,
sacraments, salvation — along with themes that are centrally ethical — virtue, guilt,
responsibility, sin. And while prayers and other practices are taught (handing on),
abstract themes such as those just mentioned are also discussed.
6. Nature of Moral Development
An important aspect of psychological research pertaining to ethics has been its
attempt to trace a normal pattern in the development of moral judgment, indicate the
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outstanding phases of its growth, and relate these to the kinds of experience which
characteristically influence them. Jean Piaget's research points in general to the
existence of two distinct levels of moral development. The first level, characteristic of
young children, tends as they grow older to be gradually replaced by the second. This
replacement often does not take place completely, and it may not take place at all."
Piaget's findings were based on children's attitude to the rules of the games in which
they are involved. They would typically regard them as deriving from the authority of
some superior beings — whether some older children, or adults or even God himself.'
They would also typically regard the rules as immutable and inviolable. Thus changing
the rules would seem to them unthinkable, and breaking the rules would be assumed to
be inexcusable. As they grew older, however, they became more flexible.
In the area of moral judgment, younger children, according to Piaget, attach little
importance to the intentions of one who violates the rules, while older children and
adults do attach a lot of importance to intentions. On the question of punishment, while
younger children regard it as an indispensable and inevitable consequence of rule-
brealdng, older ones regard it as corrective. Piaget attributes the transition from the
immature to the mature level of moral thinking to two basic factors, namely, develop-
mental and social factors.
Lawrence Kohlberg takes up the issue of social and developmental factors, but
concentrates on the developmental aspect to the exclusion of the social. He presents a
general picture which comprises three levels of maturation in moral thinking — the pre-
conventional, the conventional, and the post conventional. Each of these levels unfolds
in two stages, bringing the total to six levels of orientation:
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Level A — Pre-Conventional Stage
Characteristics
1. Obedience and punishment orientation
2. Naively egoistic orientation
Level B — Conventional Stage
Characteristics
3. Good-Boy Orientation
4. Authority and social order maintaining
orientation
Level C — Post-Conventional Stage
Characteristics
5. Contractual legalistic orientation
6. Conscience or principle orientation
Kohlberg's introduction of the subject of conscience is quite pertinent here for, any
effort at moral education must include also the formation of the conscience. It is usually
in the realm of the conscience that predicaments are encountered -- To do or not to do?
When? To what extent? — in the process of moral decisions.
Erik Erikson sees human development in terms of a cycle, and claims that there is
a cycle in individual life as well as that of generations. That implies that as a person
gets older he or she becomes like a child all over again, not in the sense of being
childish, but that of being childlike. Within the bigger cycle of generations, a later age
is prefigured in an earlier one. Erikson's final age of integrity vs despair has the moral
and religious connotations of health, wholeness, and holiness. If we are to realize such
integration or integrity, we need a "post-narcissistic love of the human ego..., an ex-
perience which conveys some world order and spiritual sense."'
7. Moral Development and Conscience
In numerous instances of living experience, we are confronted with unique situations
for which no specified rules of conduct exist. Is the rule, for example, of "You shall not
kill" violated in removing an artificial life support for a comatose who does not stand
any 'reasonable" chance of recovering full consciousness? Is it imputable to risk severe
infection that might prove fatal by assisting someone already infected with, say, the
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AIDS virus? In such and similar circumstances where opinions are polarized the
individual conscience is in a way the court of the final appeal. Basing one's action on
the dictates of conscience is said to be to act according to conscience, and the better the
conscience is formed the more reliable it is as a guide. A central question with respect
to conscience could be stated as follows: If one acts according to a conscience that is in
error, does one do well or ill? Can error be corrected, and must it be corrected? A
Socratic answer to the first problem would be that no one does evil willingly, and
therefore an erroneous conscience is only ignorant of the real issues prior to acting. But
that presumes that error of conscience is a permanent and irreversible condition.
Experience itself shows the contrary to be the case. Thus one should be able by the help
of instruction and other forms of guidance, learn to distinguish truth from error, and
pattern one's actions accordingly.
From the earliest beginnings, conscience has been considered to be a purely personal
and private affair, yet it is extraordinarily difficult to harmonize with the essentially
human task of communication and community, with living, loving, and suffering along
with fellow human beings. The essential privacy of conscience is underscored by the
fact that even though it might incline us to reach out to others, it could do nothing to
bring us into communion with them. In Stoic thought the characteristic privacy of
conscience was perceived as a striving towards imperturbability.
Moral theology speaks not only of conscience but also of a just conscience and an
erroneous conscience, the voice of conscience, and the like. The conscience is in the
realm of the subjective, and as such there is some ambiguity inherent in the conscience
as soon as it departs from its own proper and egocentric context. Outside of its
egocentric context conscience (since no one's conscience can be applied to another),
must express but the personal judgment of the situation and the concrete demands of the
situation.24
8. Moral Education in Nigeria
Moral education involves, as Otonti Nduka rightly points out, "not only the teaching,
learning, and other processes whereby values, rules, principles, ideals, habits and
attitudes are inculcated, but also the taking of adequate educational steps supplemented
with appropriate institutional arrangements to promote moral growth along the
developmental continuum."" It is a whole ensemble involving precepts, customs, and
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above all, values. The importance Nigerians attach to values, which are the central
concern of the education enterprise, is clearly attested to by the fact that one of the
objectives of the Nigerian education recommended by 1969 Curriculum Conference was
"the inculcation of the right type of values and attitudes for the survival of the indivi-
dual and of society?
It has, since that time been little else than words and worries; not much systematic
attempt has been made to identify and foster the right types of values, nor have any
appreciable steps been taken to inculcate them. For instance, former Head of State
Olusegun Obasanjo declared at Jaji on September 12, 1977: "The Nigerian society as
at now, in spite of our efforts since July 1975, is not sufficiently disciplined, fair, just
or humane..."
Perhaps the most pervasive of the reactions to the moral anomaly in Nigeria is to
attribute all the woes, to the deficiency in moral and religious education in schools,
which is one of the end results of the government compulsory take-over of schools most
of which belonged to, and were run by missionaries and other voluntary agencies.
Nicholas Nwagwu carried out a documentary survey of the arguments for and against
the state take-over of schools in Nigeria. Government's explanation was that it wanted
to achieve the "long-felt needs of developing a planned and integrated education system
which would reflect the goals and objectives of national development.' Nwagwu's
survey found a general preference to the pre-take-over status quo especially for the fact
that neither objective seemed to have been achieved since the take-over:
[T]he public generally would welcome the return to the dual
control system of education, and in this they had the support of
the persistent demand of the missionaries, especially the Roman
Catholic Church?
For most educationists the blueprint for patterning moral education can be found in
the general pattern with which the school carries out other types of education. The
pattern would appeal to the three key areas of learning process — psychological,
intellectual and practical aspects of the human constitution. On the psychological plane
the school promotes the apprehension of, and intellectual commitment to, norms. On the
practical plane, it promotes the development of skills at all levels of operation. And on
the intellectual plane, it helps develop the ability for sound and autonomous moral
judgments that lead to firm and unwavering commitment to any chosen side of an issue
as a result of a good grasp of the crucial questions involved in it.
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Considering the Nigerian needs and circumstances, Professor Akinpelu thinks it is
essential for proper moral education first to "get to the roots and principles of moral-
ity". Thus equipped, the proper climate should be created to sustain it:
We need to know more about morality, about why people behave
they way they do, about their moral perception, about the great
gulf between moral knowledge and moral action, about anything
that can relieve the moral malaise in which we are now... Finally,
what I think we need most is the creation and sustenance of a
moral environment in the country?
The task of this project, therefore, is to try to enquire as to ways of bringing about
in Nigeria and through education this highly desirable moral environment. The school
has a crucial role in this task, but certainly not the exclusive role. So long as any form
of education is defined solely in terms of school the observer has nothing to study. But
if one defines education as the whole process by which one generation transmits its
culture to the succeeding generation, then Nigerians — scholars and non-scholars alike -
- can fruitfully and meaningfully embark on the business of moral education. Nigeria
enjoys a threefold legacy: from its African heritage, from its Islamic associations, and
from its Western contacts. Its best bet is to develop both legacies in harmony with each
other wherever feasible.
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CHAPTER THREE
CONTENT OF
TRADITIONAL MORAL EDUCATION
Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above
all liberties.
— JOHN MILTON, Aeropagitica.
Conduct will not be right unless the will to act Is right; for this is the source of con-2gduct. Nor, again, can the will be right without a ht attitude of mind; for this is the
source of the will. Furthermore, such an attitude of mind will not be found even in the
best of men unless he has learned the laws of life as a whole and has worked out a
proper Judgment about everything, and unless he has reduced facts to a standard of
truth
— SENECA.
When 'Theophilus Okere defines morality as amere-alal — that which enables society
to function properly', he hits precisely at the definition of the various aspects of behaviour and
social activities that are acceptable as desirable. Also included in this concept are those actions
and attitudes that are rejected as undesirable. While Christian and Islamic moral codes point
to some form of revelation for their origins, Nigerian traditional moral code is built up from
the injunctions of the earth goddess Ala (for the Igbos), and through the ancestors Ndichie or
Ndibunze. These injunctions made up of approved observances and prohibitions, constitute
what the Igbos call omenala — the ought of the land. Those prohibitions are referred to as
Nso-ala — actions abhorred by Ala. In this traditional code, there is emphasis on group
morality rather than on individual cultivation of goodness itself, and the most important element
is the idea of Life as the highest good.'
One is accounted as Onye aruru-allt — a perpetrator of abominable things; or onye
uru-ala — one in the business of doing abominable deeds -- when one does things disruptive
of the socio-cosmic order. Uru-ala or aruruala therefore pertain to the realm of action that is
already performed or could possibly be performed. On the other hand, when one is reckoned
as evil in one's general disposition, one is described as Ajo mmadu — an evil person. The
concept of good is expressed by the word mma. The same word expresses the idea of beauty,
health, order. The antonym is njo (adjective ajo , which expresses the idea of something evil,
bad, ugly, unseemly.
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In traditional moral code, prohibitions seem to outnumber positive injunctions. The few
positive injunctions gravitate largely around religious duties, observances and rites. These must
be properly observed for the enhancement of the Good Life, which is regarded as constituting
the supreme good.
A communalistic outlook is very prominent too, and stems from the people's world
view. Professor Ilogu suggests that because of the emphasis on the community, its well-being,
and its ordered existence, the maintenance of the proper links of relationship in human kinship
as well as in the relationship between humans, nature, and the ancestral spirit, most members
of the traditional society do not readily see the value of goodness for the exercise of personal
responsibility. Goodness is seen primarily as a means of realizing the social morality of the
group, and this is capable of removing from moral life the joy of inner motivation. It is inner
motivation that is of the essence of responsibility.5
An inevitable question that arises with any group-oriented morality is whether it is
capable of bringing about a sense of personal responsibility which manifests itself in the feeling
of guilt or of exultation. There is every likelihood that it would be based on the sense of
shame. On the other hand, the sense of having done well will be based mostly on public
opinion. According to Milton Singer there is no scientifically demonstrable reason why in
group-oriented morality -- heavily influenced by the community's rigorous enforcement mecha-
nism including shame and taunting, improvised, denigrating songs — members of such groups
could not develop inner remorse or guilt.' Thus it is not a question of either/or; the two
elements are substantially present in the system.
1. Traditional Nigerian Moral "Code"
No written moral code existed in traditional Nigerian society for obvious reasons of
lack of literacy. The moral laws were generally conventional, and specific legislations were
made to cater to specific needs. Professor Ilogu, however, was able to put together a set of
twenty-four injunctions and prohibitions that could serve as a residue of the morality that
regulated, and in many cases still regulate, both the conduct of the individual members of the
community and the entire community as a whole. The following are the twenty-four injunc-
tions put together by Professor Edmund Ilogu:
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1. Stealing of yams either from the barn or from the
farm.
2. Homicide.
3. Incest.
4. A freeman dale having sexual relationships with
an Osu (one dedicated as slave to a deity), or
spending the night especially with the Osu in his
or her house.'
5. Suicide, especially by hanging.
6. Poisoning someone with intent to take his or her
life secretly.
7. Theft of domestic fowls especially a hen in her
hatching pot where she can easily be taken along
with her eggs.
8. A woman climbing a palm tree or kolanut tree,
especially if she does so with a climbing belt called
ea
9. Theft of any kind committed by an Ow titled man.
10. Adultery by a wife -- (not by a husband!).
11. A wife throwing her husband down on the ground
in the course of a domestic row.
12. Deliberately killing or eating any totem animar; if
accidentally the liability is more benignly regarded
but the act is abominable all the same.
13. Deliberately cutting the tendrils of young, growing
yams in another's farm.
14. Secretly altering land boundaries, especially during
the night.
15. Wilful arson.
16. Divulging the identity of the masquerade —
especially if the offender is a woman.
' Totem animals include the sacred or royal python, sacred cows, goats or rams
associated in one form or another with the communities origins or destiny.
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17. A woman breaking confinement by cooking and
serving meals during her menstrual period,
especially if the husband is an Ozo-titled man.
18. A widow having sexual relationships while still in the
period of mourning her dead husband.'
19. Dying a "bad death" -- that is, death resulting from an
infectious disease like leprosy or small pox, or dying within
one year after having sworn an °atilt'.
20. A husband deliberately breaking or throwing away
his wife's utensils.
21. A cock crowing at an awkward time in the night'.
22. A woman giving birth to twins. (The practice of tabooing
twins has long ceased!).
23. A baby delivered "feet-first" rather than "head-first".
24. An infant cutting the upper teeth first.'
Many important features could be noted by looking at these rules of conduct. First of
all, they cannot be called societal laws in the sense of regulations established by the people
for the smooth-running of the community. The reason for this is that no one could claim
authorship or even knowledge of the precise origins of these rules of conduct. A typical
member of the community, say an elder, will explain their validity by saying: "That is what
our forebears and their own forebears practised since the beginning of time. Anyone who goes
against them does so at his or her own risk."' The sanctions apart, whatever they are, one
would like to know the reason for, and authority behind them wherever they apply. Conformity
for its own sake is in itself clearly not a sufficient vindication of the agent's status as a rational
and autonomous agent. Its moral import could only be at best marginal.
Secondly, in general no one took any personal offence at the breach of any of these
laws. Rather it was the community that took action against offenders. The more serious
breaches were said to be offenses against Ala, the earth goddess, on whose behalf maximum
Perjury in traditional society is akin to the biblical unforgivable sin and anyone
guilty of it was denied the normal courtesies of mourning or a decent burial.
. That is, between the hours of 8 p.m. and 5 a.m. which was supposed to be the
business times of the spirits and the ancestors. It is the height of impudence to
disturb them.
b
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stiff penalties were inflicted on offenders. The land has always been there since the beginning
of time and is technically considered eternal and inviolable.
Thirdly, there is a cyclic interplay in the universe of beings among the superhuman,
the human and the subhuman, and the human is always at the centre. Even though the human
concerns are at the centre the principle behind these ethical generalizations is in base
cosmological in as much as it covers the entire spectrum of beings, rather than anthropological
in the sense of limiting itself to rules that are meant to guide human conduct. In this connection
the rules affect even domestic animals (see number 21) as well as crops in the field.
Fourthly, sequel to this is the lack of direct reference to the divine element which might
lead to suspicions of the lack of a teleological explanation. The masquerades are about the
only reference to the superhuman element, since masquerades were considered to be the
revered spirit of the ancestors come back to earth. Furthermore there is in most traditional
explanations a constant reference to Ala. This reference besides providing some justification,
also introduces the teleological explanation often sought in ethical determinations.
Fifthly, religion does not show up directly either; it seems to be only presupposed. This
presupposition is demonstrated by the fact that a breach of any of these injunctions would
attract sanctions of a religious nature by way of expiatory or purificatory rites. The conclusion
one may draw from this is the fact that morality and the religious sense are so inextricably
bound together.
Sixthly, these laws or rules appeal to the heart rather than to the intellect. That is not
to suggest that they are irrational. Rather, their validity depends not so much on their ability
to persuade the mind as in their functionality in maintaining order in the community. In this
respect one may be justified to regard them as intuitionist in character. The general attitude
with regard to the traditional moral code is to challenge one not just to take-it-or-leave-it but
to take-it-or-face-it.
A closer look at the twenty-four injunctions would reveal a great deal of emphasis on
justice and equity. Hence the many prohibitions against stealing (numbers 1,7,9,14), and
vandalism (13,15,20). While the stealing of a fowl was considered a disgrace of the most
debasing kind, the stealing of yams was a very serious offence because the yam stands as a
mark of masculine achievement. It could be compared with one stealing another's hard-won
Olympic medal. By far the most demeaning was for a titled man to steal, since the conferral
of an Ozo title amounted to a universal acknowledgment of one's integrity of life. The lesser
the worth of the object stolen the greater will be the attendant opprobrium.
56
Prohibitions against murder come out strongly (2,5,6,15) and include both suicide and
attempted murder such as poisoning and arson. Also coming out strongly are prohibitions
against sexual impropriety (3,4,10,18). Sexual activity, which by its nature procures some
bodily pleasure, was rightly considered inappropriate during the period of mourning, since it
showed lack of respect for the memory of the deceased. When it is said that the rule of absti-
nence applied to women it does not mean that men had a free ride. Because of the polygynous,
rather than polyandrous, nature of marriage in traditional Nigerian society, a woman had only
one husband to lose, but a man had other wives he could turn to. Where the man had only one
wife, he would be obliged to observe the period of mourning and the abstinence from sexual
activity that went with it.
Allied to these are prohibitions against a woman climbing trees or serving meals when
she should be confined. The former was considered to be in bad taste and offensive to the
beholder because the anatomical structure of the female body was considered ill-suited to the
hamrdous activity of tree-climbing. The latter was purely due to hygienic considerations.
Divulging the identity of a masquerade was considered abominable. It amounted to
blasphemy -- saying that the masquerade was a human being when it was actually taken to be
the spirit of the ancestors. In the Bible Jesus considered blasphemy one of the sins against the
Holy Spirit "which can be forgiven neither in this world nor in the next."" A woman guilty of
this was doubly liable of overreaching and impropriety. Since women were not supposed to
approach the masquerade in the first place, she could not have ordinarily got to know. There-
fore she could only have known illegitimately by going out of her way to find out. There lies
the impropriety.
A Western reader of 22,23,24, is sure to find them rather surprising. What may seem
excessively brutal can be better appreciated if one considered the logic behind them. In 22,
humans are supposed to be unique and single. Only animals come in multiples. To get into the
human race in multiples was considered as demeaning to the human nature and as introducing
the bestial element in the human forum. This was unacceptable.
It was a bad omen for a child to come feet-first. That was considered the exit rather
than the entrance posture. One exited the human community feet-first when his or her body
was being carried out of the house for the last time. A child coming feet-first was an omen
of death and disaster. The head touching the ground first was taken as a sign of humility and
loyalty, while the feet hitting the ground first was a sign of rebellion and intractability.
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To cut the upper teeth first was considered bestial, for it reminded one of the fangs of
deadly serpents, tigers and lions, and such domestic animals as cats and dogs. It was also con-
sidered to be an omen of avarice and wrangling. In the name of peace and harmony and in
deference to the perceived order of the universe, these phenomena were viewed with forebo-
ding and "normal" people had the duty to forswear them. There is an Igbo proverb that clearly
shows this resolute disposition: Nwata puo eze-elu ma a-kpopeghi ya, o ga epulcwa ozo = If a
child cuts the upper teeth first and you do not knock them out, he is likely to do even more
unseemly things.
Professor llogu's was a brave attempt to put together on paper what previously existed
in people's collective memory. Hopefully he will have the occasion to refine his collection by
showing more clearly the fine tunes in various aspects of the "code", and make it more com-
prehensive to cover the details of daily living. It will then be easy to translate it into basic
material for formal education, reflection and criticism. As the code stands, it is based on the
natural law and the demands it makes on the individual are a take-it-or-face-it."
In other parts of Nigeria, there are different points of emphasis, but the principle is the
same. S.F. Nadel studied the situation among the Nupes of Northern Nigeria. According to
him, law in the Nupe kingdom is a concern of the political organization, and forms part of the
elaborate coercive machinery of the state. Forms of redress and sanctions exist, and are
applied outside the political framework. This restricted form of redress covers two types of
offenses: religious offenses and kinship offenses. The former includes such acts as the desecra-
tion of sacred objects or places, whether Islamic or traditional, while the latter include
litigation over inheritance, and offenses against traditional marriage rules. Among the most
common such offenses are marriage in the forbidden degrees of consanguinity and incest."
Traditional Nupe law operated with legal distinction which, corresponding in certain
respects to the modern distinction between civil and criminal law, defined two classes of
delicts: simpler delicts Gyara, which were settled by "repairing" the damage that had been
done, and graver delicts, which called for formal judgment and punishment - She:Va. The
following table summarizes the various crimes and offenses according to this twofold clas-
sification:
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Offenses Involving GYARA:
1. Small debts.
2. Minor thefts carried out
during the day.
3. Theft of fowls, sheep, and
goats.
4. Adultery: seduction of a girl
by a man who is willing to
marry her.
Offenses Involving SHERPA:
1. Large debts
2. Theft on a small scale and
during the night.
3. Theft of cattle or horses,
and all theft committed during
the night.
4. Adultery leading to fights and
bloodshed.
5. Seduction by a married man who
refuses to marry the girl.
6. Murder and Manslaughter.
7. Highway robbery.
8. Arson.
9. High treason, ie, rebellion
of feudal lords against the
king — Lese-Majeste GI
TOKO NYA TSU, literally abuse
of the king."
The first set of offenses was a matter for the local authority, while the graver crimes
were referred to the central authority — the court of the king and Alkali in Bida. Punishment
of ordinary criminals was performed in the capital, in the open market and might range from
flogging or shela to capital punishment.
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2. Sexual Morality in Traditional Nigerian Society
An important point that requires some discussion is the question of sexual morality. In
traditional Nigerian societies sex was not a subject to be glibly discussed. It was, in fact,
considered remiss for adults to discuss matters regarding sexuality either with or in the presence
of the young. By the same token it was unthinkable for young persons to make references to
sexual things to the hearing of their elders. Whatever they needed to know about sexuality was
casually told them as was warranted by the unfolding of their own physical and sexual
development. At the onset of puberty, for example, the adolescent would probably complain of
some ache or pain or physical distress. The parent would understand the connection and instruct
him or her on how to cope.
It was not uncommon in the past that young maidens went about their daily business
without clothes on until the time of marriage. Boys also went about their daily activities without
clothes on until they were officially "clothed" in a special ceremony initiating them into adul-
thood:5
 It was at the initiation stage that anything a young initiate ever wondered about was
frankly and directly explained, since he or she would in a short time need to apply them in the
course of his or her adult and marital life that would soon follow the initiation. The Efiks,
Yorubas, Igallas, Igbos, Fulanis, IgaIlas, practically all the peoples of Nigeria had their own
versions of the initiation process.
Contrary to the impressions created by the earliest European and other foreign nationals
to witness this state of affairs, there was no pornographic intent involved in the scantiness of
clothing. On the contrary, the humid climatic conditions rendered elaborateness of clothing
unnecessary as a protection against the weather, and even less so as an ornament. Thus even
in Europe and the rest of the industrialized world, hot summers have led to various degrees of
scantiness in clothing and even at times to a state of complete unclothedness.
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In traditional Nigerian society, the moral standards were absolute and parents had an
absolute control over their children — male and female alike. The boys played and interacted
among boys while the girls played and interacted among girls. That removed unnecessary
occasions for temptation. Where a boy or girl was in a state of sexual restlessness, it became
embarrassingly manifest to any casual on-looker. In traditional society, sex was not to be
indulged in for the pleasure of it even though the craving might be there. The element of
pleasure was considered as incidental rather than central to the course of human mating. As
a result sexual promiscuity rarely, if at all, occurred. Society was very strict, and anyone
indulging in promiscuous activities earned the scorn of the neighbours.
It was probably this strictness about sexual matters that led S.M.E. Bengu to assert that
all sexual perversities were alien to Africa'. These perversities, he insists, "have been imported
into Africa through the cities with the whites as their carriers, since they were the creators of
the cities themselves." 17
 This assertion, though somewhat an overstatement, is likely to be
endorsed by most African purists. One need only consider the degree of tolerance accorded to
certain sexual practices in industrialized societies, and which are almost unmentionable in more
traditional society. On the other hand, however, Bengu fails to define just what constitutes a
sexual perversion, especially for the fact that there is no unanimity in the issue, just as there
is no strict homogeneity in African cultures. Besides, he never tried to show how he came
about his conclusion.
Flora Nwapa, a leading Nigerian lady novelist, discusses the issue of prostitution and
rejects it as bad for the African woman. In her novel Idu, the heroin of the novel by the same
name denounces prostitution outright: "Our woman of the Lake, (i.e., the Sea Goddess), frowns
at it, and that's why prostitutes of our town never profit by it."" The Woman of the Lake is
also the goddess of virginity, and is said to punish prostitutes. Idu drives her point further: "If
prostitution is to be practised let it not be native women, but women of other lands to practise
it. "19
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Professor Wole Soyinka, Nigeria's Nobel Laureate for Literature, depicts a scene where
the traditional sexual morality is given expression. A grandmother brings pressure to bear on
her grand-daughter Dehinwa not to abort a child she evidently seemed to have conceived
whether in or out of wedlock, whether for cosmetic or any other reason:
You were plump when you first came back from "ilu oyinbo".
(She looked up sharply, boring into her eyes, then shook her head
in relief and mischief). No, she chortled, 1 don't think so. But
listen girl, I know this new habit of you modern girls, don't join
them in the foolishness. If you are expecting a baby, have it. A
child is a beautiful thing; have it. The important thing is to know
the father.2°
Dehinwa is here not being encouraged to be promiscuous, but rather to face up to her
conduct. If by accident or design she had conceived a child, she should not seek to escape
by the back door. Here was an emphatic objection to any contemplation of abortion. Progeny
was to be preferred in all circumstances above personal convenience or cosmetic considerations.
Thus a woman's womanhood was assessed by her actual ability to bear children.' Where she
was unable to bear children, her esteem waned.
Another Nigerian writer, John Munonye, touches on the predicament of a woman that
failed to bear children. In his novel Obi, a friend, Warrior congratulates Obi, the hero of the
story, on his Marriage to a well-bred and beautiful wife. Nevertheless, Warrior wastes no time
in declaring his stand on any woman who fails to bear children: "We could never call her wife
until she has produced children for the family; for what use is a kolanut tree if it fails to bear
fruit."'
A similar attitude finds expression in the case of Flora Nwapa's Idu, who was so
unhappy over her inability to be a mother after three years of marriage. Of her it was said.
"She was not pregnant, she had not even had a miscarriage. She was, like any woman in
traditional society, meant to be a mother and not a mere sex object.""
Within marriage itself, adultery, especially on the woman's part, was highly con-
demned. Men were not thereby given a blank cheque. They could, as has already been shown,
meet their sexual needs from their several wives, and if they had only one wife, they were
expected to remain faithful to her. The only exception to the rule is in the case of concubin-
age."
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3. Traditional Moral Education of the Young
James Hake points out that the factors that affect the moral training of children in
Northern Nigeria (and other parts as well), were the customs, practices, and religious beliefs
of parent?. Children were required to show their parents and elders prompt obedience and
respect, and an unquestion-ing submission to their will. The belief is that if one were to be
too lenient in training the child, he or she would bring misfortune to him or herself and his
or her family. According to traditional and religious beliefs, a child is born imperfect, and if
given his or her own way, he or she will do foolish and harmful things not only to him or
herself but to other people as well. Parents therefore felt it was their bounden duty to try to
curb the incipient evil tendencies in their children, and to use corporal and other punishment
as they saw fie.
In addition to the small but recurring misdeeds of children which would irritate parent-
s, stealing and then lying were considered serious negative character traits. Quarrelling,
fighting, tardiness, rudeness, disrespect for elders, breakage of family utensils, are other types
of misbehaviour which would cause parents to use disciplinary measures on them.
The most common form of punishment was thrashing, and in many cases it was often
preceded by a good scolding. In some extreme cases of breach of discipline or persistence in
obstinacy, the child could be locked up in a dark room and temporarily denied access to his
most cherished belongings and playthings. Sometimes he or she would be denied a meal. The
idea was to let the child see the full impact of his or her conduct. Most children would break
down and cry, and that was considered an act of contrition that would earn them reprieve. It
was left to the parents to determine just the right measure of strictness that would not border
on cruelty, but they would prefer to be "cruel to be kind."
These traditional methods were thought to have been quite successful in maintaining
discipline. In the light of present-day sensitivities, they are likely to be criticized as trials by
fire. It is arguable whether it was not after all a case of parental sadism and child abuse which
did no more than impose compliance rather than real, spontaneous obedience. Could acts of
compliance be reckoned in terms of virtue as acts resulting from a developed and autonomous
judgment or are they mere conditioned responses to stimuli? If the former,it is all well and
good, but if the latter, the children's autonomy or capacity for virtuous action becomes at best
severely impaired and at worst permanently distorted.
John ICambalame and his companions put together a clear-cut code that gave specific
directives to specific groups in the community — children, adults, parents, marriage-couples.
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They were meant to provide relevant instruction for various stages of development -- initia-
tion, marriage, family, and society in general. Though designed for Kenya, Uganda, Malawi
and other East African countries, the contents are very relevant to Nigeria. The details may
vary but the substance is basically applicable. 27 It has all the maldngs of a social catechesis.
When the time of initiation came the children were gathered together, taken into the
remote forest and away from their parents and exposed for the first time to life in its most
rugged and most challenging state. The boys would experience for the first time what it meant
to be their own men beyond the protective shadows of parents, and under the strict supervision
of one skilled in the job and designated to guide them. Their food would be simple and their
shelter would be the barest possible. There was no question of the boys feeling "crushed" or
"punished" by the experience. On the contrary, their punishing experiences were meant to
"prove" to proud parents, peers, and prospective female admirers, that they could hold their
own in tough conditions and difficult circumstances. The "tutor" or mentor would proceed to
explain the significance of every object and action so that the boys would understand perfectly
what they were doing and why. Then they would be issued specific instructions which they
were supposed to carry out.
3,. Male Initiation
a. Explanations For Lads 12-14 at Initiation
Twelve- to fourteen-year olds are taught as follows during the course of initiation:
1. The porridge they are bringing here for you has this meaning:
that you belong now to your own group; that you have set out on
a journey.
2. These ceremonies mean that when you were small you played
about as you felt inclined and held off from the disagreeable
things.
3. The cruel leader of vinyau symbolizes those trials in life that you
will meet with in the world; if you go on childishly such things
will come to you from this side or from that.
4. That blindfolding of you means that there will come to you
troubles that the eye does not see, such as illness, trials, and
death; things that can take you unawares.
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5. Making you part company with your mother means putting modes-
ty between you and her, because you and she are not alike in your
physical parts.
6. This little temporary shelter here signifies the grave where you
will lie without seeing any one of the people of your village.
7. Your sponsor signifies the spirits who will stay with you among
the dead, and who, when the time comes, will present you to
Mulungu [God the Just, Upright, and Immutable], accompanying
you as witnesses to your good character.
b. Injunctions to the 12-14 year Old Lads During Initiation
1. Be obedient and do gladly all that you are ordered to do.
2. Honour all who are older than yourself.
3. You must always particularly help those in need and especially
such as are aged, the lame ones, and children. Never deride,
never revile, never strike them.
4. Be ready to fetch and carry wherever you go.
5. Honour your father and your mother for all the good things they
do for you in looking after you here on earth.
6. You must love Mulungu, who looks after the spirits of the dead,
and make offerings of worship to Him.
7. You must always speak what is true.
8. Take nothing belonging to another -- without asking for it.
9. Never entice another man's wife.
10. Have care of your body day by day.
11. Eat nothing that is stolen.
12. Be amiable to everyone.
13. Always be busy at your work.
14. Be kind to all created things such as dogs, cats, frogs, lizards.
32. Female Initiation: The Ofosi Guild
There is also a special initiation for females. It is the initiation into the female
priesthood — the Ofosi Guild among the Owe people of Kwara State of Nigeria. As a rule,
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the traditional religion of the Owe is an affair completely controlled by the adult male section
of the community. Women and children are practically of no importance, just as they have no
direct say either in the other decisions concerning the well-being of the tribe. A significant
exception to this general rule in the religious sphere is the phenomenon of Ofosi. They are
women who are initiated into an esoteric and deeply religious society, involving periodic and
authentic spirit-possession? They are considered the "wives of the Ebora", and unlike other
women who have no active role in the Ebora cult, they have some specific though limited part
to play in the worship of Ebora. Their part consists mainly in singing and dancing in honour
of the Ebora on the appropriate occasions such as the major religious festivals: Eye, Oka, and
Ekiho; for the promotion of a man to the Orota grade; the funeral of a member of the Orota
grade or his mother, or that of one of their own number.
The rite of initiation into this cult occurs only when there is a suitable spiritual
atmosphere in the town, generally on the occasion of the promotion of a great chief, or the
burial of an important priest-elder. As soon as the atmosphere is declared propitious, parents
who have daughters and husbands with wives they intend to dedicate in this way to the Ebora
take the necessary steps with the directors of the guild to have the prospective candidate
enrolled. A woman, too, may decide on her own to get initiated, but she has to obtain the
permission of her husband who then puts forward her name.
On a given day, the head of the Ofosi calls down the spirit. She performs secret rituals
involving palm oil on the sacred pot of the Ofosi, and calls out the names of the candidates.
As the names are being called into the sacred pot of "medicine", the Ofosi spirit gets into the
candidates wherever they may be. They suddenly begin to experience serious pains in the head,
fall into a trance and rush into the bush -- generally up into the Ebora hill -- for days? After
some time, the Ofosi women go in search of them, and bring them to a sort of novitiate.' Here
as the blood of a sacrificed goat is poured into the sacred pot, they regain consciousness and
begin right away the long period of elaborate initiation, divided into three stages.
The first stage consists in three months of complete isolation. In 01le, this used to be
spent in the depth of the forest. Then comes a further three months of communal life in the
premises of the Oba Ofosi — i.e. the chief of the Ofosi, during which time they learn the
language of the Ofosi, songs and ritual dances under very rigid discipline and seclusion. At the
last stage, again a period of three months, they leave the seclusion, go around in small groups
performing the ritual dances they have learnt from house to house, and begging for food and
money.
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The candidates at this stage came often into the town, "very scantily dressed, with a
small piece of cloth that just about went round the waist, and stopping far up above the
knees". 32
 Their bodies were smeared with red osim or ochre; the upper part of the body was
completely bare, except for beads swung around the neck, and many others not inelegantly
piled on the waist. Since they had, so to speak, just been born to a new life, "they behaved
like children in speech and mannerism, and were even called Akiyeye or Aldtata which means
'mad' or 'moronic" ".
Though strictly cultic, the Ofosi has a lot of features in common with the initiation rites
already described. There is a common interest in the esoteric, in the need to retire "away from
the crowd", rigid discipline, reference to a leader or guide. The end result of cultic "regener-
ation" is also noteworthy. The initiates emerge as "new creatures" untrammelled by the banal
habits of the world around them. Henceforth they are no longer ordinary people, but must be
referred to in quite special circumstances.
The scantiness of dress makes them no one's object but relates them more to the spirit
world than to the world of sense, since at the very beginning of the ceremony they were taken
possession of by the spirit. They had learnt to make-do with whatever they could; to endure
isolation and terror; to survive in tough circumstances; to keep secrets and the discipline
required for learning and using an esoteric language, esoteric songs and dances. Using Saint
Paul's expression, "It is no longer [they] who live" [and operate] but the spirit who lives in
themd. Their actions and attitudes in that state are completely adapted to the promptings of their
possessing spirits.
The fact that a new name is imposed on initiates is very important. Names in traditional
Nigerian culture express the very personality of the bearer, and the taking of a new name is a
significant expression for the fact that by initiation, the Ofosi has become a new person. In the
Old Testament of the Bible, God changed Abram's name to Abraham; Jacob's name was
changed to Israel; and in the New Testament Simon became Cephas or Peter, and Saul became
Paul.
It was a great honour to be made an Ofosi. The Ofosi women were held in respect by
the local people, and a husband (who had to pay the expenses) considered it an honour to have
an Ofosi as a wife. The hand of girls who became Ofosi prior to marriage were highly sought
in marriage, for it was generally conceded that an Ofosi woman was more trustworthy,
obedient and moral than other women, and it was rare for an Ofosi to try to leave her husband.
d The entire citation reads: "I have been crucified with Christ and yet I am alive;
it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me," (Galatians 2:19b-20a).
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4. Special Post-Initiation Instructions
After initiation, the lads as well as the lasses among the initiates were basically ready
for the marital stage of life. Special instructions and hints were offered them about successful
family-craft and mother-craft as they were gradually eased into the family life of their own.
The parents, too, had their own sets of instructions about the most helpful attitudes to adopt
towards their upcoming son or daughter and the spouses they might have chosen for them-
selves.
a. To the Parents of the Young Lad
1. Never tempt or try your child needlessly.
2. Care for your child most watchfully as he comes to his full
maturity.
3. Your child has left your hut and sleeps in the lads' hut now with
his contemporaries, but never say that he has left you. 34 Care for
him as usual.
4. If you see that he is late in coming home to his hut, ask him about
it: he has sense and will tell you.
5. Be patient and forgiving with your boy. As he goes out with his
equals (ie peers), he will get into trouble and you should rescue
him and forgive as well as console him.
6. Remember to watch over his health. Give him medicine when
he is not well.
7. Do not forget that as he grows up, he will do what you did.
Desire will come upon him to seek for a wife so that he may
build a household for his very own.
8. Now that your lad is one who eschews such-and-such things, never
knowingly give him what he should not have, lest he sin.
As the boy develops into adulthood and takes a wife in order to start his own family,
there was a set of instructions for him, for his wife, and for their various parents:
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b. To A Newly-Wed Husband
Listen, Oh husband: you have lived with your father and mother. They brought
you to birth, they nourished and fed you, they clothed you and looked after you
well until you matured, right up to the point when you desired and sought a wife.
Today here is the wife that Mulungu has given you. She is also just as your-
self: she has lived with her old folk who brought her to birth, fed and cared for
her, as was the case with you. Today, you note her beauty and, desiring her,
have caused her to separate from those people of hers, so that she may be truly
yours. You ought to pay heed to my words; but to hear them and to act by
them:
1. You must bear affection to her with the whole heart.
2. You must care for her, even as her own people did.
3. Let her want for nothing.
4. You must seek the medicines for her, should she be ill.
5. If you want that people should have you and your wife in esteem you
yourself should esteem her.
6. Do not forsake her for another.
7. Honour her parents and her friends.
8. Love your wife's relatives as your own, and be obedient to them.
9. Never despise your family and fellow-villagers.
10. Continue as you have been, that you bring no cause of separation bet-
ween your father's people and those of your inlaws: so that both may be
made one large community through you.
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c. To a Newly-Wed Wife
1. You must love your man.
2. You must listen to what he says, and do it.
3. You must have that care for him that his parents had.
4. You must be friendly to your husband's guests as with your own
and those of your own people.
5. You must not leave your man and love others.
6. Honour the parents of your man and all his kin.
7. Let your kindly feelings for your husband's circle be as if to one
large community with your own people.
8. Defend your man from any frightening things which are within
your knowledge.
9. Never despise parents or kin.
10. Continue as you have been, that you bring no cause of separation bet-
ween your father's people and your in-laws, that together they may be
one, single, large community.
d. To the Parents of Newly-Weds
1. Love your children and guide them rightly in this their home.
2. Honour their household, that others too may honour them.
3. Listen to their troubles and help them with their difficulties.
4. Do not be the cause of unhappiness in your children's home life.
5. Unite your own home with that of these your children, so that
you will make one large community together.
6. Hasten to their aid whenever they complain in any sort of trouble.
There are some important features that manifest themselves in this code. More than
anything else, it concentrates on the family unit and could easily pass as a set of instructions
for successful family living. There is great premium on forming a large community (b.10,
c.10, d.5). For this reason the individual gets little or no consideration. The ideals of unity
and reciprocity in rendering honour and respect run through very strongly. The ideal of solidar-
ity in times of trouble is another of these important features. Lacking, however, are injunctions
of a religious character, a sexual ethic, and some guideline for social interaction. The deity is
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only sparsely, if not indirectly, introduced. All these are important elements that could not
safely be ignored in any serious attempt at moral education.
5. Methods of Traditional Moral Education
Even though there were no systematized, formalized, school-type methods of moral
education, educators in traditional Nigerian society had at their disposal a variety of tools for
effective moral education. By far the most pervasive was emulation, by which the educand
learned to do things by actually doing them. The educator accomplished his or her task by a
repeat-after-me approach. This was the way of apprenticeship. It was applied in practically
every field of endeavour -- professional, recreational, educational. Thus one learned to be a
herbalist or fortune-teller by actually being an apprentice to an already accomplished herbal-
ist or fortune-teller, and doing as the master craftsman would direct. The same applied in
learning a new dance or song or game. Besides apprenticeship other approaches included the
use of stories and fictitious characters, the use of proverbs, riddles, aphorisms and other words
of wisdom, and the so-called "negative way" of caution and prohibition. Though generally
arranged to cater for various stages of development, they are by no means isolated from each
other. Their effect is supposed to be cumulative rather than occasional. I shall attempt to say
a bit more on each of these methods.
a. Learning By Doing: Apprenticeship And Emulation
The quick Nigerian child learned not only from his or her parents but even more by
using eyes and ears and all his or her faculties. Children were not isolated from the activities
of their elders. There was no baby-talk in the home; parents talked to their children as though
they expected them to understand normal adult speech. They also expected them to behave in
the normal manner within their level of development. There were things which were supposed
be avoided: there were words, gestures and demeanours which were considered to be in bad
taste for any young person to adopt. The child saw how his or her parents, elder brothers and
sisters behaved towards each other, towards strangers, or seniors or those of the opposite sex
and was expected to imitate them. In instances not previously clearly defined, it was through
their manifest approval or disapproval of certain things he or she did that the child was able to
know if they were right or wrong, permissible or impermissible. In general, the great facts of
human life and the origin of things were introduced into the child's mind by means of his or
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her incorporation into the daily activities. It was the manner rather than the amount of
instruction that was of prime importance.
In their initiation ceremonies, Nigerians showed themselves to be good, practical psych-
ologists. They knew that the child was very impressionable and therefore took every measure
to ensure that the impressions children received at initiation were so strong and pos tive as to
serve as a beacon in their later life. At the appropriate time, the boys were taken away into a
camp by themselves and isolated from the villagers. No woman was permitted to enter the
camp." The same was true of the girls, too, and males were not allowed into their camps. It
was important to maintain an atmosphere of seriousness and mystery as a safeguard against
levity of mind. Special costumes might be worn and men representing terrifying monsters (i.e.,
masquerades) would confront the boys at most unexpected instances. The aim was to teach
them courage and resilience in the face of the fearsome, the unusual and the unexpected. The
initiates were subjected to the severest disciplines and would emerge as "new" beings -- strong,
brave, confident and courageous -- having overcome fear, infantile dependency and timidity.
b. Use of Stories
It was a common practice in traditional Nigerian society that the family gathered to tell
tales which illustrate human activity and the consequences for good behaviour as well as the
penalties for misconduct. Moral lessons were often drawn at the end of each story. Sociologi-
cal facts were illuminated in the same way to explain the origins and consequences of divorce,
murder, incest, friendship, courage, treachery, etc. Edwin Smith reflecting on the content of
African stories credits them with moral and religious content that go a long way to forming the
young people's attitudes towards their environment!6
Stories are moulders of ideals, since they inculcate a high code of social ethics of
excellent quality for their ability to combine the provision of entertainment with the provision
of moral lessons. Another important feature of the stories was the high degree of particip-
ation they engendered. Since the tale was combined with song and the teller acted as soloist,
the participants had the opportunity to take the refrains. Often, the audience was questioned by
the story-teller when a character had to justify the behaviour he manifested, and interpolations
of assent from the audience as the tale unfolded were regularly heard. Edwin Smith gives his
assessment of the instructive value of African tales:
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African tales not only amuse and express feelings; they are educa-
tive... In recent years, the educative value of story-telling has
come to be recognized among ourselves. By educative I mean:
parents have always realized its value in practice. Tales are seen
to be the natural forms for revealing life; the natural carrier of
racial tradition or information and ideals. They are declared to
have two functions: they are a moulder of ideals; and they are an
illuminator of facts."
The following two stories illustrate the use of tales to draw moral lessons as well as
achieve other educational goals:
Story I: The Bride with Stained Teeth
A certain father found a bride for his eldest son and sent him off with
the bride-wealth to bring her home. As they were returning, the girl began to
sing: "I am a beautiful girl, but I have no teeth." He looked into her mouth and
was horrified to find a black ridge where the teeth should have been. And he
took her back to her father and claimed the return of the cattle he had handed
over.
On hearing what had happened, the second son went to get the girl, for
he thought that his brother must have made a mistake. But once again on the
road the girl sang her song, the black ridge was revealed and she was rejected
with scorn. Then amidst the jeers of his friends, the youngest son of the family
set out to try his luck. He handed over the cattle, and on the road the girl sang
her song again.
When He looked into her mouth, lo! the black ridge, and he knew his
brothers had not been mistaken. But he acted differently. "Never mind," said
this magnanimous, or less fastidious young man, "Let us go on." They came to
a river, and as they were crossing he seized her, told her to open her mouth, and
he scrubbed her mouth vigorously with sand. To his joy the black came away and
beneath there shone a set of beautiful, white teeth. The father reproached his son
for wasting good cattle... But to his delight and to the utter chagrin of the
brothers, the girl smiled and showed that her teeth were as beautiful as the rest
of her comely person.
At the end of a story like this, participants were invited to give their reactions and share
any lessons they could draw from the story. A wide-ranging variety of lessons could be drawn
from the story. A few samples will illustrate: heaven helps those who help themselves; do not
cry with horror over a bad situation, do something about it; better light one candle than curse
the darkness. On the negative side: a girl's beauty is severely tainted by carelessness over the
rules of hygiene; a little diligence enhances about anything. Since everyone was expected to
Dome up with his or her own lesson deriving from the story, passive listening would be
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completely out of the question, since no one would like to be exposed to the ridicule of others
for inability to draw a simple lesson from a story.
Another important feature which adds to the merit of this method was that each partici-
pant was able to view the story in accordance with his or her own experience and situation and
everyone benefited in the end from the sharing. A fmal point here is that each person's ap-
praisal subtly revealed his or her own End of psychology and would help those around to
understand and appreciate him or her more.
The foregoing story has been a contrast between the good, the better, and the best;
between judgment and prudishness: between practical resourcefulness and lethargy. We shall
consider another brand of moral lessons -- not the contrasts of opposites this time but the
awareness that through co-operation, virtues can and do complement and enhance each other.
On the other hand they could hardly stand in isolation from one another.
Story EL Who is the Hero?
A certain man had five children, four sons and a daughter. Sometime
after his death, the daughter disappeared. The mother called the sons together
and set them to finding their sister. They were remarkably gifted men. The
eldest was able to see things at a very great distance. On casting his eyes around
he discovered his sister fifty miles off in the clutches of a lion. The second brot-
her had the power of transporting himself through space unseen, and he rescued
his sister from the lion's claws.
On missing his prey, the lion went rampaging about, but the third son
killed him. The girl was brought home dead; and the fourth son, by virtue of
his powerful medicines, restored her to life. The mother was overjoyed, and
taking a large piece of meat she gave it to her sons, saying: "Eat, my sons. I
give it to you in gratitude for your cleverness and faithfulness." But the brothers
said: "No, give it to only one of us -- the one who did most in restoring our
sister to you, safe and sound."
The brothers in the story pass all tests and have shown themselves to be optimally-
formed, well-disciplined characters. They co-operate in solving the problem using the best of
brain and brawn. None tries to claim the credit to himself alone. When their shrewd mother
tests them for vanity they come out in flying colours by throwing their mother's challenge back
to her. They are not about to accept rewards for doing what they consider to be their bounden
duty towards their sister. Their preoccupation is to save their sister, and having successfully
accomplished that there was no point in getting lost in such trivialities as fighting over a piece
of meat.
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The two stories make use of fictional characters and fictional circumstances that are in
some respects true to life and in other respects unreal. The important issue is not the verifi-
ability of the facts of the story but the applicability of the principles behind the actions and
attitudes of the characters depicted. In many stories of this instructive nature animal characters
are often used and given human roles and human words. In that way the message is graphically
delivered without the risk of anyone taking it as a personal affront.
At the end of each story-telling session each child had a home work to do, namely to
pester a parent or uncle or any senior person to teach him or her a new story for the next day
including the moral lessons and the responsorial songs that usually accompanied and punctuated
each story. Apart from the formalized, customary overtural greetings the story-teller built up
self confidence and at the same time drew the attention of the listeners by posing a series of
rhetorical, aphoristic questions to which the audience were expected to respond Mba! (i.e., an
emphatic No!).38 Such questions involved truisms of daily experience like whether the most
skillful climber ever attempts climbing an Opete;" whether Fish ever gets drowned in the river;
or Frog ever trips in the mud; whether one could crack a nut with an egg; whether the weight-
lifter ever lifts the ground; or the child in the womb ever speaks, etc. These aphoristic one-
liners were an important tool used in highlighting moral impossibilities, or rather, moral
improbabilities. They were designed to sharpen the moral sense of the little ones by drawing
attention to the folly of one who would attempt the impossible or the inadvisable. The simple
principle being demonstrated by them is, in a word, that one should know oneself, one's
limitations and possibilities, and act within the realms of possibilities rather than exposing
oneself to the folly of attempting the ridiculously impossible.
Children would from time to time in the course of play and interaction intone a whole
range of such aphorisms with their friends chorusing the second half of each. In traditional
society it was a mark of erudition to be able to invoke strings of apt aphorisms to match any
point of discussion. More importantly people seize the opportunity of even seemingly inconse-
quential occurrences like sneezing, to reaffirm their rule of life or what might be called a
secular creed. Upon sneezing, those around will say the equivalent of "bless you!", but the one
who sneezed will proceed with a barrage of "spontaneous" affirmations of a rule of life called
In many ways the casual but effective process of internalizing and applying the content
of these aphorisms without the stress associated with formal school work, has something to say
to Western formalized methods of inculcation of ideas. By effortlessly invoking the appropriate
75
"principle" to match a given situation, a child manifests a thorough grasp of the principles, their
implications and their connections with one another with respect to daily moral determinations.
c. Use of Proverbs and Riddles
Intimately related to folk tales are proverbs and riddles. The moralizing aspect of the
tales is expressed in the terse statements of proper behaviour appended to them, often as the
culmination of the action, but sometimes only as an admonition that seems to have but little
to do with the sequence of events leading up to it. Riddles, for their part, while not a part of
the tales, form the prelude to story-telling sessions, where some of them are usually "pulled up"
as a brain-teaser to sharpen their wits for intelligent and participatory listening. A few examples
will illustrate:
Question:	 What is it that tortures you even while your parents
look on?
Answer:
	 Hunger.
Question:	 What happens to the fly that could never be advised?
Answer:
	 He is buried with the carcass.
Question:	 What happens to the despot to whom no one dares
make a suggestion?
Answer:
	 He could never be informed when his ceremonial
clothes are soiled.
The use of proverbs involves an interesting methodological point for, while it is not
difficult to record a long series of these short, pithy statements, it is quite different when one
attempts to discover their significance. This can be achieved only by employing the technique
of question-and-answer, where a hypothetical situation that seems to be in accord with the
meaning of a given saying is presented to the informant, and then varied until the addressee is
able to identify the understanding that most accurately reflects the meaning of the saying in the
particular instance.' Proverbs are used to warn, to admonish, to reprove, to guide, to praise,
to encourage. Facility in their use is a mark of erudition and elegance in speech. They reflect
more clearly than other forms of folklore the deepest-set values of the people, showing the
drives that motivate behaviour and controls that regularize the relations of an individual to his
or her fellows. Here are a few samples:
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1. Just one soiled fmger and the entire hand will be rendered soiled.
(Warning about the social implications of misconduct).
2. If the ear persistently refuses to hear, when the head is cut off,
the ear goes with it. (Admonition against
obstinacy).
3. When one resembles what he is caricatured with, laughter becomes
irrepressible. (Reproof against foolishness of conduct).
4. A child is never scalded by a piece of yam given him by his
mother. (Exhortation to trust and confidence).
5. When one is told to "keep it up", it means that his or her work
is being appreciated. (Compliments for action performed).
These proverbs flow freely in the course of daily speech and conversation. One is ex-
pected to understand them by applying them in the context. Some, however, are highly charg-
ed with meaning -- sometimes ironical, sometimes cynical, and sometimes humorous. The
addressee must do the homework him or herself and apply the message accordingly. The wise
person will draw the lesson, the foolish will fail to see the point. Here are some examples:
i)	 "The lazy man eats little" is used to chide one who is eating
heartily, but who had earlier refused to work.
II)
	 "When an oil-palm nut is eaten in a hurry, ants get the lion's
share" is used to back to reason one given to precipitous actions.
ill)
	 "Taking out with one hand and replacing with the other keeps
the store stocked for tomorrow" is a thoughtful reminder for
injudicious spending or use of things.
An important feature that renders such proverbs effective in driving home the moral
message is, as has already been shown, that they could be attributed to an animal or even an
inanimate object such as Tortoise, or Lizard, or Python — anything whose characteristics could
demonstrate the point being made. If the addressee chooses to take offence, let him or her refer
to the animal quoted.
In style, Igbo proverbs employ terse and archaic terms for maximum effect. Such
archaic words as bgbri, bgbdb, nnekOlOchie, dmil-nnadi, are preferred to the more modern
equivalents of nwdnyi, akwa, Oki-ibiri nwanyi, ndi-mmddis, and mean respectively woman,
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clothing, old woman, and people. Thus the truant child is often warned: "Nwdta a ndghl
agbadhd mbembe yd n'as6" — no matter how fast or far a child tries to flee, he could never
outrun his buttocks. That means that one's task, though unpleasant could never be escaped by
flight. (In contemporary language mbembe or buttocks will be expressed by "lice").
When one manages to pull through some personal difficulty in spite of a neighbour's
refusal to help, the former is likely to declare as follows: "The a wbrb nwanyi a gbddld
n'ahirf" -- literally, what a woman has been tantalized about has glutted the market, i.e., what
was vaunted as being beyond anyone's reach has turned out to be something commonplace. The
preference for archaic terms is dictated by the need to strike the chord of antiquity with the
attendant authority it lends the principle being invoked, and to show that it was there before the
speaker referred to them.
d. The Negative Way of Caution
Victor Uchendu points out an important method of instilling traditional morality through
deterrence from laxity. He observes that Nigerians "tend to wash their dirty linen in public."
Thus the fact that all eyes are watching and all tongues are ready to wag, places a strong check
on people's tendencies to laxity. When women quarrel, for instance, they mercilessly expose
each other's follies and foibles -- as they might have gathered from local and domestic gossip.
Yelling at the top of their voices they narrate with graphic details each other's darkest sides.
Uchendu calls this a transparent orientation, and anyone who would not have his or her sins
told in the market place had better watch his or her conduct.42
The negative way, though prevalent at the level of speech is not limited to speech alone;
it applies also at the level of action and daily living. In daily social interaction, for example,
foods and drinks are tasted by the host prior to their being offered to a guest. This is to show
that they are free of any harmful contents. The host thus manifests his or her good will in first
tasting what he or she has to offer. Not to taste a victual before presenting it can be construed
as not to vouch for its wholesomeness. More importantly, to refuse something offered even
after it has been tasted speak volumes about how the hosts moral, social and spiritual standing
has been perceived by the guest. Usually words are not required to make the point. ° Anyone
that must enjoy the confidence of those around him or her must be seen to be beyond guile. It
goes beyond an individual's clear conscience. A clear conscience must manifest itself in ways
that are identifiable by the community or it is as good as no conscience at all.
The concept of the good life is so built on transparency that the individual would dread
anything with the potential to bring about shame or loss of face in any form. It is the people
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that give praise or blame and they base their judgment on what they know see, hear, or in any
way perceive about a person's external conduct. Thus the major deterrent of crime, concludes
Uchendu, is not guilt-feeling but shame-feeling."
6. Conclusion
Traditional moral education in Nigeria has been able to provide comprehensively for
all facets of human conduct and inter-personal relationships. It may lack the complexity and
sophistication of the nuclear age, but its very simplicity has been its great strength. In its pure
form, it has been free of the assaults of casuistic rhetoric that has characterized many modern
ethical theories. The theories are often criticized. Barry Williams and Donald MacKinnon, for
example, in their book Soundings, claim that a great deal of what Christians often call virtue,
on closer inspection turn out to be cowardice.° Paul TilLich speaks of the moral law as too
intolerable to be borne. John A.T. Robinson criticises the idea of moral laws which come down
direct from heaven and are eternally valid for human conduct.°
Considered from those points of view, both the Judeo-Christian decalogue and the
Kantian universalism of moral law will be found to be in instant trouble. Hegel would argue
that nature and the moral agent are governed by separate sets of laws. In his view nature has
no concern with moral consciousness, and the moral consciousness has no concern with nature.
Nothing matters to the moral consciousness except its own inner purity. The moral agent,
nevertheless, has to act and carry out purposes in the world, with the result that he cannot
dislocate himself from the world altogether, but must in some measure at least subordinate it
to himself.
J.D. Mabott goes further to argue against the Kantian universalism: he insists that
universalization produces a self-contradiction, since no new rules would be possible. According
to him, if everyone said what was false, no one should expect the truth and so no one could be
deceived. Therefore, "universal lying" is a self-contradiction, and so would be universal
stealing.'
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CHAPTER FOUR
MORAL EDUCATION FOR NATIONAL COHESION:
PROBLEMS AND RESOURCES
No man is an Band, Satre of it selfe; every man is a peece of the Continent, a part of
the make... any man's death diminishes me, because l am involved in Mankinde.
—JOHN DONNE, For Whom the Bell Tolls.
1 do not know the method of drawing up an indictment against an whole people.
—EDMUND BURKE, Speech on Conciliation.
1. Role of Moral Education in National Cohesion
Moral education has a role to play in achieving national cohesion especially if it
incorporates within its content the ideals that the country stands for. By focusing on the
ethical elements of the political life, and by being thoroughly informed regarding the
basic principles for which the country was constituted, it will dispose the students to
work for unity and co-operation.
Moral education inculcates the spirit of goodwill and understanding in at least three
ways: First, it helps the people acquire the right information and understandings
essential to constructive and dynamic citizenship. Second, it offers the parameter for
assessing human behaviour thereby freeing people from cynicism and unfounded
speculation. Third, in its application, moral education teaches people how to get along
well with others and how to understand them rather than censure them. These things it
can accomplish by teaching moral principles as well as by drawing moral lessons from
the historical, political, religious, social and economic experiences of individuals and
communities in the country. It will highlight the ideals to be pursued and the errors to
be avoided, in order to emerge as a strong and prosperous nation.
In the school, moral education helps to create the right attitudes and dispositions
needed to translate the factual information received into action. Students are thus
enabled to explore individually and collectively how they could contribute to national
understanding and harmony. Furthermore, it also develops in the students sensitivity to
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the feelings and opinions of others. Emotionally, spiritually and intellectually, the
students develop genuine interest in what goes on not only within their local com-
munities but throughout the entire country. The well-being of the country and all
citizens thus become a significant factor in their lives, and they develop the disposition
to commit themselves wholeheartedly to the ideals and promises of a united and peaceful
country.
2. The Problem
Nigeria did not start off as an organic whole but as an agglomeration of nationali-
ties brought together by a colonial fiat. The task now is to turn this artificial creation
into a cohesive, coherent entity. While the British ruled Nigeria, their policy was never
directed at creating a common national loyalty. Since their primary loyalty was to the
British Crown, they were more interested in consolidating British authority. They
established one system of law throughout Nigeria to enable them govern the whole
country effectively. As a further measure towards ensuring effective government, they
imposed English as the official language in the hope that ethnic loyalties would
gradually dissolve into, and be supplanted by feelings of a national loyalty well suited
to the British interests. This hope has met with but partial fulfilment. Nigerians are still
known by their distinctive dress, facial and other tribal markings (where such exist),
various languages, distinctive social, religious and cultural traits. When these differences
are emphasized, the centre could hardly hold.
The problem in Nigeria can be described as one of a polarity of interests. This
polarity manifests itself in centrifugal ethnic tendencies; inter-ethnic rivalry; tensions
arising from disparities in socio-psychological well being; differing religious attitudes;
the lack of a common national language; and contentious educational policies.
a. Centrifugal Ethnic Tendencies
Nigeria has paid a high price for unity in terms of the Civil War where more than
two million people lost their lives. The Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) has been refer-
red to by many as a war of Unity.' Yet two decades after the war, unity still seems to
be eluding Nigeria. The states are as distant and polarized as ever. Religious, ethnic and
political bigotry seem to increase by the day and, above all, disagreement as to where
the problem lies has made it impossible to agree as to what the solution would be.
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As the national cnsis brewed in 1966, General Ironsi's attempt at a unitary form of
government cost him his life2. Much as Nigerians talk of national unity, it is quite
surprising to note that few have the disposition for it. Ethnic loyalties are much
stronger than national loyalties. In a most revealing survey carried out by Margaret Peil
in 1973, the psychological stonewalling between the various groups was shown to be
still strong. For her survey Peil chose the heartland of the major ethnic areas,
apparently supposing that they would be typical: Ajegunle (Lagos) for the Yorubas,
Kalcuri (Kaduna) for the Hausa-Fulanis, and Aba (Imo) for the Igbos. 2 These three
ethnic areas -- often cynically referred to as the Big Three — are at the centre of the
ethnic rivalry in the country. Peil's survey revealed that in Lagos 14% of the Edos,
14% of the Efik, 100% of the Hausa, 50% of the Igbo, 79% of the Tiv, 57% of the
Zugu interviewed would like to live with Hausas; 36% &los, 29% Efik, 0% Hausa, 7%
Igbo, 7% Tiv, 14% Yoruba, 86% Zugu, will have nothing to do with Hausas. For
space we shall not go into the distribution for the Yorubas and Igbos but suffice it to
say that the pattern is exactly the same.
b. Inter-ethnic Rivalry
Another great problem is the ethnic rivalry among the different groups. Each ethnic
group resents the ascendancy of any other. The ensuing rivalry is due to a number of
factors.
1. The sharing of the limited resources of a country towards which
states and ethnic zones feel but little or no spontaneous affection
or obligation. The award of scholarships, the provision of roads
and water facilities, and all that might be called social rights, have
become the attributes of the ethnic groups rather than that of the
central government.
2. There is a new bearing in the definition of one's group identity.
Traditionally, most Nigerians aspired to the level attained by their
neighbouring ethnic groups. Now the wealth acquired by a
neighbouring group is often perceived by rival groups as an unfair
"share of the National Cake". Every group wants its own chunk
of this "cake".
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3. The new civil arrangements have often upturned traditional
patterns of power relationships between neighbouring ethnic groups
and introduced new expectations and struggles for political power.
Dynastic rulership enjoyed by some people in some parts of the
country has become suddenly threatened by the power of the vote
in the new system, and the possibility of being voted out of office
fills the incumbents with misgivings. Many of them would consi-
der it in their best interests to maintain the parochial status quo
rather than submit to widening of bases that would diminish their
influence.
A clear indication of this sense of unease can be shown in the penchant for using the
threat of secession as a bargaining chip. In 1954 the Yorubas openly hinted about the
possibility of secession and indeed pressed for a secession clause in the Constitution of
Nigeria. In 1956 and again in 1966, the Hausa and Fulani leaders also threatened
secession. As already shown in Chapter One, the coup that brought Gowon to power in
1966 was said to have been a secession coup which was discouraged by the British
Government. That was why the main plotter, Murtala Muhammed reportedly backed out
of it leaving Gowon to go on. In 1967 the Calabaris under Isaac Adalca Boro actually
carried out the threat but were contained after three days. The same 1967 also saw the
Biafran secession which was sustained for thirty months. All this is symptomatic of the
chronic uneasiness experienced by the members of the various ethnic groups among each
other and the consequent reluctance to interact.
c. Tensions Arising from Differences in Social and Psychological Well Being
There is a considerable reluctance, or perhaps unease among the various segments
of the Nigerian population to interact among themselves. The rich do not find any
common ground for interacting with the poor, nor the uneducated with the educated. On
the social map of the country, some areas have a higher proportion of educated citizens
than others, and consequently more people in upper and lower middle class positions
with access to a higher standard of living.
The difference in social and psychological well-being arise from differences in the
level of education, standard of living, and mode of thinking, perceiving and interpret-
ing events and occurrences in society. It gives rise to a social and psychological distance
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among the various segments of the Nigerian population. Psychological distance is a
consequence of social distance, and sometimes it may be in the selfish interest of some
people to fan its flames. Social distance often leads to psychological distance, since
people of humble means are likely to keep their distance from those whose means are
higher.
d. Differing Religious Attitudes
Religion has also become a key factor in the political environment in Nigeria. The
storm clouds that gathered over the controversial and surreptitious inclusion of Nigeria
as a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) positively identifying her
as an Islamic State, tend to thicken rather than clear up. The late Chief Obafemi
Awolowo spotted the sombre clouds of divergency as far back as in 1947 and lamented
how religion had created a deep gulf between the Northern and Southern portions of the
country:
The peoples of Western and Eastern Regions of the South
approach religion with remarkable moderation and nonchalance:
Christians, Mohammedans, and so-called Pagans mix in society
without restraint. The people of the North, however, are extremely
fanatical about Islamism.'
There is widespread anger over what appears to be a fanatical commitment by some
Muslims to their religious tenets regardless of how everyone else is affected. Even
though the Northern part of Nigeria has a Muslim majority of 71%, Islam comes away
with a trailing 43.5% in the West while in the East it registers a near-insignificant .3 %5,
and an overall 45% nationwide6. The following table will illustrate the situation more
vividly':
Table 5:
East Midwest North West
Muslims 29,964 106,857 21,386,450 4,753,225
(.3%) (42%) (71.7%) (43.5%)
Christians 9,573,622 1,393,009 2,881,437 5,359,075
(77.2%) (54.9%) (9.7%) (49.0%)
Others 2,790,876 1,035,973 5,540,773 818,793
(22.5%) (40.9%) (18.6%) (7.5%)
Source: John J.Stremlau, International Politics of the Mgerian Mil War, p.114.
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e. Lack of a Common National Language With Which All Can Identify
The question of a national language also became a controversial issue in Nigeria: the
question of a lingua franca for the country led to endless debates producing no consen-
sus.' Ethnic chauvinism took the centre stage as the Hausas, Yorubas and Igbos each
wanted theirs to be the national language rather than any other. The late Obafemi
Awolowo had advocated the creation of states in Nigeria along ethnic lines as a way to
solve the problem9. This suggestion was, at least at its face value, overly optimistic. It
would lead to the creation of some two hundred and fifty states in Nigeria corres-
ponding to the different ethnic groups, since none of these groups would like to be
annexed to the other. As a result three mammoth states (Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba), will
emerge with more than 60% of the population leaving the other 40% or 40 million to
be divided into 247 statee -- at least theoretically. When 19 states were created out of
the 250 linguistic groups it seems that the principle followed was to consider the natural
affinity of the various groups and group them accordingly."
The practice of projecting the three major languages of Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba
almost at the expense of the others does not help matters very much either. There is no
necessary connection between unity and language. What unites is not a system of codes
but a disposition of heart. For example not all who speak Arabic are united. In the
Persian Gulf and the Middle East, the common religious language of Arabic, has not
united Iran and Iraq, or Syria and Lebanon, or the people of Afghanistan. War has been
the daily experience in that turbulent zone.
Peter Ekeh notes that millions of Fulani speak Hausa and yet assert their Fulani
identity, and the Igalla and Itseldri in spite of the striking similarity of their language
to the Yoruba language, would never tolerate being called Yoruba. 12 By the same token
the Ikwerres of Rivers State would distinguish themselves from the Igbos even though
their language is Igbo. It is possible for people to speak the same language and yet
remain worlds apart.
Some see the diversity of languages in Nigena as the great obstacle, but this need
not be so. Since diversity of language and customs has not hampered international co-
operation and fnendship, it should be possible to co-operate on the national level. As
Simpson and Yinger observe, 13 differences in language, religion and belief in the best
methods for achieving life's values are not only permissible but necessary for a society
that is eager to find better ways of solving its problems. Nigeria can prosper only by
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promoting the integration of all ethnic groups while permitting, and indeed encouraging
a wide and diversified pluralism.
f. Contentious Educational Policies
There has hardly been an educational policy in Nigeria that has not been riven with
contention. Lord Lugard's accession in 1903 to the request of the Muslims of the
Northern part of Nigeria that "government will in no way interfere with religion... (and
that) mosques and prayer places will be treated with respect by us," was construed as
insulating the Muslims against Western education and placing them at an educational
disadvantage on the national scene.
The colonial educational policy was criticised for creating a preference for grammar
schools over technological.15
When in 1956 the Eastern Regional government wanted to introduce a programme
of Free Primary Education, which the Western Regional Government had already
implemented in the West a year earlier the Catholic hierarchy opposed it on the grounds
that there was no provision for religious education'''. Some suggest, however, that the
chief reason was to prevent an erosion of Catholic control of primary education". There
was a bid in 1976 to reintroduce Free primary education nationwide in the so-called
Universal Primary Education or UPE. That attempt too was short lived.
There is widespread dissatisfaction over the alleged favouritism behind the siting,
funding and administration of Federal Government schools. There is the complaint that
in the siting and funding of institutions, the hiring and firing of staff, the admission and
enrolment of students, some areas have had more than their fair share while others have
been left at the bare margin of things.
The government policy of establishing Federal Government Colleges in strategic
locations country-wide was intended to ensure an even pace of qualitative educational
development throughout the country is a welcome one, but it does not go far enough.
In the first place, there are too few of these institutions to make any sigiuficant national
impact soon. Secondly, their very fewness and tough entry requirements almost
automatically makes it an exclusive preserve of those whose parents could afford to
provide the extra instructions almost always required to pass the entrance examinations.
As things have turned out, most of the students are the children of the upper middle
class. Thirdly, the favoured treatment they receive from the government is often
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perceived as a conspiracy to create and maintain a privileged class of citizens main-
tained by government at the expense of other citizens.
The educational policy that has had the most radical impact in Nigerian educational
history is the state take-over of schools. It began in the East Central State, and was soon
copied by the other states. The ostensible reason of achieving a planned and integrated
system of education has however, not been achieved, for there is little, if any, evidence
of any such integration as school textbooks varied from one state to another. In the first
place, no such integrated programme ever came out. Secondly, the huge cost of
financing elementary and secondary education became the responsibility of the states,
and the East Central State, (later to become Imo and Anambra States), was soon unable
to pay the bills required for the schools they inherited. Teachers' salaries often went
unpaid and they resorted to industrial action which sometimes dragged on for months.
There was therefore no opportunity to put their dreams of take-over to a real test;
instead the standards badly deteriorated, leading to persistent questioning of the policy.
On the national level, education became a controversial issue when the balance was
tilted in favour of the so-called educationally disadvantaged areas at the expense of the
so-called educationally advantaged. The hiring of staff, the appointment of vice
chancellors, the allocation of funds to the various institutions of higher learning, all have
become occasions for complaint and speculation. Why, for instance, are academic and
administrative positions reserved for those who are still engaged in fulltime studies while
other Nigerians competent for the same position are bypassed or hired on a non-renew-
able contract basis? Why do some people receive guaranteed Federal Government
sponsorship for studying abroad while others are completely left out? How come that
some people are appointed to positions where they are the boss over their seniors and
former mentors in the field? The dust will probably not settle until the ground for such
questions is removed.
3. Addressing the Problems: Government Action
Various solutions have been suggested including: to bridge the social and
psychological distances; to divest Nigeria of vestiges of foreign dependency and promote
a national sense; that Nigeria be decolonized by having its name changed," and all
remaining trappings of colonialism including Christianity and the western form of
government. Some of the proposals are clearly off the mark, since both Christianity and
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the various forms of government are as good or bad as those who operate them. The
discomfort over Christianity arises from the challenging moral demands it make on its
adherents even in public life. As for the change of name, by itself it does not unite a
country unless it is accompanied by a removal of the factors that caused the division.
In accordance with the motto of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which is Unity and
Faith, Peace and Progress, the Constitution makes it government's duty to actively
promote national integration. A sure way to both national cohesion and effective moral
education is the creation of a conducive social, political and moral environment. Most
of the steps require government action:
a. critically reviewing the political system and aiming at what is
adapted to Nigeria's needs and circumstances;
b. changing the socio-economic structure that seems to favour the few
and disfavour the majority;
c. bridging the social and psychological distances that result from
such a structure;
d. encouraging social mobility across ethno-linguistic lines;
e. reviewing the system of justice to ensure equal justice under the
law in a uniform system of justice;
f. a vigorous programme of mass civic and related forms of
education to enable the citizens to understand and better appreciate
their national values;
g. a general review of educational and related policies to reflect the
ideals of national unity and promote mutual understanding among
the citizens.
h. improving transport and communications links that will facilitate
the interaction of the citizens.
a. Critically Reviewing the Political System
It is important to examine critically the political system that is operative in Nigeria
to see if it is actually effective in bringing about national cohesion. The question might
be raised as to whether Nigeria's cohesion is better guaranteed as a federation with
semi-autonomous states; as a confederation with the states quasi autonomous; or as a
unitary government with the states nominally autonomous or with no autonomy at all;
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or "an entirely new arrangement which will be peculiar to Nigeria and which has not
yet found its way into any political dictionary. "9
The question is not a new one in Nigeria. It has been in discussion prior to indepen-
dence and after the counter coup that put an end to Ironsi's decree establishing a unitary
form of government. In September 1966, the then Head of State Yalcubu Gowon
formally abolished the Unification Decree which was a great bone of contention in the
Ironsi regime and reinstated the Federal system of Government. He had convened a
constitutional conference to consider the four options which while ruling out a unitary
form had room for an entirely new arrangement.
b. Review the Socio-Economic Structure
The Constitution (11.16.1a) has stated the economic objectives of the country to
include the running of the economy in such a way as to secure the maximum welfare,
freedom and happiness of every citizen on the basis of social justice and equality of
status and opportunity. The social and economic structure which overwhelmingly
favours the nch against the poor must be reviewed. In this connection the salary
structure keeps a few rich while many are left in poverty. A study by Oladimeji Alo
of the salary structure in the Western State of Nigeria for the year 1966-1973 shows
this amazing disparity. In the 1966/67 fiscal year, 89% of tax payers in the Western
State earned N.200 (two hundred naira) or less, while 1% earned above N.1000.00.
For the 1971/72 fiscal year, the ratio of earnings between the lowest and the if ghest
income groups stood at more than 5:1. 21
 A breakdown of the figures in the years under
review show that the poorest 20% received only 8% of the gross income; the poorest
60% received only 27.50%; the middle 40-60% received only 11.50%, while the top
20% got 57% and the topmost 5% took a whole 40% of the gross national income."
This salary structure remains basically operational countrywide till date.
c. Bridge the Social and the Psychological Distances
Injudicious management of the national economy has rendered the government
financially incapable of providing such rights as free education at the primary,
secondary, university and adult literacy levels. This inability contributes in no small way
to the perpetuation of the social and psychological distances, since it undermines the
basis of "equality of status and opportunity" sought by the Constitution by limiting
access to education and all its promises only to those who can afford to pay for it.
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Social distance can also be eliminated through social mobility -- the possibility to
settle and earn one's living anywhere in Nigeria as provided for in the Constitution
(II. 15b). So far the government, especially in the states, has shown great reluctance in
granting residency rights to Nigerians who wish to settle in states other than their
"home" states. Interviews for jobs and the issuance of certificates of occupancy usually
give priority to the "sons (or daughters) of the soil."
d. Encourage Social Mobility Across Ethno-Linguistic Lines
Because of the social and psychological distance as well as ethnic rivalries, many
Nigerians are unable or unwilling to marry outside their own ethnic area. As a result,
their perception of the other peoples remains distant and peripheral, and they remain
perpetually strangers. Citizens know only about the textbook compatriots of fantasy but
never get to meet or know the real ones. Hence the Constitution (II.15c,d) encourages
"intermarriage among persons from different places of origin, or of different religious,
ethnic or linguistic associations or ties," and the promotion or encouragement of the
formation of "associations that cut across ethnic, linguistic, religious or other sectional
barriers."
e. Review the System of Justice
In Nigeria's judicial system there exist at the Federal level the Supreme Court, the
Federal Court of Appeal, and the Federal High court. Notwithstanding the human errors
that sometimes arise in the delivery of justice, the system is uniform in its demands on
every citizen. The same is true of the High Courts in the states. There is no problem
with the customary court of appeal since it limits itself to matters of local customs
where constitutional provisions are lacking.
The problem arises with the demands of the Sharia Court of Appeal which is based
on the Islamic Religion. Its point of reference is the Koran instead of the Constitution.
Although said to apply only to Muslims (Constitution 242), it provides for the
possibility "where all the parties to the proceedings (whether or not they are muslims)
have requested the court that hears the case in the first instance to determine that case
in accordance with Islamic personal law... "(242e). The implication here is the
possibility of a parallel system of justice based on religious lines and independent of the
laws of the land.
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Though its declared area of jurisdiction is questions of personal law regarding the
validity or dissolution of a marriage contracted according to Islamic law, and questions
regarding walif, (a gift, will or succession where the deceased person is a Muslim), the
Sharia law can stretch to other areas of human interaction. Muslim litigants might
collude to circumvent the laws of the country in other matters by opting for hearings
according to the Sharia court, and probably get away with little or no penalties. When
the dispute is between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, the issues are compounded.
According to Hyppolyte Adigwe 23, under a Sharia law, non-Muslims do not enjoy
equality of status as Muslims. He refers to the Qasas or retrievation law which states
that punishment of similar severity should be meted out to any offender, but which is
promptly modified when a non-Muslim is involved. Thus if a non-Muslim kills a
Muslim, the doctrine is fully applied; but if a Mushm kills a non-Muslim it does not
apply since, in the words of the Prophet himself, "the brain of a non-Muslim is half that
of a Muslim's". A non-Muslim woman who is married to a Muslim cannot, under the
Sharia, inherit his property should he die; nor can a non-Mushm brother inherit his
deceased Muslim brother's property.
In matters pertaining to marriage, a marriage contracted between a Muslim and a
non-Muslim is deemed null and void and if such a marriage comes before the Sharia
Court it will be dissolved forthwith with no benefits to the non-Muslim partner who,
according to Islamic law, has no rights in the first place. Finally, a Muslim convert-
ing to Christianity is given three days to turn to his onginal faith. If he fails, he is
killed.°
Since the system of justice is meant to protect all the rights and freedoms of the
citizen as guaranteed by the constitution, a system of justice that places one citizen
above another on any basis whatever, is prejudicial to the Constitution. Since Nigeria
is not an Islamic but a secular state, and has a population that is 49% Christian, 6%
belonging to other religions, and 45% Muslim according to 1980 estimates, 26 a unified
system of justice is more likely than any other to ensure equal justice, equal rights to
citizens.
f. Massive Citizenship Education
Besides education in the liberal arts and exact sciences, a well-rounded political
education is necessary for a fuller appreciation of what it means and what it takes to be
a responsible citizen in modern Nigeria. It requires a joint effort between the govern-
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ment and the school. The government provides the sponsorship while the school
provides the educational programme. The programme will involve themes on the status
of citizens", their rights and obligations as provided for by the Constitution", the
meaning and process of democracy", and the social, political and moral virtues that
dispose citizens to work for harmony, peace and progress in a democracy'. As can be
seen, most of these themes are contained in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, some are found in the National Anthems (old and new) and the National
Pledge31 , while the rest are found scattered in government documents.
There is therefore ample resource material to sustain such a school programme, and
a coherent scheme capable of producing the required result can be drawn up from them.
In the National Pledge, the Nigerian pledges to be "faithful, loyal and honest", and "to
defend (Nigeria's) unity." The national anthems (old and new) stand for brotherhood
and tolerance in spite of the great diversity in the country, and the National Coat-of-
Arms bears the inscription: Unity and Faith.
In addition to school work, extensive use should be made of the print and electro-
nic media -- film strips, documentaries, symposia, seminars -- for a deeper education
on issues of national unity, the desirability of unity over division, the stunting effects
of ethnicity, the positive aspects of pluralism, the place of religion and the need for
prudence and moderation in its exercise.
g. Review Educational Policies
Government educational policy can play a catalytic role in bringing about the desired
understanding and shared ideals among students. In view of the fact that students,
especially those of the Federal Government Colleges who have placements outside their
"states of origin", never get to know and associate with the local environment outside
the school precincts, a programme of interstate exchange during the summer period will
enable students to experience the direct family environment in the host state, and
establish friendships that could last a lifetime. Such exchange programmes have been
successfully carried out among alumni of certain institutions and have involved students
from Europe. It is commendable that the National Youth Service Corps already operates
on that principle of national integration such that young graduates are required to
perform their National Youth Service outside their home states.
National cohesion does not come from a few citizen satisfied at the expense a
majority of their compatriots. In the siting of educational institutions, care should be
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taken to consider the serviceability of such institutions to the local community. A
Federal Government College is of no use in a locality if the children cannot get into it,
but play perpetual hosts to others from other places. Thus, while qualitative education
is sought, adequate provision should be made for all who want to be educated. The
educational institutions should therefore be sited where they could be of maximum
benefit to the local population without necessarily excluding children from other
localities who wish to be educated therein.
In government institutions, effort should be made to promote national integration. In
the Federal Government Colleges the spirit of integration is not quite as evident as
might be desired. Most students complete their course of studies without getting to know
any bit of the place where their school is located. They learn everything but ignore the
local realities around them. They march, sing, dance, dramatize — but all in English or
French and never get to learn the local language. They are in fact forbidden to use the
vernacular. They are thus ill equipped to interact outside the controlled school en-
vironment. From this point of view, the Federal Government Colleges have failed
because of their inability to help the students integrate into their local environment. The
schools as they are now, are no more useful for National unity and national integration
than any school in Britain or France. All they achieve in that regard is like training
people to be foreigners in their own country.
Furthermore, the state take-over of schools has been perceived to be a punitive
measure directed against the voluntary agencies involved in the field of education.
Concerning the compulsory acquisition of property the Constitution (IV:40) forbids any
such acquisition. This situation must be justly resolved either by offering compensation
for the schools or their return to their original owners. Since free enterprise is
encouraged in Nigeria, there is no justification for clamping down on those who chose
the field of education as their own field of endeavour especially since such has been
specifically provided for in the Constitution. Since the controversy has dragged on now
for twenty years it is time to resolve it either by a referendum or by a constitutional
amendment.
h. Improve Transport and Communications Links Between the Peoples.
Where citizens have the facility to travel through all parts of the country and
communicate easily, their knowledge and appreciation of the country as a unit is
improved and enhanced. The language barrier will steadily diminish as through sheer
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interaction most people find a reason to get to know each other's language in order to
be able to communicate with them. But where everyone remains confined to his or her
ethnic zone there could never be a point of meeting.
4. The Constitution: Ideals and Reality
A country's constitution is its most important document since it outlines its national
objectives for itself and its citizens. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
provides an indispensable reference point for the country's national life. Talking about
the nature and composition of the government, it states that government should be
"carried out in such a way as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria (by ensuring
that) there be no predominance of persons from a few States or from a few ethnic or
other sectional groups in that government or any of its agencies in order to "promote a
sense of belonging and loyalty among all the peoples of the Federation" (11.3,4). The
opening statement of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1979) states
as follows:
"We the people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, having firmly
and solemnly resolved: To live in unity and harmony as one,
indivisible, and indissolubly sovereign nation under God,
dedicated to the promotion of inter-African solidarity, world
peace, international cooperation and understanding: And to pro-
vide for a Constitution for the purpose of promoting good
government and welfare of all persons in our country on the
principles of freedom, equality and justice, and for the purpose of
consolidating the unity of our people: do hereby make.., the
following Constitution:"
It is significant that in the Constitution "the people of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria resolved..." The implication is that over and above any individual interests or
considerations, the people had resolved to find principles to govern social and political
life without necessarily beclouding individual concerns. The Constitution therefore forms
a moral basis, and has important consequences for moral reflection. In it the people
agree to an arrangement which they consider to be fair to all, but without actually
worrying about how it will benefit them personally.
The Constitution highlights such ideals as loyalty, honesty and fidelity which are the
characteristics of good citizens. Loyalty among citizens precludes rebellion against
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legitimate authority or engagement in any form of subversive activity. Loyal citizens do
whatever is necessary to uphold and maintain their nation's goals and ideals. They stand
by their country through thick and thin; they obey its laws, and uphold its values. A
striking fact about Nigeria at the present moment is that almost everything about it
seems to operate unconstitutionally. The incumbent administration came into being
unelected having seized power by force. This is clearly contrary to the provisions of the
Constitution that no person or group of persons shall "take control of the Government
of Nigeria or any part thereof except in accordance with the provisions of this
constitution" (1:1,2).
The Constitution specifies that Nigeria is a secular state where everyone is equal
under the law. The provisions of the Sharia law negate this provision by treating
litigants unequally if they are non-Muslims. Furthermore, §35 of the Constitution which
guarantees freedom of thought, freedom of conscience and freedom of association is
thwarted by a favouring of one religion or mode of perception over others. In §10 of
Chapter MI of the Constitutions it is clearly stated: "The Government of the Federation
or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion." The registering of Nigeria
into the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) contravenes the Constitution by
implying that Nigeria is an Islamic state whose laws will favour Islamic tenets.
The objectives of the OIC which require the appointment of only Muslims into
strategic national and international posts contravene the equal opportunities clause, and
goes against the principle of maintaining the Federal Character in all government
appointments. Guaranteed to Muslims under the OIC provision are the posts of Presi-
dent, Defence Minister, Foreign Minister, Oil Minister, Finance and Economic Plann-
ing, and Education and Technology.
Nigeria's record with regard to adherence to the prescriptions of the Constitution is
quite unsatisfactory. It is riven by corruption, abuse of office and mismanagement in
high places. The constitutional ideals and those provided by other documents are
frequently ignored, and people do only what brings them or their interest group the
greatest advantage. National goals are then conveniently set aside. So long as national
goals are set aside in favour of parochial ones, there is no chance of the diverse peoples
of Nigeria can come together since everyone will be too busy with local issues to be
concerned with national interests. Our individual needs and desires are always greater
than our individual power to satisfy them; and they can be fulfilled only by the co-
operative effort of society.
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5. The Challenges of Pluralism
Pluralism's challenge in Nigeria manifests itself in ethnic, religious and linguistic
diversity. It is a daunting task for Nigerians to seek to hold together in spite of the
diversity. The challenge of pluralism was met by an impressive motto powerfully
expressed in the first Nigerian National Anthem:
Though tribe and tongue may differ, in brotherhood we stand,
Nigerians all, and proud to serve our sovereign motherland.
In this connection, to attain the national goals of unity and brotherhood, tolerance
and openness are a must. Many philosophers have sustained the thesis that the good
society is characterized by the co-existence of many social groupings. As Charles
Dechert points out," the concept of pluralism leads to a conceptual model of a pluralis-
tic society characterized by a multiplicity of dimensions in social life (political, religi-
ous, economic, territorial, ethnic, etc.), and a multiplicity of groups within a given
dimension. What is most desirable in a pluralistic society is the possibility of a many-
pronged development of characteristics best adapted to the goals of human survival, and
a relatively high degree of personal freedom. This would require an institutional struc-
ture that would permit the competitive interplay of various groupings while bringing into
action automatic compensations based upon mutual interdependence in order to prevent
a monopoly of power by any single group.
Plato divides his Republic according to functional groups. Aristotle for his part bases
his morphology of Constitutions on the number ruling. But while his distinction between
oligarchy and democracy essentially implies a class distinction, his polity is charac-
terized by a balance of class interests and participation. In either case the goal is unity
amidst a diversity of functions, of backgrounds and of methods. Nigeria's circumstan-
ces require an admixture of both principles, namely a clarification of the modes and
conditions of interaction in a situation where there is a diversity of backgrounds,
tendencies and functions. The application of these two principles will give rise to an
amicable, open-minded, non-confrontational approach to the challenges; a tolerant, non-
censorious approach to divergent religious views; and a positive effort to evolve an
integrated set of moral values in Nigeria.
Conflict and competition need not always characterize human interaction. If
anything, they are only an existential hazard, and hazards as chance events need not
dictate the tempo of life and activity. Co-operation, rather than confrontation is of
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crucial importance where unity is the goal. Compared to toleration it seems to demand
a higher level of understanding and autonomy for, while toleration could possibly be
construed as coldness and indifference, co-operation is an evidence of genuine interest
in and acceptance of, the prosperity of another's activity. Moreover, a large part of
societal interactions occur symbiotically, and each individual and group benefits from
the existence and actions of others. Therefore, if Nigeria's institutional structure can
produce a high degree of mutual dependency rather than antagonism, the challenge of
pluralism would have been successfully met.
The first step in achieving mutual co-operation in a pluralist society is mutual
toleration. Toleration operates on a simple principle: I may not share your views but I
do respect your right to hold them. John Stuart Mill said something similar in his
defence of liberty and individuality by showing the indirect benefits of toleration. He
argued that only individuals of strong character will set examples of more enlightened
conduct, and that unless they were allowed the freedom to set this example the gener-
ality of persons will lose the opportunity of witnessing innovative examples with the
possible benefits to their own conduct.
It must be pointed out, though, that the right to be different, which is one of the
characteristics of autonomy is protected in both toleration and co-operation. Robert
Nozick makes a similar point when he points out that there is not one kind of life that
is best for the variety of individuals that exist. Individuals should be free to pursue their
own kind of life provided they respected the right of others!' The individual or com-
ponent group must realize that there are practical limitations on the extent to which
individuals living in the same society can differ from one another in the pattern of life
they lead. It is the law and other societal conventions that set the limit. One's religious,
social, or political affiliation could place a further restriction on the individual. By
voluntarily belonging to these organizations one has given one's consent to submit to
these restrictions.
Religious toleration is another area of critical importance. As John Rawls points out,
believers of all sorts of religions attach great importance to the freedom to practise their
religion and worship in the way they please". With this recognition they would
converge on the view that a fair framework for religious practices would be one in
which all persons had the equal right to freedom of religious conscience and practice.
Rawls' optimism is plausible here, except for the fact that it takes no account of
situations of religious fundamentalism and religious fanaticism. In such circumstances
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certain religions see themselves as the only true religion, and others as false. They
would often consider it their religious duty to put an end to all "false" religions either
by persuading other religious groups to renounce their own faiths and join them or
physically try to force them to close down.
Religious toleration must culminate in a meeting of minds and a conscious
disposition on the part of all to be respectful, considerate and kind in regarding other
people's beliefs.
6. Nigeria's Religious Traditions: A Potential Resource
Though the diversity of traditions sometimes adds to the conflict, the generally
religious orientation of Nigerians is a positive resource for national cohesion especially
if it is accompanied by an accepting, accommodating and co-operative disposition on the
part of all persons involved in the various religious traditions. The religious traditions
have the possibility of providing a religious view of the world that will move each one
to respect the realities in the world as belonging to higher divine power. They have, in
addition, the possibility of creating an atmosphere for dialogue, mutual understanding
and mutual toleration among the various groups. Finally, they can provide an integrated
set of moral values that can be applied in the moral formation of Nigeria's citizens.
In spite of the plurality of religious beliefs and the possibility of non-belief among
some segments of Nigerian population, a religious view of the world which acknowl-
edges that there is a higher power that controls the world is prevalent among
Nigerians. That is already a pre-disposition to hold in awe the realities one encoun-
ters in the universe -- the environment, human beings, objects.
Carol Marlcstrom Adams raises an interesting speculative question as to the kind of
situation that would obtain and the nature of religious experience one would expect
where there is pluralism such that there was not one dominant religion." There would
be fewer instances of religious discrimination and less overt criticism of others' beliefs.
Such a community would consider itself fortunate, for where there is no minonty there
will be no fear of dominance of one group by another.
The combination of political, religious and ethical pluralism seems to promise the
best recipe for the meeting of minds among Nigeria's various groups through a
mechanism of exchange where everyone might have to give something up in order to
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share in what the others have to offer. Where there is pluralism of any sort, a meeting
of minds can only be achieved through toleration.
Toleration is an issue over which Traditional Religion, Islam and Christianity
experience considerable difference in their various perceptions of it. Traditional Religion
seems to lend itself more easily and naturally to religious toleration than Christianity and
Islam. Islamic teaching has aspects to it that make toleration quite a challenge and, in
spite of the fact that their religion is built on the principles of love, meekness,
forbearance, some Christians have been known to manifest a lack of toleration in their
dealings with people of other faiths.
J.S. Mbiti attributes African Traditional Religion's disposition to toleration to its
pragmatic character which is occasioned by its non-dependence on any scriptural
authority:
Having no scriptures, it has been able to move with the times, and
it has produced no religious controversies. People are free to hold
different views and beliefs without the danger of being accused of
heresy or falsehood... African Religion is very pragmatic and
realistic. It is applied to a situation as the need arises.A
As revealed world religions, Islam and Christianity tenaciously hold to the
exclusivity of their legacies and the superiority of their worth and origins in comparison
to others. Though non-European in origin, Christianity has taken on many trappings of
European culture as a result its many centuries of close association with Europe.
Incidentally, Europe produced most of the best known apologists of the Christian faith
till date. But since the decade of the 1960s there has been a steady increase in openness
to other cultures as the vernacular has replaced Latin and Greek -- the two European
languages which from the earliest times became the official languages of Christianity.
Latin had replaced Greek in the Middle Ages but held influence well into the 20th
century with its last bastion in Catholic liturgy. Now there is an increasing disposition
towards toleration among Christians towards members of other Christian denominations
and people of other faiths.
By the same token, Islam has become quite synonymous with Arabic culture.
Historically wherever Islam and Christianity encountered each other or other religions
there has always been tension, within both, sectarian tension has always been rife. All
that is steadily changing now. With a broadening of world-views among the members
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of both religions and a preference for dialogue rather than confrontation, the way of
toleration is no longer an impossible dream but a realizable objective.
The Islamic attitude towards toleration is at variance with the Christian. In Dar al-
Islam (Islamic domain) non-Muslims are regarded as protected citizens who should pay
for this protection in the form of firya, (a special poll tax). 39 Even though the Dhimmis
or "unbelievers" may have the right to practise their religions, they are excluded from
certain posts in the domain of Islam. The Koran sometimes encourages a belligerent
attitude to non-Islamic believers:
Fight those who do not believe in Allah, nor in the latter day, nor
do they prohibit what Allah and His Apostle have prohibited, nor
follow the religion of truth, out of those who have been given the
Book, until they pay the tax in acknowledgment of superiority and
they are in a state of subjection (Surah: ix: 29).
It must be pointed out here that most Muslims in Nigeria do not think Surah ix:29
should be taken literally. It is only some fundamentalists, like the followers of
Maitatsine, that would take it as an injunction to take up arms and bring about a
restoration of Islam. Maitatsine was an obscure but enigmatic militant who having
moved in from the neighbouring Cameroon, twice in 1983, once in 1985, and once in
1987, organised a violent uprising of Islamic fundamentalists in his bid to restore what
he described as the true spirit of Islam. His group has since been broken up by the
government security forces. Also some Muslims did distance themselves from the
inflammatory remarks of Abubakar Gumi already referred to in section 10 of Chapter
one. The problem of Nigeria's controversial membership of the OIC appears to be more
of a political problem with a political rather than religious solution.
It was not until quite recently that Christianity as a movement has made toleration
an explicit commitment. In spite of the "love your enemies" taught by Jesus, and the
injunction to "let the cockle grow along with the wheat", it is only the past nearly three
decades that contemptuous reference to "pagans", "infidels", "heretics", "anathema",
has now all but ceased. Since then the Church has issued declaration after declaration
committing itself to toleration. Thus at its meeting in New Delhi in 1961, the World
Council of Churches declared:
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God's redemptive dealing with men is not coercive. Accordingly,
human attempt by legal enactment or by pressure of social customs
to coerce or to eliminate faith are violations of the fundamental
ways of God with men."
The Catholic Church, which is not a member of the World Council of Churches
made its own declaration in the document Dignitatis Humanae of the Second Vatican
Council (1962-1965). The Council identified as the ultimate foundation for the right to
religious liberty the dignity of the human person as known through the revealed word
of God. It concluded: "This right of the human person to religious freedom must be
given such recognition in the constitutional order of society as will make it a civil
right"".
The spirit of toleration can be fostered by seeking for an integrated set of basic
values. In his recipe for evolving a set of basic values for Nigeria, Otonti Nduka notes
that the need for moral integration on a national scale necessitates the making of a con-
certed effort to evolve a set of trans-cultural, trans-religious and trans-ethnic basic
values to which the mass of Nigerians can subscribe." In no other area is such an inte-
grated set of values as urgent as in the area of religion, especially in as much as it
provides material for moral education. When these values are identified and combined
in one course in Nigerian schools has the probable effect of destroying the myth the
adherents of each group hold about each other's beliefs and practices". While the
common factors already present are useful resources the intention is not just to extract
them from the religions and teach them out of context, but must be carefully studied and
organised in such a way as to respect important areas of difference.
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Table 6: Traditional Islam in Christianity
Religion in
W. Africa
West Africa in Post 19th
c. W. Africa
Sexual Intercourse Before
Marriage No No No
Puberty Rites Yes No No
Adultery No No No
Divorce Yes No No
Polygyny Yes Yes No
Bachelorhood/Spinsterhood No No Yes+
Celibate Clergy No No Yes
Breach of Covenant No No No
Bribery No No No
Profiteering No No No
Theft/Robbery No No No
Dishonesty No No No
Tribalism Yes No No
Domestic Slavery Yes Yes* No
Animal Sacrifice Yes Yes No
Human Sacrifice Yes+ No No
War Yes Yes No+
Retaliation Yes Yes No
Alcohol Yes No Yes*
Divination Yes Yes* No
Tendency to produce 3rd
Generation Atheism No No* Yes
Source: E A. Ade Adegbola, (Ed.) Traditional Religion in West Africa, lbadan: Daystar Press, 1983, pp.256f.
[The Astericized* entries were supplied by me based on the nuances of the teachings of the religions in question;
and the entries marked + are once which I think might need some qualification].
A quick glance through the various points of moral concern in Traditional Religion,
Islam and Christianity show an impressive convergence of values and attitudes in areas
of moral import. Adultery, pre-marital sexual intercourse, the breach of covenant,
bribery (and corruption?), profiteering, theft, dishonesty, which are all areas of central
concern for all Nigerians are unequivocally condemned by all three religions. Thus
anyone guilty of any of the offenses stands condemned, and anyone whose life is free
of them is indeed living according to the norms of probity. There is no connection
between a multiple-wife marriage which is perfectly respectable in Nigeria, and adultery.
Puberty rites are no moral issues, since one does not become better or worse for
going through them or refraining from them. It is in base a (physical, psychological and
spiritual) health measure, a matter of style of life which differs from locality to locality,
J
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and which the members of one community do not seek to impose on their neighbours.
Matters of lifestyle like alcohol intake are of little moral importance.
A somewhat similar point can be made about bachelorhood/spinsterhood which, if
it ever occurs, might only be the peculiarity of the religion that practises it, and is never
imposed on neighbours. A concrete example is in the celibate clergy required in the
Catholic brand of Christianity. In itself celibacy is technically referred to as one of the
"Evangelical Counsels" of voluntary chastity, poverty, and obedience often based on
Jesus' teaching in Matthew 19:10,12: "It is not everyone who can accept what I have
said (about continence), but only those to whom it is granted... Let anyone accept this
who can." Also the I Corinthians 7: 1,6-7:
Now for the questions about which you wrote. Yes, it is a good
thing for a man not to touch a woman; ... I am telling you this as
a concession, not an order. I should like everyone to be as I am
myself; but everyone has his own gift from God, one this kind and
the next something different.
An area of great moral import is the question of domestic slavery, which has by now
virtually disappeared. What really occurred was not a situation of slavery but one of
contract's. In traditional Nigerian society, no loss of social status resulted from such a
contract and at the expiration of the contract everyone resumed normal life.
In Islam the status of slaves is quite different. The master or mistress has absolute
power over the life and person of the slave. 46 In other respects the slaves are usually
well treated and they are, not infrequently emancipated especially at the death of their
owner. In Christianity, slavery as an institution has completely disappeared.
Concerning the sacrifice of animals, in so far as excessive cruelty is avoided, it has
no greater moral import than the ordinary killing of animals for the purpose of food.
But human sacrifice as an aspect of religion nowhere obtains especially in the face of
modern civilization and modern laws. The same respect for life which characterises all
three religions prevents human sacrifice from becoming a part of religious practice. The
issue of war remains highly controversial among Christians. Aquinas in Question 40 of
his Summa Theologica dealt with the conditions under which kings can go to war. The
principle of a just war which he enunciated seem to be present Traditional Religion.
Islam believes in just wars but can invoke as their justification the purpose the spreading
of the Islamic faith'''.
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The last entry about a religion's tendency to produce third generation atheism is
more likely in Christianity which tends to distinguish between spiritual life and social
and political life. Sometimes a crisis of perception or an unfulfilled expectation may lead
to disillusionment and disenchantment from the practice of Christian religion in favour
of something which clearly works. Unlike Christianity, Traditional Religion and Islam
create no dichotomy between what is religious and what is not for there is a compene-
tration of all aspects of life in them.
8.
r-
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CHAPTER FIVE
WHAT CAN NIGERIA LEARN
FROM WESTERN THEORY?
Personally I'm always ready to learn, although I do not always like being taught.
— WINSTON CHURCHILL.
If all mankind, minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the
contrary opinion, mankind would be no more Justified in silencing that one person, than
he, if he had the power, would be Justified in silencing humanity.
—JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty.
Nigeria has the advantage of, as it were, drawing from many political, ethical and
religious sources from all over the world. She has, however, special mentor-ward ties
with the West and therefore has had a lot to learn from Western theories. The important
advantage Nigeria has with regard to Western theory is the opportunity take a complete
and sober look at each theory both in its conception and in its implementation — the
prospects as well as the problems with each before deciding on her course of action. In
that way the problem areas can be identified in advance and dealt with.
Education has sometimes been described as 'the management of knowledge". What
is important is not just the knowledge we acquire but what we do with it. Practical
knowledge such as is obtained from political, moral, and religious education needs to
be reflected in the acquisitor's subsequent actions by way of generating attitudes and
responses of a certain kind. In a totalitarian state, for instance, the attitudes which the
official educational machine seeks to inculcate are those of conformity, acceptance, and
militant orthodoxy. In a liberal democracy, there is also a type of conformity, even if
it is the conformity to a belief in openness and freedom of enquiry. In the moral sphere
the attitude is one of conformity to certain standards of behaviour regarded as good and
acceptable; and in the religious sphere one of acceptance, awe and belief.
From Western political theory Nigeria has learnt the ideals of modern democracy
even if she may not be amenable to all its methods. She has also come to discover the
necessity for tolerance rather than confrontation. From Western ethical theory she has
learnt new ways of inculcating and evaluating virtue; and from Western conceptions of
religion she has acquired a broader view of religious toleration in a pluralist society, as
well as the close link between religion and morality.
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The fact of Nigeria's leaning towards the West — politically, culturally and ideologi-
cally -- is a matter beyond question. As John Stemlau reports, when a group of
Nigerian legislators were asked to indicate their opinions of various countries on the
scale of 1 to 10, their preference for the West as embodied in the United States and
Britain showed clearly in contrast to the Soviet Union. The United States scored 8.3,
Britain scored 6.9, and the Soviet Union scored only 4.6.2
1. Western Political Theories
Political theories abound in Western thought and have been applied in the
government of various nations. The dominant concept in Western political theories
seems to be that of democracy. It has not always been so, for both Plato and Aristotle
rejected it on quite different grounds. Plato saw it as the rule of the mob because he
remembered the unjust condemnation by Athenian democracy of Socrates his mentor and
friend. He wanted the philosopher-king instead of a group of bigoted bureaucrats.
Aristotle dismissed democracy as the rule of the poor against the rich. In the history of
Western thought, a variety of theories of democracy has emerged thanks to the work of
philosophers and political theorists. These theories have covered trends and tendencies
from the aristocratic outlook of Plato through the qualified democracy of Aristotle, the
authoritarianism of Hobbes, and the totalitarianism of Rousseau. These tendencies find
expression in modified forms in the thoughts of Kant (duty for duty's sake), Hegel (the
absolute spirit), and Marx (the dictatorship of the proletariat).
a. Some Problems
There are some problems, however, with the applications and general attitudes with
regard to the Western political theories. Among the most obvious of the problems are
the tendency to universalize Western perspectives to encompass the whole world; a
selective application of the principles and parameters for political legitimacy; and the
inherent ambivalence within each political system as demonstrated by Aristotle.
i. Tendency to Universalise Western Perspectives
The most widespread problem with Western systems is their tendency to univer-
salize Western experiences, perspectives and preferences as though they were in all
circumstances valid for the entire human race. This universalist tendency gives rise to
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a spirit of intolerance towards anything different. Political innovations are perceived as
destroying the necessary conditions of government. An unexpected, order as Henri
Bergson observed, is seen, as disorder. Thus when a new political system or set of
rules and procedures emerges from any quarter whatsoever, the reaction is one of horror
and panic.
The hostile attitude towards socialism or Marxism in general, though not altogether
unjustified, can be said to be exaggerated. By the same token, the strenuous and
vociferous objection in the Western media to Zimbabwe's proposed transition to a one-
party state is indicative of this intolerance of any idea that is unusual or different. At the
present moment pressure is being mounted on governments in the developing countries
to adopt both the so-called "free market economy" and the so-called "multi-party
democracy", as a condition for granting them economic aid. No such conditions are
imposed before weapons are sent for internal and regional conflicts. As a result of this
pressure, social unrest is threatening to engulf such countries as Kenya, Uganda,
Cameroon, Zaire, and others. (Nigeria has already committed itself to a time-table of
transfer to an elected government and is therefore spared the scourge agitators in that
direction) Some of these countries could in past years claim some degree of stability in
spite of economic poverty. Now their stability has begun to totter.
In the 1960s which was the decade of independence for most African states, they
had inhented along with national 'sovereignty' Western models of government under
the multi-party system. Soon most of these "newly-independent" states found themselves
having to abandon the multi-party for some reason or other. This development was no
coincidence, since it was not limited to a few isolated cases, a sign that the system
simply did not work. It can be said that the political turmoil that characterized the
decades of the 60s, 70s and 80s is a result of trying to cast off what can be called
figuratively an unwieldy Davidic shield amidst the continued insistence of their Western
mentors that the armour fits. The biblical story of David and Goliath 3
 shows that in the
final analysis, victory came David's way not by his following the rules of war imposed
by the conventional wisdom of mentors but by his native nimbleness of foot, his skill
with the sling, and a mighty touch of good fortune. The point of the analogy is that
though multi-party democracy works in the West, it has simply not worked in Nigeria
and other so-called new states, and probably may not work in the immediate future. The
fault is neither in the system itself nor the people of the newly-independent states
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themselves. It is rather a matter of different circumstances requiring different
approaches.
In trying to decide what is suitable for Nigeria's own requirements it is almost
irresistible to say: let Nigeria go ahead and adopt or adapt any of the extant theories
-- the best of them -- and make it hers. This temptation must be resisted, or at least
viewed with great caution, and for good reasons. In the first place, there is the
possibility that the newly adopted one may turn out to be unworkable. That a given
political theory has worked quite well in, say, the United States or the United Kingdom,
does not guarantee absolutely that it will work everywhere and in all circumstances.
Historically, politically, socio-economically, between the Western nations and
Nigeria the circumstances are different. It will be presumptuous to think that the
Western theories when swallowed bait, hook and sinker will be the Open Sesame! to
all socio-political problems. There is no universally guaranteed political theory, for
even the most perfect of them has its Achilles heel, and the success or failure of any
given system depends most on its effectiveness in addressing the problems of the
community.
ii. Selective Application of the Principles of Political Legitimacy
Another problem with Western political theory arises in its selective application.
There is the widespread tendency to shift the parameters for determining the political
legitimacy. Majority vote, for example, which is the clearest indication of the will of
the people suddenly becomes inapplicable in South Africa since it would necessarily
mean a loss of power to an entrenched interest group. The internal contradictions of
the stand are either conveniently ignored or laboriously rationalized in unconvincing
rhetoric. Furthermore, at the time of colonialism, the question of discerning the
people's will never came into discussion. There was no talk of human rights or national
sovereignty with regard to the people colonized against their will. Instead expansionis-
m was elevated almost to the level of virtue. Nationalist activists agitating for the
independence of their colonized countries were branded insurrectionists, seditionists and
enemies of the peace. . The "lucky" ones among them were jailed for extensive periods
of time, but the less lucky ones paid the ultimate price for subversion. Nelson Mandela
is a case in point.
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ill. Inherent Ambivalence Within Each Political System
There seems to lurk within each political system an extreme that, if allowed to
develop, might be considered as contradictory to the ideals of democracy. Aristotle
considers three different systems and identifies the ambivalence inherent within each:
Monarchy, the rule of one person, when abused becomes despotism, (where one person
inflicts his or her will on others for his or her own selfish interest and against theirs);
aristocracy, the rule of the best few, when abused becomes an oligarchy (where a
privileged few seek their own interests in opposition to that of all); and democracy, the
rule of the majority, when abused becomes also democracy, (where the poor and
ignorant seek their own interests in opposition to the rich)!
When Aristotle upholds the leadership of the middle-class, 5 he inadvertently
contributes to the use of stereotypes that has been the scourge of most political systems.
Nothing stops one comparing what Aristotle advocates with either oligarchy or the type
of democracy that he had earlier discredited. With oligarchy it shares the feature of
favouring a few, and with democracy it shares the feature of being at some other
group's expense. The middle class whom Aristotle here commends were written off by
Marx as the petty bourgeoisie. Furthermore, to give rulership to the middle class as of
right could not be any different in justification from what the dynastic state used to
justify the Divine Right of Kings, as Jean Bodin gives it:
Because there is nothing greater on earth, after God, than the
sovereign princes, (the middle class?), and that they are esta-
blished by him as his lieutenants, to rule over other men, it is
necessary to have due regard for their status so as to respect and
obey their majesty in all obedience, and to speak of them in
honourable terms: for whoever shows contempt for his sovereign
prince shows contempt for God, of whom he is the image on
earth.'
Hobbes advocates the rule of one physical person, and believes that organized
society is opposed to the state of nature. To achieve social harmony therefore it will
take the rule of an artificial man, Leviathan, wielding unlimited and irrevocable power.'
The frightening scenario is one of Leviathan big-footing into all human affairs, uni-
versalizing itself and reducing everyone else to trembling silence. Citizenship after
Hobbes' theory would be marked by terror and anxiety under the watchful eye of the
Orwellian ubiquitous 'Big Brother'.'
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There is another element in Hobbes' theory that could be a source of worry. It is
his understanding of the human person in terms of either an actor/mask or an author.
Hobbes leaves the question of personal responsibility ambivalent, since if people claimed
the authorship of the actions of the Sovereign to whom they irrevocably transferred their
right of nature, they would in effect be responsible for the consequences of the actions
he would perform on their behalf. 9 The ambiguity lies in the fact that while exercising
unlimited executive powers, he or she would in reality be doing so as an actor rather
than an author. Hobbes provides that he would be immuned from any negative conse-
quences that might arise from the actions he or she might have taken.
In Rousseau, humankind is collectivized, and individual persons abnegate their
autonomy. Thus the price of citizenship in Rousseau's theory is the "total alienation of
each associate with all his rights to the whole community."' It is frightening to think
of a citizenry of zombies. This is further aggravated by the paradoxical idea of `forced
freedom'," which is impossible to reconcile with the normal understanding of freedom
as implied in the normal meaning of democracy. There is also the idea of the 'General
Will', which Rousseau denies as amounting to consensus." The latter is the mainstay of
decision making in both traditional and contemporary Nigerian society.
The legacy of citizenship according to Rousseau's theory will be tantamount to the
people being present as mere cogs in the political wheel without any corresponding will,
choice or decision to show for it. Before them all is the leader, having the attributes of
a god, who decides what the will of the people is or should be. Him the people would
be obliged to obey. Nigeria has already lived through several 'leaders' of this descrip-
tion and would now rather do without any further ones.
At the opposite pole of the issue is the concept of popular sovereignty as expressed
in the theories of Voltaire, Montesquieu, the Encyclopedists, and Marx. One should not
be overawed by a grandiose sovereignty that exists in slogans alone. Not one known
political system has been able to put into practice the complete ideal of popular soverei-
gnty — Power to the People — which is the kernel of democracy.
Furthermore, there is also the idea of the Common Good as the end of government.
Each theory claims the ability to realize it in its application; yet there is no agreement
among them as to what the common good consists in. Each system defines it on the
basis of its own presuppositions and according to the protagonist's own ideological
leaning. A conservative's idea of property or freedom or defence etc for the common
good is often diametrically opposed to what the liberal or socialist would propose. It
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seems that all political leanings, right, left and centre, appeal to nothing else in their
references as much as they appeal to the ideals of democracy, freedom, and common
good. Each claims to be democratic, yet democracy seems to elude them all.
Political theories are reflections on the social and political developments in their
society. They are generally their authors' response to these developments. 13 They are
not meant to be dose-administered to any society different from their place of origin.
If they must, it has to be after a period of vigorous scrutiny and adaptation. The citizens
of the recipient community should have the final decision as to what suits, or does not
suit, their own needs.'
b. Western Democracy Applied
It is said that democracy rules the world. To rule the world it must operate a
system of justice and base its authority on the express will of the people. The style of
democracy that rules the Western world does not appear to be suitable for Africa
because the features it manifests do not appear to the average African to be either just
or democratic. One need only consider the international bodies like the United Nations
with the five most powerful countries taking on to themselves the exclusive status of
'Permanent' membership to its Security Council. They exercise the power of veto over
any resolutions arrived at by the majority of member nations when such resolutions do
not suit their political or economic interests. Even at its face value, that does not look
very democratic. It is like one arm of a country's government -- say the executive --
overruling entire parliamentary decisions to go its own way.
On the national level one needs also to look at the structure of the multi-party states
where the views of the opposition count for nothing and the winner takes all at all times
in favour of the ruling party. That makes it difficult to separate narrow party interests
from the broader national interests which every government should serve. The result is
that the dreaded dictatorship of the despotic individual is replaced by an `elected' dicta-
torship of the party in power. The Roussean Sovereign thus resurfaces under another
name. The interesting thing is that most of the time it seems that what wins votes is
more by the candidate's ability to sway opinions through eloquent political speech-
making than through the actual disposition to deliver what they promise. This is not the
style of democracy Nigeria wants for the people are used to decision-making via
consensus, and to appoint public servants on the basis of personal merit.
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Practically speaking, a multi-party government is perhaps not the best thing for
Nigeria, at least at her present stage of political development. This assertion might be
surprising to some people, but there are a variety of reasons for this conclusion:
First of all, there is too much hassle and the electorate, made up of a vast majority
of uneducated, ill-educated and politically rustic citizens, is left in confusion. It cannot
cope with a plethora of parties with really no substantial difference in ideology.
Secondly, it seems that the multi-party system will polarize rather than unite the
country. Nigeria's great problem is with existing polarization along ethnic, linguistic
and religious lines. A polarized political set-up will be the coup de grace against the
fragile links that at present seem to bind the country together. In most of the countries
where the multi-party system is at work, it seems that at some stage in their history
there had to be a charismatic leader that would gather the scattered bits and weld them
together. Washington did it for the United States, Franco for Spain, Bismarck for
Germany, De Gaulle for France, and Mussolini for Italy. Nigeria must be able to come
together first under one banner, under a strong but good and patriotic leader. Only then
would it be possible to diversify methods without the danger of rapid disintegration. As
Rousseau, quoting Grotius in Chapter V of his Social Contract, said:
(Only) a people.. .can give itself to a king... A people is a people
before it gives itself. The gift is itself a civil act, and implies
public deliberation. It would be better, before examining the act
by which a people gives itself to a king, to examine that by which
it has become a people; for this act, being necessarily prior to the
other, is the true foundation of society.'
Thirdly, all party politics brings about the element of partisanship in dealing with
issues and objectivity goes to the wind as party loyalty most frequently overrides
personal sense of judgment, and the desire to 'keep one's job' becomes the overriding
concern.
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Fourthly, technically speaking, the element of consent which is so crucial in any
democratic process is distorted in a multi-party arrangement by the reliance on a
majority rather than a consensus. In a majority-oriented set-up the majority, which is
nevertheless a part, is treated as though it were the whole, and the minority is expected
to conform to every determination of the majority and get lost in the majority. The fact
that the majority has, not infrequently, been proven wrong by events, makes an
institutionalized majority-is-all assume the face of tyranny."
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Fifthly and finally, the multi-party system just does not seem to work in Africa and
some other geographic zones. It is not quite correct to suggest that the failure is due to
the people's incompetence alone. It is probably reasonable to suggest that its failure is
because it seems to be unsuited to the people's way of thinking and operating at their
present level of development. It seems to be a grave mistake to think that the multi-
party system, often referred to as 'Western-style Democracy' is the only, or even the
best type of democracy. If anything it is only one out of many possible types of
democracy. Other people must be allowed to apply their talent in working out a pattern
of 'government of the people, by the people, and for the people' according to their own
understanding and as their own peculiar circumstances demand. Those who do not want,
or are unsuited to the 'Western-Style Democracy' must be given a fair chance to demon-
strate an alternative.° Perhaps what they come up with might be of benefit to politics
even in the West. Provided that a system protects the life, liberty and property of
citizens, and provided it is what the people want, the question of multi-party or dual-
party or non-party is a matter of modality and should not occupy the centre stage.
The proper business of education includes among others to civilize each oncoming
generation by putting at its disposal the wisdom which humankind has accumulated by
experiment and thought, and to train them to be able to evaluate both the past and the
present in order to achieve a clearer understanding of the truth. The legacy of the West
as well as the contributions of such persons as Nyerere will enable Nigerians to come
to grips with their own situation. So far it seems that the question of citizenship educa-
tion has not received much emphasis in Nigeria's agenda. A distinctively Nigerian
approach will, through the school, provide the groundwork for reversing the trend so
that within the professional life which follows after schooling, citizens will have the
opportunity to put into effect what they learnt from books and classrooms. They will
exercise their citizenship and identify with the democratic process which has become the
recognised hallmark of decision-making in contemporary political society.
The exercise of citizenship manifests itself in the enlightened combination of
willingness to support and sustain democracy and to reject governmental tyranny.° This
combination is perhaps one of the greatest implications of patriotism. Any genuine com-
mitment to democracy must be on-going, because any true democracy must aim at
conscious social reproduction whereby a democratic state tries to equip its future citizens
to make democratic decisions in their turn.
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In the Western world, (and now in the Eastern Bloc as well), the ballot box has been
the mechanism used to determine who rules and who stays out of office. In Nigeria,
some members of the military establishment have for most of Nigeria's political life as
a sovereign state, decided that the ballot box will not be applied in Nigeria, and
persistently held to power without the clear mandate of the people. They then proceeded
to place government above the people and to exercise unlimited and unrestrained flat in
every department of the people's life. Citizenship education is capable of putting an end
to such anomalies. When the modern democratic process becomes fully operational in
Nigeria, the citizens will work out a mechanism for checking, and if necessary
forestalling, any incipient tendency in some individuals to try and assume absolute
power without the people's mandate. Happily the people are less and less intimidated by
the military and have, even without the ballot box, been able to make unbridled
autocracy an inconvenient enterprise, to say the least. For instance the whole Organiza-
tion of Islamic Conference (OIC) issue was bitterly contested by the people and the
government was forced into the defensive.
Furthermore, when it came to taking the International Monetary Fund IMF loan in
1986, Nigerians were able to come out strongly against it in a referendum of sorts, 2° so
that the government had to change its mind. And when journalist Dele Giwa was blown
up by an assassin's letter bomb and the people suspected that the government had some
knowledge of what happened, the people never stopped screaming until the government
was forced to commence an official investigation into the allegations. The Nigerian
people have already begun to take their own destiny in their own hands. The military
government has already given a pledge to return power to the people by October 1992.
That hopefully should be their last appearance on the political scene. In fairness to the
military government, steps are being taken to ensure that the hand-over is permanent
and the transition smoothly effected. 21
 The Administration took at least three major steps
that are indicative of a seriousness of purpose:
First, there was the quite successful four-year-long period of political education
campaign organized under government auspices, extending to the village level, and
designed to expose Nigerians to the purpose and meaning of democracy.
Second, there was the generally applauded decision to break with the past discre-
dited political experiments by excluding from the new political order all politicians
associated with the governments of the past. People were then to form new political
associations from among whom two would eventually be approved.22
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Third, the government set a schedule whereby elections would be held in four stages
spread out over a period of three years:
i) the local government elections;
	 the state legislature; 	 the state governorships;
iv) the Federal legislature; v) the presidential elections.
This three-step programme, at least in its conception, is manifestly a clear movement
towards restoring to the people the full savour of the sovereignty that belongs to them
in virtue of their citizenship of their country. It is through the exercise of sovereignty
that the people, rather than an aristocracy, can take their national destiny into their own
hands. It is a truism that the country is its citizens, and there can be nothing, no
government or aristocracy, that should reckon itself as superior to them.
c. Pluralism and Political Systems
From the political and ideological points of view, pluralism is a factor that no one
may casually ignore, for there is no system that is completely immune from its
challenges. Moreover, there is no system that is without its own flaws. Though Western
Europe and North America have the tendency to claim to operate the true democracy,
theirs is only a version of democracy — the parliamentary version. Every country on
earth claims to operate a democracy but the results are as diverse as the countries' cir-
cumstances themselves.
Not too long ago, the vast majority of French Catholics had stuck to the theory of
the divine right of kings and were resolutely opposed to democratic republicanism
which, ironically today, the same vast majority consider as their touchstone of democr-
acy. The Marxists, on the other hand, believed that supreme happiness for humankind
would only result from a classless society under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and
under the guidance of the communist party. Recent developments in Eastern Europe
have shown that that is not to be any more. The Americans were as convinced of the
'divine right of democracy', so to speak, and would pride themselves -- often to the
irritation of some — as the world's greatest democracy. They would often proceed,
almost with holy zeal to seek to propagate, and if necessary impose, their own ideas of
democracy around the world.
On the left of the political spectrum, the Soviets have had until quite recently an
all-too-similar attitude with regard to socialism which is their own brand of 'people's'
democracy. Now the Soviet empire is rapidly dissolving into separate, sovereign
republics, each invoking the name of democracy. The confusion generated in the mirage
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chase for 'democracy' around the world leaves the image of democracy not a little
tainted by scepticism in the consciousness of many as to whether it could ever be found
in a pure form.
As Ignace Lepp rightly points out, there is no political regime that has divine
sanction guaranteed in advance; no regime that is alone legitimate or at the best for all
peoples at each stage of their evolution. Political morality like the morality of property
must take into consideration that humanity is certainly one, but that this is a unity in an
infinite diversity. It is futile to moralize or speculate, or appeal to stereotypes in regard
to imaginary excellences that make `democracy' work in some places, and the absence
of which prevents the monolithic 'democracy' from working in other places. If such
stereotypes are anything to go by, then the Hitlers, Mussolinis, and Francos of the not-
too-distant past should have sprung from some stock other than the Nordic stock.
And as Ignace Lepp concludes, it would be a mistake to wish to apply the same
system, in the name of a static and abstract political morality, to nations that have not
attained the same degree of maturity.24
Even though one might morally object to the dictatorship of communist countries,
yet a pseudo-democratic regime could never have accomplished in Russia what the now
wobbling communism die. In Africa the 'Peoples Democracies' have failed in Angola,
Mozambique, Ethiopia, Benin; just as the 'liberal' democracies have, in practically all
of Africa including Nigeria, failed to answer the precise needs of the people. It will be
simplistic to say that the fault is totally that of the people. It is more realistic to
consider the situation as analogous to that of a square peg which does not fit snugly into
a round hole.
With the multi-party government not considered as the best option for a country
like Nigeria, the question arises as to what alternative system one might propose in its
place. The alternative that is most likely to be conjured up in the minds of many is the
one-party government. For psychological reasons of the great scare conventional wisdom
has come to associate with it, it is probably not the best idea to advocate a one-party
system either. To begin with, such a proposal is not likely to find favour from many
people even though it is in itself not necessarily always bad. The idea of a one-party
state sends chills down the spines of many who have learnt — not without justification -
- to associate it only with despotism.
Technically speaking, however, the greatest setback for a one-party rule is the
reductionist presupposition that the whole nation is suddenly equivalent to a party of a
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few bureaucrats who inflict their will on the people; and who presume to speak for the
people without the people ever having the chance to speak for themselves. Space is
wanting to pursue this point in greater detail; and so it seems sufficient to simply say
that a one-party rule is not the best alternative either. A non-party form of government
seems to be the best option. This will be discussed later in Chapter Six.
2. Western Ethical Theories (of Virtue)
Western ethical theories have been largely characterised by individualism and an
emphasis on decision-making. In contrast, Nigeria operates with an emphasis on the
community rather than the individual, that makes Western theories less appealing than
they should be. The recent focus on virtues in Western ethical theories, however, may
have more to offer. Taking their departure from a plurality of backgrounds: religious,
ethnic, linguistic, historical, educational, Nigeria should approach Western ethical
theories with the same sensitivity and discernment with which she approaches Western
political theories. Because of the nature of ethical theories and based on the history and
background behind each, it is almost impossible to find an 0-perfect one against which
others should be measured. A federated approach would do greater justice to each
theory than a pick-and-choose approach would since it does not set one theory against
the other but recognises the integrity of each and seeks to rescue from each what is
useful, reasonable and appropriate.
Graham Haydon's three lessons drawn from critics of ethical theory, are quite
pertinent in illustrating the above point. As he rightly points out, it is impossible to
show any positive ethical theory to be 'correct', independently of some particular tradi-
tion of theorizing, and to everyone's satisfaction. Besides, ethical life does not consist
for the most part in applying theories, but must include dispositions, that is, virtues.
Nevertheless, morality does not rest on the decisions of autonomous detached indivi-
duals. To the extent that individuals do make decisions in a way detached from any
tradition, this is a feature of certain societies, and not one that has to be approved?
Ethical theories can provide a resource by which, where there is disagreement,
people can think their way to a resolution. Thus, concludes Haydon, what theories need
to be is not true, but agreed — amongst the persons who face the problems."
In their discussion of the theme of virtue, Western ethical theories branch out into
at least four general tendencies. One tendency identifies virtue or the virtuous life with
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obedience to the moral law; a second tendency associates it with the upholding of
values; a third emphasizes the epistemological approach by identifying virtue with the
acquisition of knowledge; and a fourth tendency links virtue with imitating the exam-
ples of others.
a. Virtue As Obedience to the Law
Aristotle had identified the just (virtuous) with the law-abiding and the unjust
(vicious) with the law-breaker. His reason? The laws make pronouncements on every
sphere of life, and their aim is to secure either the common good of all or of the best.
Furthermore, he argues, the great majority of lawful acts are ordinances which are
based on virtue as a whole."
The traditional way of grounding the moral law is by taking God to be its giver.
He is the agent who creates obligations by his acts of legislation, but some modern
philosophers are disinclined to allow God this role. Even when they admit that God
exists and gives laws, they tend to think that being moral requires that a person make
a judgment that he or she morally ought to obey the divine law. Thus while God
perhaps tells us what we ought to do, it is not his saying so that makes it obligatory. It
is obligatory because, and only because, it is moral (Kant).
Kant inherited the Christian reverence for divine law and the worth of the indi-
vidual self. According to Kant moral philosophy is properly concerned not with what
is, but with what ought to be. In humans, there is a sense of duty: the "I ought" or
the moral law, which is logically prior to experience and which springs from a person's
innermost nature. The moral law results from the will governed by reason and brings
people into contact with the very order of the universe itself, since the laws of nature
and the laws of reason are essentially one."
Thomas Hobbes, a lawyer by profession, goes further on the theme of natural law
and justice. He considers obedience to the law and being virtuous as two aspects of
the same thing. For him the concepts of justice and injustice arise only when there is
some coercive power to compel people to keep their covenant of transference of their
natural rights to the commonwealth. Bringing the two concepts of law and morals
together he relates justice and injustice with righteousness and unrighteousness. Justice
itself he distinguishes into justice of manners which he calls virtue (with its oppos te as
vice), and justice of actions which "denominates men, not just, but guiltless.., and the
injustice of the same... gives them but the name of guilty"."
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Rene Descartes before him had set himself on the path of intelligently assessing
values before espousing them. The world, he thought, is composed of two kinds of
minds: those who, believing themselves cleverer than they are, cannot avoid precipitate
judgments and never direct all their thoughts in an orderly manner; and those who have
enough reason or modesty to recognize that they are less capable of distinguishing the
true from the false than others by whom they can be taught. The latter should be content
to follow the opinions of these others rather than seek opinions of these others them-
selves.'
Once Descartes had arrived at this conclusion, he decided that it was compatible
with growth and maturity to:
(i) obey the laws and customs of his country, holding to the religion in
which he was brought up;
(ii) be as firm and decisive in his actions as he could, and follow even the most
doubtful opinions once adopted, with no less constancy than if they had been
quite certain;
(iii) master himself rather than fortune, and change his desires rather than the
order of the world;
(iv) review the various occupations of men in order to choose the best!'
Like Descartes and Kant, many philosophers and theologians are wont to extol the
virtues of obedience to the law in terms that leave no doubt that breaking the law is
also breaking the moral obligation. Nevertheless, there is a distinction between the
moral and the legal obligation. As Burton Leiser points out, high as the duty to obey
the law may be, where there is a conflict between one's moral duty and one's legal
duty, most people believe that the moral duty takes precedence. The moral operates on
the level of the conscience and the legal is measured by the letter of the law.
The distinction between the purely legal and the moral can be seen when we consider
that society is not necessarily better with an increased number of legal practitioners or
legislators unless they are at the same time moral. In other words to practise law is not
the same as to practice justice in the sense of uprightness, and society could be better
off with citizens who are just or upright than with those who merely practise the law.
On the other hand, and especially in the major religions — Christianity, Islam, Judaism
— morality comes in the form of law. Jesus talks of the new commandment to love one
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another34 and Paul considers love as the greatest of all the virtues33. The distinction
between the purely legal and the purely moral does not amount to a dichotomy. As
Locke points out in his The Spirit of Toleration, "moral actions belong to the
jurisdiction both of the outward and inward court, both of the civil and domestic gover-
nor,... both of the magistrate and the conscience."
b. Obedience to the Law and Personal Autonomy
Obedience to the law seems to be at odds with personal autonomy. The question is
whether and to what extent one could obey the law and still claim personal autonomy.
Man's fundamental moral obligation is to govern his life by reasons which receive their
specific content from a consideration of human interests and needs. In effect, if
obedience to an authority is to be morally justifiable, it must be because it is humanly
reasonable to obey, and not simply because it is a command. In other words the one
commanded has to have identified with the object of the command on the basis that it
is reasonable, needful, and better than its opposite.
If what is commanded is not humanly reasonable, then to obey would be materially
wrong and therefore not in the human interest! 6 If there were not need that the com-
mand be given, then to obey would be formally wrong and thereby a surrender of
human autonomy. Therefore, if someone is to have the right to command another, this
right can possibly be justified only in an area in which it is reasonable that someone
else's judgment be followed." Since circumstances abound where someone else's
judgment is called into play, it is in the interest of personal autonomy that it be supple-
mented by an openness to the other which enables one to follow the directions or
commands of another without necessarily jeopardizing autonomy. That is why when one
obeys authority, it is not merely because the authority appears to have good and suffi-
cient reasons to command, but over and above because the one who obeys sees the
reason for obeying. Authority is not an alternative to reason but is grounded in it. This
openness or disposition is not innate, nor is it immediately intuitively acquired. It is
enhanced by teaching, which frequently involves elements of practical instruction or
training, and at times legislation.
Teaching provides the impetus, while personal growth and maturity sort out the
applications as life unfolds. Freedom is not incompatible with law. Even though the
element of autonomy is crucial in the sphere of moral development it does not operate
right from the beginning. The normative element which demands conformity comes
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first for, as Kohlberg points out, every individual has to go through the "good boy"
stage of morality before he or she can attain moral autonomy. It could also be referred
to what Freud says about the super ego stage of development whereby children come to
enjoy following rules and to revel in the sense of mastery that this gives them."
In contemporary times, many educators seem to deny these facts of experience. As
a result the young are from the beginning brought up with greater emphasis on the
empirical, hypothetical, experimental approach to everything. They thus have the
tendency to judge actions and occurrences only by their consequences. However, those
judgments must be formed by principles if they are to escape the grip of arbitrariness.
The young get to know correct and incorrect procedures as they conform with, or depart
from, the empirical laws of science.
Situation ethics is a substantial departure from the trend of identifying virtue with
obedience to the moral law. Also referred to as Contextual ethics, or the New Morality,
it is associated with Rudolf Bultmann, John A. T. Robinson, and Joseph Fletcher. These
contemporary theologians share certain ideas with the "God is dead" movement, which
maintains that the archaic biblical conception of God is no longer applicable to the
experience of modern people. Their main emphasis is on the primacy of love as the
guiding principle for society. They are more concerned with the ethics than the
metaphysics of Christian thought, and even if religious belief entirely disappeared they
would still want to salvage the ethics of love and not throw out the baby with the bath
water." They therefore want God redefined leaving out the archaic concept of a law-
giver, a righteous God who gives humans codes engraved on stone tablets and specific
dictums for the governance of their lives.
Situation ethics gives the individual total discretion in all circumstances such that
anything and everything is subject to, and dependent upon, the context to determine
whether or not a particular principle or value should be applied. The determining
principle of action is whether love is better served than law. It operates on the
principle of compromise, since everything is negotiable if by so doing the purpose of
love is served. The risk that goes with this is that individuals are likely to exaggerate
their discretionary abilities and lose sight of objectivity. Even love itself must be
recognizable objectively as love and not simply what an agent regards as love. This
theory also tends towards reducing love into simply what brings about pleasure or what
alleviates pain. But love's content goes beyond hedonism. A further point to note here
is that the theory tends to regard the law with cynicism as though it were always
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crippling of human discretion and reason. But experience shows that in society that is
already evolved and complex, convention has a wider application than mere discretion,
since most of the time people have to deal with other people on strictly business lines
without any need to have a close acquaintance with them.
c. Virtue through the Upholding of Values
The attainment of virtue might be realized by the upholding of the positive values
of society. Positive values in this respect refers primarily to those values which bring
to the fore what is best in humans and for humans as embodied in the United Nations
Bill of Rights -- life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. True virtue is one which is
realized in concrete life. Thus the virtues sought in a society are closely linked with,
and dictated by, the values upheld in that society. The school seeks to cultivate selected
virtues in the young by means of both the subject matter of the course and the methods
that it employs in its unfolding.
In concrete life though there can be a conflict of values in the moral agent.' The
values of the agent's professional life might be in conflict with that of his or her
religious, political, social and familial life. There is the famous case of John F.
Kennedy when he became President of the United States. To reassure Congress about
his single-mindedness with regard to his position, he declared that if there ever would
come a time when his conscience was in conflict with his constitutional duty, he would
resign from office." Kennedy, however, cautiously added that such a conflict was
unlikely to arise. In the larger community, especially in a pluralist society, the situa-
tion is even more complex as the agent is required to respond to the conflicting demands
of conflicting interests. Is it, for example, a breach of family loyalty and trust to refrain
from discussion sensitive national security issues that one comes across in the normal
process of one's job? The ethical principles one has imbibed will enable him or her to
cope successfully with such conflicts.
In education, as in other human arts, those actions the child performs under
direction become more intelligent, more deliberate and less mechanical as he or she
grows up. The child being educated receives the subject matter through the methods
available in the school. His or her awareness is usually in proportion to his or her
level of development but it improves, matures and becomes more significant with time
and understanding. What begins as an undifferentiated assemblage of unrelated facts
gradually sorts itself out in the understanding as a cohesive body of principles significant
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for living. In principle the pupil first gets to know that, and then in the course of time
gets to know the how and perhaps the why.
As John L. Childs points out, a values structure of things considered significant,
worthful, and right — operates in endless response to the behaviour of pupils. Many
of these educational values concern the very fundamentals of human existence. They
have to do with such elemental things as the rights, responsibilities, beliefs, tastes,
appreciations, faiths and allegiances of human beings. Thus, as the young are intro-
duced to the various aspects of human experience, attitudes and habits of response to
them are set in motion. Since values are by definition goods desired for their own sakes
and not contrived, our best attitude to them is to try and identify with them as societal
givens, which are not subject to our individual whims to manipulate or change at will.
We therefore try to uphold them for their own sakes and later hand them on to suc-
ceeding generations.
The process of selecting and rejecting, of distinguishing the desirable from the
undesirable is unending in education. It is this process of choice that defines what is
meant by the term moral in connection with necessary choices among genuine life
alternatives. These choices necessarily have consequences in the lives of the young and,
through them, in the life of larger society. People become knowledgeable about values
as they become aware of the consequences to which their actions lead. As John Dewey
points out", not all of the things that are immediately liked are likable, nor all the
desired things really desirable. The difference between the merely desired and that
which is counted desirable is the difference between organic and impulsive acts, and
those acts whose conditions and consequences have been judged to be good.
One consequence of this development is a distrust of any authority that cannot be
proven or verified. Parental, seigniorial and religious authority no longer hold their
traditional clout. The concepts of good, evil, sin, moral and immoral are either
relativized or assume more decreased relevance in daily living. New concepts come into
application: mental health, authenticity, self fulfilment, motivation, and self realization.
The conviction is rapidly gaining ground in the Socratic spirit that in order to be moral
one must have to be intelligent, and in order to be intelligent one must have the capacity
to take a critical account of actual life's alternatives. In this new frame of mind the
question is how to identify the values that motivate action.
Values that motivate action can be theoretical, economic, social, religious, political
or even aesthetic. John Locke provides for three types of laws, namely, the divine law,
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the civil law, and the law of opinion and reputation. These three types cover all human
motivations in every sphere of life -- religious, civil, and behavioral." The concurrence
with which these types of laws are meant to operate underscores on the one hand,
Locke's dedication to pluralism and, on the other hand, the futility of seeking to com-
partmentalize human action and motivation. In the process of education the student
learns to choose from among these or from combinations according as his or her special
circumstances demand.
Child-centred educators like Rousseau and his successors think that each stage of
education has its own values, and that adults should not try to impose their own values
on children. This point of view seems to ignore the fact of continuity in human nature
and experience. Each person does not have to experience the world from zero. That
would be stunting. We need education in order to be able to evaluate and choose
properly from among the many alternatives available already in the moral community.
Moreover, if something is valuable, it does not become so because children rather than
adults are concerned with it and vice versa.
d. Virtue as Knowledge
Socrates believed that virtue consists somewhat in knowledge. This meaning is
recaptured in Nicia's interjection: I have often heard you say a man is good in those
things about which he is wise, and bad in those things of which he is ignorant." This
interjection boils down to the cerebralization of moral education - namely that theoreti-
cal knowledge of the Forms of the Good is sufficient to make one good. The resulting
Socratic conclusion that all vice is essentially error and all wrong-doing a mistake could
not be sustained when one contrasts the activities of evil geniuses like Hitler and Stalin,
with the tremendous amount of good done by such intellectually less-acclaimed people
like John Mary Vianney".
Aristotle rejects the Platonic idea that the end of life is the Form of Good which is
the source of all goodness wherever it is found in the universe. "Good" for Aristotle
has no meaning common to all applications, and there is no form of good separate from
its particular manifestations. The kind of good that makes humans good must be chosen
for its own sake and never as a means to something else. It should be able to render
life worthy of being chosen." Aristotle's position is a protest against the ascetic,
Manichaean view which condemns all natural impulses, and against the naturalistic
view which elevates them above criticism and adopts them as the guide of life. These
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impulses are neither good nor bad in themselves; what is needed is the right amount, at
the right time, in the right manner; and the right object for each." Aristotle distin-
guishes between moral and intellectual virtue, and recognizes that while moral virtue can
be achieved on one's own by habit or ethos — becoming just by doing just deeds, and
a harpist by playing the harp — intellectual virtue comes through teaching." Hence,
some form of authority is required for effective inculcation of virtue.
A number of Western writers are not completely satisfied with the prescriptive,
normative approach to the inculcation of virtue. They call for alternative methods.
They point out that ethical theories fail in at least three respects:
1. They fail to examine motives and the motivational structures and
constraints of ethical life.
2. They fail by making it impossible for one to achieve the good in
an integrated way, and instead pick and choose aspects of the
mind or body as their area of operation.
3. They put one in a position that is psychologically uncomfortable,
difficult, or even untenable, and make life fragmented and
incoherent.
Alasdair MacIntyre draws attention to the bankruptcy of modern moral philosophy
in its failure to provide a clear guide for moral conduct: it is "nothing but endless moral
debates with no side winning the rational argument since there is no common moral
tradition." 52
 We are all inheritors of fragments — often mutually inconsistent -- of moral
traditions and philosophies. In Michael Stocker's assessment it was a case of cosmic
schizophrenia whereby each moral theory provides separate reasons for ethical action:
egoism says self-interest is a good reason; utilitarianism says that the well-being of the
greatest number is a good reason; hedonism says pleasure is a good reason." This is the
background that gave rise to the so-called psychological and anthropological turn in
moral theorizing. They ask less about the nature and foundations of moral rules and
language and more about the nature and traits of the moral person!' This would
culminate in the so-called authenticity theory.
The aim of these theories is to produce people who are capable of responsible
conduct, and who can judge for themselves what they ought or ought not to do. This
is not inconsistent with the ethics of principles which does not intend to turn human
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beings into 'Pavlov's Dogs'. The test of a formed character is precisely the capacity
to hold one's own in the midst of life's moral challenges. One is placed in a histori-
cal situation in the face of a changing environment where every occasion presents a
fresh challenge. In the midst of moral crisis, the individual must decide whether his
or her encounter with the cultural tradition inherent in his or her moral practice will
take the form of rejection or critical acceptance." It is in this possibility of critical
acceptance or total rejection that the element of freedom is evidenced. That is why we
can talk of the law of freedom.
It seems rather implausible to reject the normative, prescriptive approach in the
formation of character merely on the pretext that it is legalistic and authoritarian and
leaves no room for freedom. Even freedom itself is identifiable under the aspect of law
-- the law of freedom. In Plato's Crito, Socrates vigorously defends the view that the
violation of the laws of state is also a violation of the highest moral norms, and that
even if the law works to one's disadvantage one still has the moral -- not just legal --
duty to uphold it. It is a sustained teaching of scholastic philosophers like Aquinas and
Suarez, and later by Locke, that it is the divine law that constitutes the eternal
foundation of morality and that, by the intervention of inferior laws derived from divine
law, introduce moral values even into things indifferent." This traditional explanation
though no longer of topical, interest in moral philosophical discussion, is still upheld by
many. It is however relevant in Nigeria since in traditional life the moral is legal and
the legal moral. As Bernard Williams points out s', someone who has a particular virtue
performs actions because they fall under certain prescriptions and avoids others because
they fall under other prescriptions. That person is described in terms of virtue, and so
are his or her actions. Thus he or she is a just or courageous person who does just or
courageous things. The benevolent or kind-hearted person does benevolent and kind-
hearted things.
e. Virtue through Examples: Paradigmatic Individuals
Since, in real life people in their daily activities tend to copy the behaviour of others
whom they admire or who influence their lives, the role of paradigmatic individuals
requires some mention. When it comes to individuals, there are role models, but when
someone's moral influence pervades a whole culture or environment or epoch, such a
one is more than a role model but forms a whole blueprint according to which moral
conduct can be judged. Such people have been referred to as paradigmatic individuals.
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The great pioneer of this concept was Karl Jaspers who in 1952 discussed the issue.
Seventeen years later in 1969, Antonio S. Cua took up the discussion. Following after
Jaspers, Cua lists among his paradigmatic individuals the following: Socrates, Buddha,
Confucius and Jesus." These people are characteristically moral pioneers; charismatic
in temperament, with a sense of devotion to a mission, and a confidence in the rightness
of their mission. Through their lives and their utterances these people inspire others and
moral codes have arisen based on their teachings.
Though admirably creative in the moral sphere, these individuals were not known
for lawlessness. Rather they used their own insights to transform their environment.
They would transfuse the content of their moral tradition with their own insights and
give the principles, implicit in their moral practice, a substance and meaningful content
with a style that was all their own." That sometimes put them into trouble with the
purists of their tradition. Socrates and Jesus paid the ultimate price for their efforts.
A number of problems arise with the theory of paradigmatic individuals:
1. To start with, the individuals mentioned, with the exception of
Socrates, are connected with some religion or other. Protagonists
of a secular morality could hardly be willing to distinguish
between the purely ethical and the religious element in their
teaching.
2. Moreover, they are bound up with the ancient times and their
theories can be charged with anachronism with regard to
present-day developments.
3. Furthermore, the very fact of their being confined to antiquity
would give rise to the conclusion that generations after them till
the present have been moral drones incapable of any moral
creativity.
4. Besides, they could hardly claim an experience wide enough as
to warrant that their teachings have a universal applicability.
5. Finally, the growing sensitivity to apparent male chauvinism would
lead feminists to be aggravated by the claim that only males have
been capable of being considered paradigmatic for the whole
human race — at least as far as the list of paradigmatic individuals
goes.
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If one were to agree with the role of paradigmatic individuals it has to be possible
to widen the parameters. It must be possible to find one or several within any given
culture or epoch. Nigerians should be able to find at least one among their own people
and for their own time. The Catholic Church has the practice of canonizing saints,
whom they set up as exemplars of good, holy living. Every society has its own heroes
whose achievements they celebrate. Today, we have people like Mother Theresa of
Calcutta shining out for the whole world. In quite recent times people like Mahatma
Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., and Archbishop Oscar Romero have shone out
sufficiently enough as to make the whole world take notice and acknowledge their
influence. Through the ages people have shone out that have had a decisive impact on
the society's way of seeing things. A new star might be arising in Gorbachev as his
influence has changed the whole concept of communism and international relations. If
what we want of paradigmatic individuals is their life story, then that belongs to the
history books; but if we want their moral example, we are already on our way back to
moral codes whose critics suggest the use of examples rather than precepts.
It might be useful at this stage to take a careful and critical look at the overall
purpose of paradigmatic individuals. Susan Wolf did just that in an article she captioned
"Moral Saints". 6° In this fascinating article, Wolf described the moral saint as "a person
whose every action is as morally good as possible, a person, that is, who is as morally
worthy as can be." Wolf goes beyond actions and would enquire into motives. What if
they derive the greatest happiness from achieving happiness in others? Or, as Rousseau
asserted before her, what if all those commendable actions were only motivated by
vanity?' What if what makes them happy is the total neglect of their own personal
comforts in the light of the overriding importance he or she gives to the wider concerns
of morality? On all three counts, they could be said to be pursuing their personal
interest. For this reason, Wolf does not find moral saintliness a model of personal well-
being toward which it would be good or desirable to strive.62
Wolf's scepticism about possible aberrations in motivation is quite understandable.
For instance, the prevailing opinion of Socrates or Jesus or the Buddha is very high,
not out of any conspiracy, but for the fact that their positive influences have far
outweighed any negative traits some people might be wont to attribute to them. Thus,
for instance, Xenophon makes of Socrates a stupid, good man; Aristophanes (in the
Clouds), makes of him a clever, bad man; while Plato sees him as a wise, good man".
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The Platonic image has tended to command the field. The point being made here is that
what leads to their being considered as paradigmatic is their overall impact in spite of
any isolated personal character traits. Having already stood the test and scrutiny of
sceptics, they have emerged stronger than ever. They had their critics, sometimes very
bitter ones, with respect to their style, their claims and their motivation, yet they stand
generally beyond reproach in spite of all. In the case of Socrates just cited, by weaving
the accounts of Aristophanes and Xenophon around the Platonic Socrates in order to
make a single character, what emerges is a sort of secular saint who out-sophisticated
the sophists and raised a structure of knowledge, or confidence of knowledge, upon a
foundation too weak in other hands to support more than changing opinion."
In conclusion, it must be said that with or without paradigmatic individuals, the
individual has access to the moral principle for the purpose of acqiring good moral
habits and dispositions. To hold otherwise would imply that the individual is only
morally adrift, devoid of the capacity for personal discernment, and incapable of any
moral creativity in his or her personal life. The individual should both draw from, and
contribute to, the larger society such qualities as moral leadership, pioneering activity
and commitment to affirmative action. By so doing he or she adds to that variety that
characterizes life in a community of persons. As Antonio S. Cua points out: personal,
ideal-embedded principles are not necessarily disruptive of social equilibrium, but may
be articulations of the participant's understanding of the inherited core of common
ethical knowledge. The individual bears the responsibility of reasonable persuasion in
advocating his or her principles as the correct or sound interpretation of what is deemed
implicit in common ethical knowledge.°
3. Western Understanding of Religion
Western accounts of religion are based predominantly on a Christian tradition and
the various points of view ultimately give a broader understanding of the role of
religion. Those who oppose religious education base their objections largely on such
allegations as that religion is a delusion and belongs no longer to the present level of
mental and scientific development of man. Some people even dismiss religion as a
form of ideology, and religious education as a form of propaganda or indoctrination in
furtherance of this ideology. On the pragmatic level some say that religion is relevant
only to believers and should not be offered to those who do not want to be believers.
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It was not until the 18th century that political theorists and philosophers began to
enquire seriously as to how it comes about that men have religious beliefs. Until then,
they had confined themselves to examining the doctrines of the theologians, especially
their proofs of the existence of God. They accepted some, but rejected others. They
sometimes expressed doubts about traditional accounts of the origins of particular relig-
ions, but had little to say about the origins of religion in general, or its place in the life
of human beings. In general the Western understanding of religion can be roughly
separated into such views that it is a support for morals; that it satisfies special human
hungers; that it provides common values for the legitimation of the social order.
a. Religion as Support for Morals
Ordinarily many Western theorists approve of religion as a support of morals and
deplore religious fanaticism. Machiavelli thought religion was a good thing and that
"founders of religions [were] greater benefactors of humankind than the founders of
states." 66
 Most political theorists, even champions of toleration like Locke, condemned
atheism. Human beings need religion to give them a sense of their place in the world,
a sense of their own identity, an idea of themselves that satisfies them. Without these
ideas humans, who differ from other animals in being self-conscious, would be
intolerable to, and seek escape from, themselves. Religion satisfies an essential need of
the (human) creature that is an object of thought to itself, and therefore aware of itself
as a finite being in an infinite world.
For Rousseau, religion does not only provide humans with additional motives for
behaving well, it also brings them closer together in the community of faith, consoles
them when they suffer, and provides them with a conception of the place of humans in
the world. These things make life worth living. Kant for his part considers religious
belief among the three things necessary for humans to be moral and happy. These are
belief in God, in the freedom of the will, and in the immortality of the sou1.67
Fallenness is part and parcel of the human condition. In religion this state of
fallenness is called sin or a falling short of the ideal. Both the Bible and the Koran
acknowledge the fallenness of man. In traditional religion fallenness is also an acknow-
ledged fact as can be shown from an Igbo proverb: "The na-esi nkapi isi si ya n'obi;
a si na o si ya n'ahu, mmiri gaara asachapu ya." (The foul smell associated with a
shrew is something from within; if it weren't, he would have been washed clean of it
by the rain.)
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In his analysis of Dasein's (man's) existence, Heidegger recognizes fallenness
Verfalkna as part of the structure of man's temporal existence. Man shrinks from
responsible living. He is unwilling to accept the limitations of his human heritage and
to face responsibly the possibilities of his future. Fallenness is a characteristic of human
existence and is transmitted, perhaps from generation to generation, by social inheri-
tance. 69 The concept of fallenness is likely to give the whole discussion a religious tone
reminiscent of the Judeo-Christian biblical reference to the fall of Adam and Eve.
Heidegger's reference is not religious for the fact that he never linked fallenness to any
type of moral conduct or deity? His reference is to a failure of humans to live up to
their true nature. It is an indictment of the propensity of some humans to lose
themselves to the banal and unchallenging, emphasizing things, quantity, and personal
power, rather than demonstrate a disciplined self-mastery that would also include a
mastery of the environment.
As humans study themselves, questions of temporality, fear and dread, conscience
and guilt, nothingness and death, and the like come to the fore. Heidegger's fallenness
is characterized by (proneness to) temptation, tranquillizing (beriihigentl) alienation, and
self-entanglement (Vetfiingt). 71 One might perhaps be excused to presume some liberty
in trying to express these ideas of Heidegger's in more familiar expressions like the
sense of lousiness, lethargy, and incapacity. The concepts are without doubt relevant in
a moral discussion, since they are descriptive of conduct and refer to the inner nature
of humans rather than the outer.
Heidegger's analysis of the nature and condition of human existence, though
explicitly non-religious both in its conception and its expression, can nevertheless find
some applicability in the religious sphere, and a parallel in the fall of Adam and Eve.
The fact of fallenness is considered by Muslims and Christians alike to have spiralled
through the ages to affect all members of the human species. 72
 There is an inescapable
dimension of mystery in human existence, and religion like morality, having its roots
in the very nature of man address this mysterious aspect.
As a way out of this situation of fallenness, religion points to the supernatural,
while in a situation devoid of religion, there would still be the focus on the human
being as his or her own rescuer. There is a conception of religion which has had a
profound influence on modem ways of thinking about the place of religion in the life
of humans. It inspired Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and even goes back to
Paschal's Pensies. According to this trend of thought, humans need religion to give
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them a sense of place in the world. Religion gives each person a sense of his or her
own identity as imperfect but perfectible. Without this sense, there would be no differ-
ence between them and other animals. Religion makes life worth living in spite of
human fallenness. Because of religion the human being is no longer intolerable to him
or herself and no longer seeks to escape from him or herself. He or she learns to cope.
Even from the purely secular point of view, religion serves a practical purpose by
holding ecclesiastical communities together, and by giving a public and sacred character
to certain actions and occasions such as marriage, birth and death. It serves to reinforce
men's motives for observing social rules by the threat of punishments or the promise of
rewards and the hands of some being or beings more powerful than humans.
b. Religion as Satisfying Special Human Hungers
Human beings have other hungers which the lower animals do not have, and if they
are not taught how to satisfy these hungers too, they will remain individually distraint,
socially dangerous and disruptive, no matter how well they have learnt to state or cope
with their lesser appetites. Dietrich Bonhoeffer identifies three such hungers: the hunger
for meaning, the hunger for love, and the hunger for craftsmanship. By feeding these
hungers, humans can overcome the frustration attendant upon their state of fallenness."
Bernard Iddings Bell links the extra hunger to the religious realm and claims that
ignorance of religion lessens the human impulse toward endurance and daring as well
as toward compassion and love'. It prevents a right evaluation of human motives and
therefore hinders a sound understanding of the human condition and human behaviour.
The search for compassion and encouragement is expressed in religious creeds, rituals
and prayers. These are the ways in which the human race cries out for help.
There is no doubt that religious belief is the mainstay of most moral laws and even
the entire legal system operative in the "Christian" Western world — a heritage Nigeria
also shares. The Decalogue in the Christian Bible as well as the moral teachings in the
Koran are not just a set of religious rules meant for worshippers. They are designed as
the path to the good life, which it is the goal of moral education to clarify. In the
Decalogue, for example, apart from the first three commandments against idolatry and
commanding the observance of holy days of worship", all the rest are reflected in soci-
ety's books of law binding everybody in society. It can thus be supposed that one who
faithfully observes the prescriptions of the Decalogue and related laws, would be ipso
facto keeping the moral law.
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c. Religion as Providing Common Values for the
Legitimation of the Social Order
The common conclusion from this fact is that religion provides the common values
for the legitimation of the social order." That means that the practice of religion
sometimes directly aids moral consciousness. The antireligious policies of the Soviet
Union are among the great bastions of communism. Now the leadership aware of the
country's desperate situation and the need for moral regeneration, is looking for help in
the form of the restoration of old religious norms, usually presented in the Soviet mass
media as "all mankind values"." The media now preach compassion, grace, forgiveness,
charity and other virtues previously presented as elements of bourgeois decadence."
Furthermore, priests, the targets of derogation for decades after the revolution,
"emerged as among the most respected people in the country; and literature and the arts
started to praise religion" and has begun to acknowledge religion as "a means of halting
Soviet society's accelerating demoralization.""
Some Western theorists have been critical of religion. It would seem to most people,
however, that the objections to religion are based on a misunderstanding of its true
nature. What the cntics usually emphasize is where religion has been abused, such as
where people have been persecuted for not believing what they were expected to
believe. When people in the name of religion take on to themselves the power to perse-
cute others, that is an abuse of religion. Such abuses manifest themselves in religious
fanaticism, bigotry and anti-religious chauvinism. It is worry about this kind of situa-
tion that led Hobbes to consider a diversity of religious beliefs a danger to domestic
peace. Anyone wanting to appeal to religion as a base for moral education in a pluralist
society such as Nigeria, need not be put off by, but must have to contend with, the
views of critics of religion in general.
Religion is not merely believing, as Hegel and Tylor claimed; nor is it just a matter
of emotions, as Schleiermacher claimed. Even though the element of belief and of
emotion is present, uncritical belief or emotions unaccompanied and guided by intellect
and reason, are likely to mislead. Religion must be felt as well as thought. It must be
lived, and translated into action. It is not a segment of life. It is not just ritual or
ceremony or doctrines or structures. These might be in the service of religion, but they
are not religion itself. Finally, religion cannot be properly described in terms of an
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ideology because unlike ideology, which operates on the level of the intellect and the
emotions, religion penetrates man's innermost being.
A morality based on religion would base the moral law on the authority of God or
some divine being. Such a morality would, for obvious reasons, be unacceptable to
atheists, agnostics, and some humanists.' Radical humanists argue that since there is no
God to rebel against, humans should realize for themselves that it is senseless to be
rebellious. They should cultivate cheerfulness rather than cynicism!' Most atheists
would be inclined to toe the line of radical humanism° and, grounding their world view
on nature alone, would base all human values in this-earthly experiences. They would
view the human being solely as a functioning unity of physical, emotional, and
intellectual faculties. Moral education under this view would comprise, as Corliss
Lamont claims, the education of the emotions, the senses and the aesthetic faculties.°
The basis of this thesis is the presupposition that pleasure is the sole good for man and
the sole end of human activities!' The laws that regulate activities have been made for
utility, which in turn generates pleasure. Virtue is therefore "no other than the calculus
of pleasure."' Humanism's appeal lies in its fascinating combination of utilitarianism
with hedonism -- which are, no doubt, among the most appealing tendencies to the
human fancy.
As can be read from the preamble to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria which declares Nigeria to be "One Nation Under God", atheistic and agnostic
views and tendencies can only be associated with a minority of the population. By the
same token, even though tolerance and understanding should not be denied them, it is
unlikely that Nigeria's rule of life will be based on their preferences rather than on
those of the generality of the Nigerian people.
Religion is generally accepted as a help both in establishing and ensuring a morally
sound society, and in eliminating misdemeanours. Its great strength in moral matters is
the provision of a model — Jesus Christ for Christians, Mohammed for Muslims, and
the Ancestors for the practitioners of traditional religion. It achieves this by offering
an incentive for moral conduct — often reward in an afterlife or union with God.
Sometimes the very exercise of religion turns out to be a practice in moral training.
Each religion contains within itself its own moral codes. These codes are not
necessarily opposed to each other, but frequently there are subtle differences between
them. These subtle differences must be respected, and there should be no attempt to
down-play or ignore them. It is a mistake to think that one could wish away the
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differences and create a single moral system based on all the religions and valid for
all Nigerians. As Theophilus Okere points out, such a common-denominator religion
would carry no more weight than a code of etiquette, because it would not be supported
by the deep convictions one could live for and die for."
Religion has to do with the good life. Its concern is that men and women should
behave according to God's desire, and thereby behave as human beings. Religion is
not merely a moral science. It has to do with knowing what the good life is and living
it. Even learned scholars know that if left unaided, courage fails as they contemplate
the vastness of truth and the difficulty of learning and of living, and their morality.
Religious education will enable pupils to come to terms with, or understand those
experiences of humankind that culminate in religious belief and practice. It will sensitize
them to religious views whether they are themselves religiously committed or not. When
sensitivity and sympathy to others' views, values and feelings develop, mutual concord
and harmony follow.
Admittedly, there are the seemingly unresolvable discrepancies in inter- and intra-
religious interpretations. Some people in desperation have dared to call for a secular-
ization of religion. Some even called for its total abrogation. Just as the secular state is
supposed by some to provide a panacea to religious bigotry, so also is secularism
believed by its advocates to provide a compromise situation amidst the never-ending
controversies over religious interpretations. Dr Tai Solarin of Nigeria would bulldoze
all churches (and mosques?), Ogali A. Ogali would turn them into warehouses after the
manner of the communists in Russia and other socialist states. It remains to be shown
however, why religion per se can be blamed for Nigeria's problems, and how a relig-
ionless situation or an iconoclastic attitude to religion could work the magic. The
suppression of religion in the Socialist States, rather than bring heaven to earth only
gave birth to cynicism which has had the unforeseen effect of poisoning other aspects
of social harmony.
Diversity of doctrines is not exclusive to religion, and should not be invoked as a
pretext for implementing a policy prejudicial to the inclusion of religious education in
the school curriculum. It is found in practically all fields of education. In modern
human sciences, for example, as much as in ethical theorizing, there is the endless
dispute as to when exactly life begins, and at what stage of pregnancy the foetus can
be considered a human person with rights. In philosophy, there is disagreement between
idealism and empiricism, materialism and rationalism; and in political theory there is
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disagreement among Marxism, Capitalism and the various theories as to the true
meaning of democracy. These disagreements should not lead to the discontinuance of
any of the fields in schools, nor should it lead to the adulteration of any, so that it could
become acceptable to everyone. Those who fear that religious education will heighten
religious tensions are therefore mistaken. Religious education will bring about a
meeting of minds so that those seemingly daunting obstacles can be closely examined
and their sting removed.
What is feared and censured by critics is religion as abused. Pure religion is free
from the negative idiosyncratic elements that built up in the course of religion's march
through history -- the persecutions, wars, crusades, fanaticism, bigotry, chauvinism,
authoritarianism. Pure and unspoiled religion as Saint James describes it consists in
coming to the aid of the hungry, helping the underprivileged, and above all, keeping
oneself uncorrupted by the world!' It is inconceivable that anyone who understood
religion in its pure sense would still call for its abrogation.
4. Recent Western Developmental Theories
Any discussion of moral education needs to take account of psychological theories
of moral development, already referred to in Chapter Two. These include those of Erik
Erikson, who is best remembered for his so-called Eight Ages of Man (see below); Jean
Piaget, who speaks of three (or rather four) levels of development -- the sensori-motor,
the pre-operational, the concrete operational, and the formal operational. Then there is
Kohlberg with his three levels of development — the preconventional, the conventional,
and the postconventional levels.
a. Psycho-Social Approach: Erikson
The Erilcsonian pattern tries to take account of both psychological and social data
in the human make-up. The study of development is not only a matter of general
interaction with environment but of specific kinds of interaction. Other people are not
just pieces of one's environment; social environment is fundamentally different from
physical environment. The individual "plays a role in society" which in turn helps to
determine what and who the individual is. An element of unpredictability has to be
admitted, and the rules and canons of experimental-mathematical science are not going
to be observed.
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Erikson comes out of the Freudian tradition, but he has also tried to do a major
overhaul of psychoanalysis by trying to incorporate the psychoanalytic categories into
a socially oriented theory. He begins his charting of human development with these
two assumptions: (1) Human beings develop according to steps predetermined by the
growing person's readiness, and (2) society is constituted to meet and to invite the
succession of potentialities for interaction. Such a correlation between the organismic
and the social does not determine whether there might be other powers of the individual
have not been or cannot be socialized.
Erikson goes beyond the individual and focuses on the generation." He interprets
the individual's life from within the movement of the generations. The child who is on
one side of the generational divide will eventually come around to the other side. He
maintained that the pattern of one generation "concluding itself in the next" is evident
in the flow of the centuries."
Erikson formulated his well-known "eight ages of man" in his essay in Childhood
and Society, setting down the chart of ages as follows:
1. basic trust vs. basic mistrust
2. autonomy	 vs. shame
3. initiative vs. guilt
4. industry	 vs. inferiority
5. identity	 vs. role confusion
6. intimacy	 vs. isolation
7. generativity vs. stagnation
8. integrity vs. despair
Erikson has frequently pointed out that he does not have an achievement scale. He
does not propose a description of qualities that should be preached to people who would
strive to attain them. Two things seem to be implied here: (1) The first term in each
pair is clearly the desirable one; however, it appears in personal life more by discovery
or gift than by conscious acquisition; (2) The terms in the second column, instead of
being bad qualities, are more like the minor characters in a play; they are bad only
when they try to upstage the major characters. A conscious attempt to eliminate these
qualities is unwise.
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Erikson seems to relegate religion to a smaller, helping role in each of his
developmental stages. He places religion as an institution in the very first age along
with the struggle of basic trust versus basic mistrust. At first glance that seems to imply
that infants are religious and everyone else is not. However, if one recalls that he is
describing the relation between generations, then religion is at least as important for
adult ages as it is for the children. Erikson is no doubt aware that his final age of
integrity has moral and religious connotations. Etymologically, the word integrity is
related to peace, health, wholeness, and holiness. If we are to realize such integration
or integrity, we need a "post-narcissistic love of the human ego..., an experience which
conveys some world order and spiritual sense.""
The age that does not seem to fit the religious sentiment is generativity. That word
seems to suggest activity directed outward without inwardness, mutuality, or a sense of
limits. The choice of terms here is crucial because Erikson said that if he had not been
writing from the standpoint of the child, generativity would be the centre of his
system.'
b. Moral Reasoning: Piaget and Kohlberg
Jean Piaget's work provides experimental data to validate Kant's principle. Piaget
sought to trace in painstaking detail how forms of knowledge are constructed by the
mind and when they appear in an individual's life. Lacking any clear method to
accomplish this project, Piaget had to invent his own, and, as Gabriel Moran puts it,
"often relying on instinct and intuition, and often concentrating on his own children"."
He left himself open to criticism about method, and many scientists attack him on those
grounds.
Like Erikson, though not so frequently, Piaget uses the word epigenetic and sees
later development in evolutionary terms as already initially present in more primitive
forms. For example, the adolescent's fully developed notion of causality is already
discernible in the infant's magical views of reality.
Piaget's interest was the steps by which a child comes to make abstract judgments.
These judgments can be studied as structures of logical reasoning. An aspect of this
reasoning power is what Piaget calls moral judgments, those judgments pertaining to the
ordering of society. For Piaget, moral is almost another name for social/affective. That
is, the social context of cognition has laws to protect the individual. As the child
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develops it comes to see the necessity and value of these rules governing social
harmony.
The whole scheme of Piaget's moral development is a movement from thinking that
rules are external to an understanding that they are intrinsic to our own good. Piaget
refers to "two moralities" rather than to two stages of morality. The first morality he
calls heteronomous, meaning that rules are external, sacred, and unchangeable. A
second morality, called autonomous, grows up parallel to the first, conflicts with it, and
finally replaces it. The second morality is one of co-operation, intention, and solidarity.
The child eventually comes to see that laws are a matter of mutual consent and so at
times they can and should be changed for the good running of society.
A chief concern of Kohlberg's has always been education. He saw moral educa-
tion as caught between indoctrination, which gives over morality to the objective realm
of rules, and values clarification, which does not escape subjectivism. He therefore set
out to build a kind of bridge between the implications of the two concepts.
The concept of indoctrination in its strictest sense assumes that individuals must be
told what the truth is and have limits imposed on their questioning. In the 1960s and
1970s, values clarification came into prominence as a reaction to indoctrination. Since
it assumed there was no objective morality, values clarification consisted almost entirely
of techniques for stimulating awareness. As a "school of thought" it was "so lacking in
substance it could hardly avoid being more than a passing vogue"" for, stretched to its
logical consequences values clarification can be a form of hedonism where a subjective
awareness -- usually of pleasure or pain -- is the end point, and where there is no
additional mechanism for determining the value or goal of such an awareness. However,
other forms of moral subjectivism had preceded values clarification and no doubt will
recur after the interest in techniques for clarifying values has passed.
Piaget's definition of morality bridges the positions between indoctrination and
values clarification. In accordance with Piaget's theory, an adequate moral education
would have to transcend the dichotomy of subjective and objective moralities, and
reconceptualize the problem instead as one of interaction. Then a process of personal
clarification might be useful as part of the human quest for an adequate morality.
Kohlberg offers as his own system a kind of corollary to Piaget's position: a
stimulation of the "natural" development of the child's own moral judgment. Such a
development of the reasoning power could hardly escape subjectivism, some critics of
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Kohlberg have pointed that out. In popular summaries Kohlberg is often grouped with
values clarification, but he rejects this classification.
c. How Adaptable to Nigeria's Situation?
What are most readily applicable in Nigeria are the various theories of development
as conceived by Erikson, Kohlberg and Piaget. Each of the theorists recognizes various
stages of development, which means that moral education at any stage must be
applicable to the level of development attained by the child. Their three tendencies
correspond to the various levels which must be attained for moral education in Nigeria
to go beyond the common-sense level to which it seems tied.
At a very young age, the child cannot cope with complex theories as much as he
or she can cope with simple illustrations and demonstrations. The very young child
therefore remains at the common-sense level of explanation. As his or her under-
standing develops, the child will no longer be satisfied with commonsense explanations,
but must apply reason in order to question any explanation further. As his or her com-
petence with critical reasoning develops, he or she has the possibility of discerning
between sound and unsound reasoning, good and bad explanations in order to be able
to drop the bad and unsound in favour of the good and sound. These three stages
roughly fit respectively into the schemes proposed by Erikson, Piaget, and Kohlberg.
Erilcson's psycho-social approach which is the fruit of his Freudian sympathies, has
wide-ranging applications for political, moral and religious education in Nigeria. By
taking into account the social and psychological, the predictable and unpredictable
aspects of human development, and by correlating the individual with the social
environment, Erilcson's theory works on the presupposition that there is always
something of value that endures through generations and is passed on for the enrich-
ment of succeeding generations. It can therefore easily relate with the transmissory
approach which the method most favoured in traditional moral education. Its purpose
would be to `introduce' the children into what makes for the good life — a further
vindication of R.S. Peters' consideration of education as initiation.
Piaget's interest in the understanding takes the process a step further where moral
reasoning takes the place of common-sense explanations that characterize moral
explanations in traditional moral education. At the 'initiation' level, children operate at
the command level in which it is sufficient to do things because that is 'the way it is
normally done' by decent people, and to fail to comply means to be naughty. The
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second level introduced by Piaget's theory would be interested in determining just what
makes it decent to act one way rather than in an opposite way. It is the level of seeking
and giving reasons for action.
Beyond the seeking and giving of reasons for action there is yet the higher level of
distinguishing between good reasons and bad; between indoctrination and values
clarification. Kohlberg's interest in education makes his theory operative at this level
where the child having passed the earlier levels must adopt a certain mode of beha-
viour which can be said to be virtuous or good based not on the child's preferences or
feelings but on the objective demands of the moral law.
The details of how the developmental theories mentioned could be applied in Nigeria
are covered in section 2f of Chapter Six which deals with beginning the child's moral
education early enough in life.
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CHAPTER SIX
TOWARDS A DISTINCTIVELY
NIGERIAN APPROACH
Reason and experiment have been Indulged, and error has fled before them.
— THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia.
The wide d(ffusion of culture, and the education of humanity for Justice and liberty and
peace are indispensable to the dignity of man and constitute a sacred duty which all
nations must fulfil in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern.
— Preamble of the Constitution of UNESCO.
Extensive discussion has been devoted in Chapter Three to the traditional Nigerian
approach to moral education. The traditional approach is distinctively Nigerian in that
it is carried out by Nigerians, for Nigerians, and based on principles and presuppositions
that are uniquely Nigerian. An important difference though is that it is closer to the past
albeit recent. In the light of contemporary circumstances many aspects of the traditional
approach will be seen to be rather anachronistic. The jungle experiences of the lads for
example, could hardly be re-enacted except as a quaint showpiece, since the circum-
stance within which that form of education thrived has largely become history. Most
forests have disappeared and formal schooling has replaced the informal.
Any new approach that is distinctively Nigerian, besides being carried out by
Nigerians, for Nigerians, and with specifically Nigerian issues at the background, must
also be able to be applied in present-day formal classroom situations. There is still room
for reference to the traditional forms of government; the traditional moral code; adapted
forms of initiation; discussions about traditional and other forms of religious activities;
the use of stories, proverbs and brain teasers so effective in traditional educational
methods.
A distinctively Nigerian approach should be able to provide for at least three major
areas of interest, namely, 1) the possibility of political education towards a non-Western
form of democracy; 2) the possibility of moral education building on the strengths of
traditional cultures; and 3) the possibility of religious education which builds on common
factors while also promoting understanding of differences.
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1. The Possibility of Political Education Towards a non-Western Form of
Democracy
For effective political education to be achieved in Nigeria, primary consideration
must be given to the country's unique needs in her own unique circumstances. There
are two aspects in the process of education — the speculative and the practical. The
speculative aspect of political education is concerned with theories and principles, while
the practical is the application of these theories in concrete life situations. The heart of
the speculative aspect is the ideology behind the political system. It is the ideology that
provides the basis as well as the justification for the political stance of the community.
Used in this broad sense, ideology can be said to include organized religion in its aspect
of providing motives and giving answers to problems.
The speculative aspect can be found in theories propounded in documents, manuals,
treatises, textbooks and manifestos, and is meant to engage the mental and intellectual
capacities of humans. The practical aspect is these theories as applied in the national life
of the country and according to the country's own unique circumstances.
For a distinctively Nigerian approach, it is necessary, among others to a) be
primarily based on distinctively Nigerian or related sources; b) consider the Athenian
model of democracy which is so similar to the traditional and contemporary Nigerian
socio-political experience; c) consider the contributions of such luminaries as Julius
Nyerere in his interpretation of democratic principles according to Tanzania's contem-
porary experience and ideals, since there are a great many parallels between Tanzania
and Nigeria; d) analyze and seek to understand and apply the principles of democracy
to Nigeria's present needs and circumstances; e) eschewing negative approaches --
brainwashing, propagandizing, sloganeering — which are likely to distort issues, and
getting into the business of rigorous analysis which confronts all the important issues that
might arise in trying to understand and apply the democratic process.
a. Using Distinctively Nigerian or Related Sources
The primary resource material for political education is without doubt the country's
constitutions and allied documents. With those forming the background, the history of
political thought as well as a study of the major political theories and systems of
contemporary times will provide an in-depth understanding required for operating and
living a political system well suited to the country. The relevance of any political theory
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to the country can be measured from understanding the historical circumstance behind
its formulation, the issues it set out to address and how successfully it managed to
address the issues. The next question is how, if at all, and given Nigeria's unique
historical and social circumstances, any or several theories can be applicable in its case.'
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria defines, as no other document
does, what the national goals are; its expectations for citizens, the place and role of the
individual in the community, the way to relate, the economy, the freedoms, the laws,
etc. The Constitution set out for the Nigerians at least two major ideals of:
1. Living "in unity and harmony as one, indivisible and indissoluble
sovereign nation under God".
2. "Promoting the good government and welfare of all persons in
Nigeria on the principles of freedom, equality and justice, and
for the purpose of consolidating the unity of our people."
Specifically articulated in the Constitution is the national ethic as comprising
"Discipline, Self-reliance, and Patriotism.'" From the Constitution also the phrase
"one nation under God" is worthy of note. It implies that theism or religion does have
an important place, and precludes atheism as a principle in the national life. Thus
Nigeria as a nation is theistically oriented.
Nigeria also upholds the principle of freedom, equality and justice. Thus in practice,
those whose convictions do not lead them to theism are still protected under the
principle of justice and freedom. In brief the Constitution demands of the good citizen
the disposition to live in unity and harmony, and promote good government on the
principles of freedom, equality and justice.
There are also other ideals for citizenship education. These include the inculcation
and nurturing of a patriotic spirit, learning and practising the spirit of democracy,
vindicating the universal franchise which democracy guarantees to citizens, and making
the government work according to the will of the people rather than impose its will on
them.
Talking of democracy and education, some questions come to mind. Does democracy
mean that the everyone should have a say as to the content, method, setting and style
involved in the educational system? In other words should the educational policy be
based on a plebiscite, on the decision of the government, on the wishes of parents, on
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the preferences of students, or should it be left to experts in the field? These represent
the various tendencies that come into play in determining the educational policy and
each has arguments in its favour. The democratic aspect is certainly not breached if the
experts in the field of education, in full cognizance of the concerns and wishes and
overall goal of education for the given community, work out the programme and its
content.
To guide them in this task they need the guiding light of certain principles which
are plausible in themselves and suitable for the task they are meant to accomplish. In
this regard, Amy Gutmann, in her book Democratic Education, argues that our alle-
giance to democracy commits us to accepting at least three fundamental educational
principles of preparation for democracy, non-discrimination, and non-repression:
1. For Democracy: That education must provide the ability to
participate actively in the democratic process.3
2. For Non-Discrimination: That no educable child may be excluded
from an education adequate to participating in the political
processes that structure choice among good lives.'
3. For Non-Repression: That neither the state nor any group in it
may use education to restrict rational deliberation of competing
conceptions of the good life and good society.5
Also worthy of note is the concept of "one nation". This concept has the capacity
to evoke in the citizen the nationalist as well as the patriotic spirit. The spirit of
nationalism is often viewed with suspicion particularly for its association with
fanaticism, militarism and disruptive revolution. However, no nation could do without
at least some measure of nationalism.'
There is actually only a thin line between nationalism and patriotism. The distinc-
tion between them lies in the distinction between the concept of nation — place of one's
birth; and country — a political entity to which one belongs as of right and where one
is entitled to exercise franchise. Clearly then, while the concept of patriotism has
cosmopolitan implications, the concept of nationalism is more parochial. Since the
French Revolution there has been a close synonymy between country and nation and,
consequently between patriotism and nationalism.
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As Ignace Lepp points out, 7 nationalism was from the beginning a return to closed
society. Patriotism is by far superior to nationalism for in it one's country is cherished
for what it actually is, while in nationalism it is prized for what it is imagined to be.
Nationalist patriotism is directly opposed to other nationalisms. While pursuing its goal
of preaching the love of country, it indirectly preaches at the same time hatred of other
countries. The elevation by Dr Joseph Goebbels' of the Nazi fame, of lies and calumny
to the rank of patriotic distinction is a case in point.
Traditionally nationalist patriotism has been associated with the conservative right
political wing, while the left wing is associated with internationalism; indeed radical
cosmopolitanism, and would sometimes regard themselves as citizens of the world. The
former would stress elements of national pride, territorialism, s strong defence, national
identity or sovereignty, while the latter would stress the world community, dis-
armament, international dialogue, and international cooperation. Fired by a patriotic
spirit, Nigeria must decide what form of government it must have: a centralized, unitary
government; a federal model with a strong central government; a loose federal model
(confederation) with a weak central government; a completely new arrangement unique
to Nigeria.
The first option, a unitary government leaves the central government with all the
powers while the states have no powers at all. A unitary government would be unwork-
able in Nigeria now, since it will be construed as a renunciation of autonomy, so to
speak, by people of the component section, who have known nothing else since Nigeria
was established. Furthermore, Nigeria is so large geographically that it will be too
unwieldy for one central government to run effectively, since the cultural, ethnic
political and religious peculiarities of the various sections would call for special
consideration each on its own merit.
In the second option, the central government is strong and the states are fairly strong
also. That has been in operation in Nigeria all along. The strength of the central
government is in its monopoly of the armed forces, the police force, and the foreign
affairs. In that way it is able to place the states under control. This option gives ample
room for self expression of the various component sections, and at the same time leaves
ample room for unitary action on the national level. The states are sufficiently strong
but not so strong as to overwhelm the central government. Thus it seems the Federal
system remains Nigeria's most viable option.
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The third model, a confederation, would deprive the central government of complete
control and the possibilities are limitless as to what each state would decide to do with
its autonomy. Theoretically a confederal system will grant each of the various peoples
ample opportunity to be themselves and give their peculiarities full expression. The
drawback of this possibility is that a national identity diminishes in inverse proportion
to the increase in sectional or ethnic identity. Mobilization for national causes would be
difficult to achieve, since there could hardly be any cause where every state would agree
without any of them foot-dragging or trying to back out.
Another important point is the implication for Nigeria's unity of either aligning with
the capitalist West or Socialist East, 9 or whether it were best to be politically non-
aligned. It seems that Nigeria's position of greatest strength will be to remain politically
non-alignee. That will enable it to enjoy the best that each political bloc has to offer
without placing itself under the perpetual spell of any. It can enjoy full autonomy and
always talk from a position of strength in world affairs. It can relate with a member of
either bloc on a strictly business level as an equal partner, or it can feel free to go
completely on its own without requiring any other country's endorsement.
It seems more realistic in the light of what has been said, to go instead for a non-
party government." The advantage is that a non-party arrangement is spared all the
defects of a multi-party system which has been pointed out in the last chapter includes:
pressure on individuals to toe party lines rather than follow own conviction; party
loyalty overriding national interests; reductionism arising from considering the country
as a party and the majority as though it were the whole. The non-party arrangement will
enable Nigerians to pick across the board the very best talents that could fill the
positions of leadership, put them to work together according to a well-defined modus
operandi based on the constitution, and dispense, at least for a while, with the
expensive, rancorous, time-consuming, often confrontational partisan rhetoric. The
blueprint for this kind of proposal is the family which is the foundation of all society.
In the family the members often have to discuss frankly in order to reach the best
decision in the interest of the entire family.
The military government in Nigeria, apart from the fact that no mechanism has
been provided for monitoring its leadership, seems to be operating according to what
might be considered a zero-party blueprint that is politically centrist. It can provide an
interesting model with features that could be gainfully adopted in a civilian context:
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a: It is essentially task-oriented.
b: There is no opposition on the basis of losers.
c: Appointment to public office is not the triumph of winners over
losers but a recognition of personal competence.
d: Every office holder therefore stands or falls not on party loyalty
or patronage, but by the effectiveness or otherwise which he or
she handles the responsibilities entrusted to him or her in the
service of the country.
If this kind of model can be constitutionally established and refined and put into
operation in a civilian context, it would be possible to hold political debates on national
issues on the basis of what one frankly views as best for the country without having the
party's interested policies in one's way. Everyone will be entitled to raise an objection,
or contribute an idea to any point that needs either clarification or modification. Thus
each point brought up for consideration has the chance of a tough but thorough and
dispassionate discussion rather than a wholesale, uncritical endorsement by fellow party
members, and guaranteed rejection by the members of the opposing party members.
Finally, inordinate ambition for political position will be minimized such that those who
want political appointments must compete for them on the basis of proven personal com-
petence.
Nigeria must discover for herself the true meaning of democracy in its original
sense. This will mean a substantial modification of the current understanding of the
term on both the Left and the Right of the political spectrum. When Rome was faced
with a similar situation Aristides encouraged them to hold on to their own system of
democracy — the Republic — because it was better than the Greek versions and had the
advantage of being "a blend of all political systems, without the faults associated with
each."' Basically a republican system is very much alive in traditional Nigerian society
and can be updated to meet contemporary needs.
Dr Julius Nyerere, former President of Tanzania has already taken the bold step of
attempting to give the definition of democracy an African flavour. The definition he
gives and the order of priority he outlines are different from what obtains in both the
Western and the Eastern world. He once declared:
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Our nation has neither the long tradition of nationhood, nor the
strong physical means of national security which older countries
take for granted.... Development must be considered first, and
other matters examined in relation to it. Our question with regard
to every matter -- even the issue of freedom -- must be, "How
does this affect the progress of our National Development Plan?"13
To reach an application of democracy that is more meaningful and relevant, at
least two models are available to Nigeria — the Athenian model of Greek democracy
and the pioneering effort of Julius Nyerere.
b. Model of Athenian Democracy
From the Athenian model the following features already familiar to the Nigerian
mentality are evident:
1. Decision was by consensus in the E1CKLESIA or assembly.
2. The leaders were directly accountable to the community.
3. Accountability demanded that all holders of public office should
not go abroad, or make donations, or administer property; and
that their own personal property be held in security until they
rendered the final accounts to the community."
4. High ethical standards were expected of public officers.
5. There was political control of the armed forces and public officers
to forestall such behaviours as indecent sexual behaviour and the
abuse of public funds.
The Athenian democracy was indeed popular sovereignty at work. It protected the
rule of law such that no individual would be able to claim immunity or place himself
or herself above the law. In studying the Athenian democracy one sees that it is specifi-
cally forbidden for anyone to seize political power by force. Military regimes are
denounced for the penchant for ruling by decrees rather than by the law. As Andokides
points out in his On the Mysteries, this is unhealthy for democracy and an abuse of the
constitution:
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In no circumstances whatsoever may the authorities apply an
unwritten law... No decree, whether of the Council or of the
people, may override the law... No law applying to an individual
may be passed, if it does not apply equally to all..."
In Against Timocrates, Demosthenes pursues the point that no established law may
be repealed, save in a legislative committee; and that anyone proposing that a law be
repealed should have the onus of providing a better alternative or face the possibility of
an indictment under the law that deals with the proposing of detrimental laws.' This is
a sure safeguard against erratic whimsical laws issued by people with no proper
knowledge of the law, and who have placed themselves above the existing laws.
c. Nyerere's Political Legacy
From Nyerere's model, the Ujamaa — the Swahili word for "working together" -
- features similar to those that obtained under the Athenian model are evident:
I.
	 Decision was by consensus and not arbitrary.
2. There was the in-built system for monitoring the
activities of public officers.
3. The leader used persuasion rather than coercion.
He therefore led rather than ruled.
4. Political education included in the secondary school
programme.
5. There was political control of the military
establishment.
6. The leader led by personal witness of life and
example.
Nyerere captured the African mind in his propositions. He based his system on the
principle that power belongs to the people. His system was socialist, but provides a
direct say to the people. Seeing no need for a distinction between a ruling party and
the people, Nyerere preferred a single political party to which all belonged. The prime
purpose of the party was to instill a sense of national purpose and identity into the
populace, a purpose which was quite well realized. C. George Kahama, a long-time
government official who worked under Nyerere said of him:
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We call him Moses because he gave us the tablets of gjamaa.
With hindsight, I think those ideals have served us well. There
are no riots in the streets of Tanzania. We have stability. We have
basic national principles."
In-built within the ujamaa system were avenues for individuals to appeal or protest
against governmental decisions. The laws were simple and justice was speedy. There
was also a permanent Commission of Enquiry which looked into the conduct of any
person in public office to prevent abuse. Finally, the regime leaders were to apply
persuasive rather than coercive means of social control, since viable socialist com-
munities, argued Nyerere, could only be established with willing members." Nyerere's
goal was to build a society in which all members had equal rights and equal opportun-
ities; and in which all lived at peace without anyone suffering or inflicting injustice,
exploiting or being exploited.'
He incorporated political education into the Tanzanian secondary school programme
and the party had a youth wing in each school. To reach the grassroots, a system was
created whereby every unit of ten houses in their towns and villages was designated a
"cell". The cell leader was duly elected from among them and had the responsibility of
explaining party policies, mobilizing groups for work and other projects, and channel-
ling their complaints for consideration!'
Nyerere was able to steer beyond the pulls of tribalismn
 and achieve a political
control of the armed forces. He sought to restore to the people a sense of pride by
reversing the negative, stereotypical definitions of the African by detractors. 22 "The
average Tanzanian," he declared, "is a rather hard-headed, but essentially malleable,
citizen fully capable of effecting behavioral balance which will serve both self-interest
and national needs..."
In addition, Nyerere was able to effect policies that were unquestionably in the
interest of both the people and democracy, and would rather have a country that is
honourable and poor than one that mortgages its independence to foreign powers for
the purpose of obtaining foreign aid. In his Arusha Declaration he asked:
How can we depend upon foreign governments and companies
for the major part of our development without giving to those
governments and countries a great part of our freedom to act as
we please? The truth is that we cannot...23
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Nyerere's belief was that neither political independence nor material development
is truly meaningful unless the direction and operation of independent development
springs from the aspirations and labour of the citizenry. Chiefly because of his belief
in indigenous African values, Tanzania is the only country in Africa with a native
African national and official language — Swahili!'
Besides putting together a political system, Nyerere earned for himself credibility
beyond question. He attempted to live the principles of the ideology he proclaimed by
pursuing a frugal style of living, shunning pomp and ceremony, and by being disposed
to sacrifice some degree of economic utility in order to maintain a consistency of
approach. He thereby achieved at the same time a robust, philosophically coherent
alternative to the extant political systems. In addition he left an impressive legacy of
personal probity and integrity that speaks volumes in the field of social and political
enterprise
d. Understanding Democracy and Putting It to Work
Democracy is not an abstract label for what politicians do in parliament, nor does
it stop with casting votes in the ballot box. It pervades the socio-economic life of the
community. It is the people having full control of their own destiny. The first step
towards democracy is by preparing the mind through education. Education, particularly
formal, structured education will take full account of the central issues involved in
democracy and subject them to informed and vigorous critical analysis.
Questions about what democracy consists in, the moral basis of political legitimacy,
how the respect for personal rights can be observed in a democracy, how good
leadership is to be distinguished from bad, and what can be done to prevent or eradi-
cate bad leadership, must engage the attention of anyone who is genuinely interested in
the democratic process.
John Dewey's description of democracy puts into sharper relief the contrast between
leadership which enables human free spirit to thrive rather than being tethered to some
inordinate form of external control:
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Democracy is belief in the ability of human experience to generate
the aims and methods by which further experience will grow in
ordered richness. Every other form of moral and social faith rests
upon the idea that experience must be subjected at some point or
other to some form of external control; to some 'authority' alleged
to exist outside the process of experience. Democracy is the faith
that the process of experience is more important than any special
result attained, so that special results achieved are of ultimate
value only as they are used to enrich and order the ongoing
process.'
Besides providing the principles for distinguishing between good and bad leader-
ship, between good and bad government, the democratic principle is also interested in
such other questions as, what it means to say that power belongs to the people; what
the basis of popular sovereignty is, and what power and legitimate authority consist in.
More globally, there could arise the question as to whether the sovereignty of one nation
could legitimately override that of another. If the theory is well understood, the
application is easier to put into effect.
Familiarity with the central issues prepares the mind of the student more than the
actual experience (in the role of a spectator) of politicians at work. They are able to
distinguish good politics from bad, genuine political point and rhetoric, true patriotism
from pretence.
The questions proposed above are clearly complex ones requiring a considerable
amount of intellectual competence in the field of history of ideas. This competence does
not come overnight but must be built up over time by the students being exposed to
simpler issues in their junior school years. Students can address such questions as: What
makes a good leader? How do you distinguish between a good leader and a bad one?
What does it mean to be law-abiding? Why be law abiding? In what consists political
legitimacy? Such questions lend themselves to an analytic approach, which is by no
means the only approach. A historical approach is also possible and useful. In a
historical approach, students might begin on the global scale to study the lives of people
whose greatness was as a result of rendering political or other service to their country -
- George Washington, Mahatma Gandhi, Charles de Gaulle, Winston Churchill, Mao
Tse Tung, Vladimir Lenin, Otto von Bismarck, Kwame Nkrumah. The specific things
that earned them a place in history — fighting for their country or judicious, selfless
leadership in serving or uniting their country — would be able to inform, inspire and
motivate the students. Then the contributions of specific national figures to specific
national issues can provide yet more inspiration for the young.
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Education supplies the enlightenment required for effective application of the
universal suffrage which Nigerians already enjoy. As Mortimer J. Adler points out,
without education universal suffrage produces an ignorant electorate and amounts to a
travesty of democratic institutions and processes. The one without the other is a peril-
ous delusion. In the past as Nigeria tried to grapple with Western-style democracy, it
was sufficient for someone to stand up and tell his people: "I want you to vote for
so-and-so; see his picture; his electoral symbol is so-and-so; just press your inked thumb
on the little square besides his picture." The result was always complete chaos, and
most of the time the ballots were manipulated. The words of Mortimer J. Adler hold
true when he said: 'Suffrage without schooling produces mobocracy not democracy —
not the rule of law, not constitutional government by the people as well as for them'.26
The mobocracy that seems to have been Nigeria's lot has shown itself in seven
military coups and only two constitutional governments in twenty-nine years.
Nigeria's road to democracy has been checkered by the constant involvement of the
military in government. In 1985 the then Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Major
General 'Tunde Idiagbon, came out on television to say: WE ARE NOT RUNNING A
DEMOCRACY!, and warned vocal malcontents of the dire consequences of their activi-
ties. It is not a little impudent to gloat over the idea of having trampled on democracy.
It is questionable if Nigeria can understand democracy while operating a dictatorship.
Some people have proposed Diarchy as a way to pacify the military while operat-
ing a full democracy." Diarchy is not a viable option for the following reasons: The
military establishment is all about issuing and obeying orders. Their rule is by decree
and they get to implement them through the barrel of the gun. Their entry into govern-
ment is through seizing power by force. On accession to power their first act is usually
to suspend the country's constitution and issue such decrees as suits them. By such acts
the military fail to be bound by the constitution, fail in respect for the democratic
process and impose their presence, on an intimidated citizenry? They institutionalize
force as a way of getting into power.
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2. The Possibility of Moral Education Building on the Strengths of Traditional
Cultures
It behoves the educational system to provide opportunity for the pupils to learn
about the traditional cultures and values. The moral values of any society have to do
with the level and character of its social development, since social values tend to define
the proper conduct in relations among people in society. In Nigeria there has been
considerable evolution from the traditional values and practices, and resulting in an
interplay of traditional, Christian, Islamic and Western secular values.
The traditional values, however, still maintain a hold, even though they have been
technically forced into the shadows. Among the traditional values, the family occupies
a high position. The family remains a necessary unit of organization, and the larger
unit, the village, was either an extended family or a union of families. It was necessary
to maintain the solidarity of the family in order to hold it together. Family loyalty
extends to the ancestors. The image of the ancestors and the power of the elders as cus-
todians of the Of6, the symbol of authority (for the Igbos), also became the mystical
Of6 and the principle of justice and righteousness which regulated relations among
people became Of6-na-6gU, Oh being the mystical symbol of innocence and upright-
ness.29
The moral values of the traditional Nigerian society were universally applicable
within the community: namely, truthfulness, honesty and self control. Their objectivity
was never in dispute. So they were backed up by sanctions. Moral lapses on the part
of any member of the community were a concern of everybody. The prescriptions were
clear, simple to understand, and human- rather than system-oriented. That meant that
everyone was accountable for whatever he or she did at every stage. People were
expected to seek their preferences within the defined areas of the community. One had
the possibility of initiative in things that could be reckoned as good and helpful.
Eccentricities of conduct of a questionable type would, however, meet with decisive
censure. Sensitive areas in this regard were marriage and sexuality.
The state of affairs just described might seem like a situation of collectivization
where peremptory seigniorial authority was operational and absolute. This is not the
case. On the contrary, individual freedoms were guaranteed within the community.
Property rights remained inviolable: freedom of speech, movement and association were
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not infringed upon within the arrangement. On the other hand, the community often
assumed responsibility for the individual. In ancient times a community was willing to
assume the responsibility for making redress on behalf of a member who caused the
death of someone in another community, or going to war on behalf of a member who
was killed or harmed. Thus, looked at from the outside, it would seem the individual
was lost in the collective. The contrary was the case. The individual mattered so much
that anything that hurt him or her was taken as having hurt the entire community. The
individual was therefore, in a sense, lost-and-found.
In traditional society the authority of the elders practically controlled the life of the
community. But that authority was not arbitrarily sought, it had to be balanced with a
proven life of probity or the elder would be likely to suffer disgrace. When people fol-
low the injunctions of the elders, it was in the understanding that time had more or less
tested them and, as the saying goes, "those who aspire to greatness had better watch
dance steps of the great" (an Igbo proverb). The authority they enjoy is, above all,
earned moral authority that falls to them as teachers of the community. Their teachings
are mostly directed to the young, and consist in outlining their duties towards their
elders. The logic is that the elder, having learnt his or her own lessons in youth has the
opportunity to apply in practice what he or she demands of the young. The young need
preparation for adult life.
Through the many stages of initiation, the young learn lessons in endurance, humilit-
y, self-discipline, courage, creativity. These virtues are expected to be the bedrock of
their adult life and they will be able to be the kind of elders to whom the young could
meaningfully look for guidance. The role of the elder as teacher is manifold: he or she
instructs as well as provides an example with his or her own life.
Traditional Nigerian society laid more emphasis on the spiritual and social
dimensions of human nature. Part of the formation of the young was to impress on
them the religious view of life; respect for the divine and the human; respect for life
and for authority; the dignity of labour and the value of justice, truthfulness, simplicity
of life; and consideration for other people's needs and feelings. In view of a religious
conception of the world, any tendency towards materialism, acquisition of wealth by
foul means, ostentation, arrogance in power, or mediocrity, are roundly discouraged.
For a distinctively Nigerian approach, therefore, it is indispensable to try to a) work
in harmony with the mentality of the people rather than impose things that are strange
to them; b) respect traditional methods of proven value; c) make more extensive use of
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the interactive method; d) highlight the human, spiritual and political values of the
country; e) begin moral education early in a child's life. f) respect traditional values and
institutions rather than arbitrarily seek to overthrow them.
a. Working in Harmony with the Mentality of the People
There are three most dominant political entities on the national scene -- the Hausa-
Fulani, the Igbos, the Yorubas — often cynically referred to as the "Big Three." Every
Nigerian has felt their overall impact in the country and presumes some kind of insight
as to how to deal with them. For any programme of moral education to be effective in
Nigeria, it must take account of their considerable influence, their best as well as their
worst traits, without prejudice to the immense contributions other peoples are capable
of making in this regard, and everything could be put together to provide a comprehen-
sive as well as effective backdrop for moral education.
The Hausa-Fulani are admired for the astuteness in business, honesty and simpli-
city of life, loyalty and total commitment to any cause they believe in. On the other
hand they are feared for their belligerence and criticised for what would appear to be
a monolithic and fanatical commitment to the Islamic cause over and above any other
national commitment.
The Igbos are admired for their intelligence, their bold, aggressively competitive
and indomitable spirit, versatility and adaptability to all situations. But they are
criticised for stand-offishness that borders on arrogance when relating to other
Nigerians, and for non-acknowledgement of social rank.
The Yorubas are admired for their learning, pragmatic business skills, and
commitment to culture. But they are criticised for their political opportunism which
makes them rather unreliable partners in matters of agreements, and for pasturing only
where the grass is greenest.
During the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970), a popular stereotype, which tends to
persist till today31 , got into popular conversational reference, as Donatus Nwoga
observes:
...[I]f three Nigerians, one Igbo, one Hausa, the other Yoruba
found themselves under a ripe coconut, the Hausa would say, "If
Allah sends down this coconut, I will eat it"; the Yoruba would
say, "I will wait here and whoever bnngs down the coconut, I will
share it with him"; whereas the Igbo man would look for some
implement for bringing down the coconut!
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b. Respecting the Traditional Methods of Proven Value
The most important thing in this regard is the central place given to a role model
or an exemplar or coach in providing leadership and inspiring virtue in the young. This
approach has proven so effective in the past, and with a little updating, is likely to
prove effective for the present needs. In his inaugural lecture at the Institute of
Education of the University of London, Professor R.S. Peters preferred the word
"initiation" to either "instruction" or "teaching" when talking of moral education. He
argued that education involves essentially a process by which we transmit what is
valuable in an intelligible way, and that it is largely a matter of knowing how, rather
than of knowing that." Professor Peters' insight bears out the inclination towards
imitation (or emulation), and thus lends more moral significance to example than to
precepts. The teacher as exemplar is more identifiable with the transmissory method
rather than that of teaching principles. It is like learning to dance by dancing rather
than by reading about dances.
Whether in or outside of the classroom, in so far as the practices are meaningfully
handed on, the aim has been achieved. The morally educated Nigerian will, at the end
of the day, be equipped to pursue a high moral standard of behaviour, since moral
conduct cannot be derived from definitions alone any more than food can be derived
from cook books. Teachers, parents, adults, everyone will be able to be a good
influence in society through examples rather than by words and precepts alone.
c. Respecting the Traditional Institutions and Learning From Them
In most parts of Nigeria, the masquerade institution is not simply an entertainment
showpiece. Besides the elements of cult and entertainment, the masquerade institution
provides for the security of property. In this regard anything "entrusted" to the mas-
querades would be strung with palm fronds and would be absolutely out of bounds to
anybody. In addition masquerades are responsible for enforcing society's laws, disci-
plining defaulters and offenders, irrespective of the latter's social status. For the purpose
of the subject of effective moral education the most interesting activity of the masque-
rades is the use of symbolic actions in teaching moral lessons, as Professor Nwoga's
story shows in Chapter 7 Section 5c.
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There exist some traditional institutions and pressure groups like the age grade, the
elders, the powerful fima-ada or iinul-mgbdtb% with various degrees of capacity for
exercising pressure on individuals or groups in order to protect the interests of the
community.
d. More Increased Use of the Interactive Method
Considerable space was dedicated to the description in Chapter Three of the central
position enjoyed by the interactive approach in the process of traditional moral
education. At every stage of the story-telling, riddles, proverbs, the student was always
actively involved, and his or her response was solicited at every stage.
A distinctly Nigerian approach must not neglect, but recognize the fact that effective
learning on the practical level engages the entire human faculties of sense, emotion and
intellect. So often there is the tendency to identify education with mental activity alone:
for example, what insights we gain, what conclusions we draw. Such mental processes
are important but they do not exhaust the meaning of moral, or any other type of
education. Theories must be supplemented with experience and practice; intellectual per-
suasion must be tempered with openness of mind.
In the kind of learning that leads to moral and spiritual growth, the mind, the heart
and the will must work harmoniously together. The best method of teaching children
and most categories of people seems to be by repeated practice. The same action is done
over and over again under the eye of some guide or tutor until they acquire the habit of
doing it well. Since virtue has been shown to be all about forming good habits, the
method of repeated action is vindicated. If on the other hand all reliance is on rules
committed to memory, the memory quite frequently fails and one is left utterly
confused.
e. Highlighting the Human, Spiritual, and Political Values
Because of the socio-political, ethico-religious situation that make Nigeria a pluralist
society, a distinctly Nigerian approach to moral education must incorporate within its
areas of interest whatever will enable the students to respond correctly and appropriately
a The amts-ada are all women born in the same town but married elsewhere.
In situations of grave tension they would step in and are unstoppable in their
prescriptions or exactions. People would not want to enter into any
confrontation with them for they will always win, since traditional practices
grant them total immunity from molestation.
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to the situation in the society in which they belong. Such principles as justice, honesty,
kindness, love, patriotism, patience, courage, piety, respect for authority, obedience
should be explained in all their implications and how they apply in the life of the
individual as well as that of the community. Here such values as industry, probity,
accountability and autonomy are inculcated.
f. Beginning the Child's Moral Education Early Enough in Life
Borrowing a leaf from the traditional Nigerian methods, where the process of
initiation begins at the earliest opportunity possible, the moral education of children
should begin from a very early age. John Locke's belief is that it is possible for the
teacher to guide the young much more easily away from any immoral habit to which
they might be inclined through a gentle application of authority while they are still
young, than when they are older thereby finds a Nigerian context. As Locke points out,
"the peculiar physiognomy of the mind is more discernible in children, before art and
cunning have taught them to hide their deformities, and conceal their ill inclinations
under a dissembled outside."'
The traditional initiation rites are an example of how children can be gradually
introduced to the demands and realities of life. There are various stages of initiation
corresponding to various stages of development. The very young go through
programmes that they can physically and mentally cope with. The programme gets
physically tougher and mentally more demanding as the age and development increases.
The very young begin with simple facts of life and action and are given the explanations
behind each item or action. Later they would be increasingly prepared to make their
own decisions based on the progressive increase in their knowledge and understanding
he or she has acquired over a period of time. The specific instructions and explanations
on a variety of issues disabuse their minds of some negative or inadequate preconcep-
tions or inclinations that might lead to socially and morally unacceptable behaviour.
Thus if a child is brought up to acquire and prefer good habits to bad, difficulties, if
any, will be minimal in adapting to sound moral principles in more complex circum-
stance that might arise in adulthood.
The ground for good moral habits can be prepared in children if from the earliest
years they are taught to value and apply the elementary rules of etiquette and social
conduct — respect for orderliness in daily life and social interaction. Orderliness itself
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will preclude disruptive or inappropriate behaviour in school, in class, at work or play,
and at worship.
At a yet higher level, the students will be exposed to the rules of school discipline.
Those who fail to abide by them will be censured in such a way as to help them to
realize and appreciate the reasons for good behaviour. With the school rules, the
background has been prepared for formation of character in accordance with moral
rules and the rules required for good citizenship.
While at this early stage, which corresponds to the first level of the first stage of
Kohlberg's three-tier development', to Erilcson's first stage of basic trust vs basic
mistrust, and to Piaget's concrete-operational level", the child is amenable to take on
whatever is presented to him or her because of his or her 'obedience and punishment
orientation' and 'egoistic deference to superior power'. He or she would be pre-
disposed to perform actions because they have been commanded or refrain from actions
because they have been forbidden. Since moral education is not to be limited to the
school, pre-school moral education at the stage corresponding to Piaget's pre-operational
stage would fall within the roles of the family.
As regards the religious aspects of moral education, simple stories from the Bible,
the Koran, or traditional folklore can be used and the children would be guided and
encouraged to identify the moral lessons in them. In the process of towards teaching the
principles of good conduct in schools, it is not enough to recite Biblical and Koranic
injunctions, and urge pupils to obey them. Such an approach will be too abrupt and
superficial, and the children would be unable to relate to them in their ordinary day-
to-day activities.
3. The Possibility of Religious Education Which Builds on
Common Factors While Also Promoting Understanding of Differences
In her book Modeling Religious Education for the Future, Gloria Durka points out
that religious education should be geared to developing communities in which people
can live more comfortably with change than with rigidity.37
The religious education Nigeria needs is one that will nurture understanding and
mutual concord rather than contention and rancour. It must be able to help the members
of the different communions hold to their proper roots while intelligently and positively
relating to others. In a pluralistic situation like that of Nigeria, religious education must
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take account of, and emphasize, the shared values, and explain why the differences,
where they exist, should not lead to the denigration or triumphalism of a given religious
tradition in the face of others.
The plurality of religious traditions is an opportunity for growth forbearance, mutual
respect, courtesy and hospitality, mutual dialogue and co-operation. It should be able to
orient the believers of the different faiths towards one another while still remaining
themselves. m
 It should enable everyone -- Christian, Muslim, and practitioner of
Traditional Religion -- to see each other not as enemies and rivals to be beaten, or as
disciples to be won over, but as friends and equals with whom one could share as
brothers and sisters, the best there is in common human existence.
As a concrete measure in Nigeria it is possible periodically to invite guest speakers
who are members of the different communions to the school to talk candidly about their
own religions with as much insight as they can muster, and answer questions that might
arise from their talk in order to clarify the points to the students.
Better still, the entire course can take the form of a seminar whereby main
presenters are experts in the various religions and ensuing discussions can clarify a lot
of the points that touch on the various aspects of the religions under discussion. By the
time the student has gone through a series of discussions about the concept of God, the
world and the place of human's in it; the notion of the ultimate and the supernatural in
general; elements of worship and belief; time, eternity, the good life, suffering,
happiness, sacrifice, salvation as understood in the various religions, he or she would
have attain a high level of understanding across a wide spectrum beyond his or her own
religion.
Such points will aid the students in their reading to identify the central ideas and
questions in each religion and how they are related to each other in the various
religions. The best bet would be a round table situation where each religion is allowed
to hold its own and speak for itself without any single religion claiming a pride of place
among others. In the next chapter a more detailed outline will be laid out to form the
points of reference for such presentations.
The Hindu belief that every human being, every group and every nation, has an
individuality worthy of reverence, is slowly gaining ground. Such a view requires that
freedom be allowed to every group to cultivate what is most distinctive and characteris-
tic of it. Hinduism can be an example here. Later in its history, it developed an attitude
of comprehensive charity instead of a fanatic faith in an inflexible creed. It accepted
181
the multiplicity of aboriginal gods and others which originated, most of them outside the
Aryan tradition, and justified them all. It brought together into one whole all believers
in God. As a result, many sects professing many different beliefs live together within
the Hindu fold and heresy-hunting is singularly absent from Hinduism.39
This Hindu attitude presents quite a challenge to Christianity and Islam. As All
Mazrui aptly observed,49 even though they have within their teachings important
provisions for tolerance, love and restraint, there is something within Christianity and
Islam that promotes competition rather than tolerance, namely their strict monotheism.
According to Mazrui, himself a Muslim, monotheism is a doctrine of divine monopoly:
there is only one God who is absolute and admits of no rivalry. It is in the interplay
between absolutism and monopoly that intolerance is born. In contrast, concludes
Mazrui, religions that acknowledge the existence of many gods, (most traditional
religions fall into this category), are not specially incensed when one more group comes
along and claims gods of its own.
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Notes
1. The Biafran crisis has continually raised the question in Nigeria as to
which system serves best in protecting the interest of all groups.
Nigeria is a federation but claims are that Igbos were singled out for
decimation in the pogroms of 1966 and no longer feeling safe under
the umbrella of Nigeria, wanted self-determination. The secession did
not work out and there are suggestions in some quarters that a looser
form of federation might be able to pacify all the groups so that none
would feel cheated or swallowed up.
2. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1979), Chapter 11,22.
3. Gutmann, Amy, Democratic Education, Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1987, p.136.
4. ibid.
5. ibid.
6. In spite of its weaknesses nationalism can be described as a political
virtue; it is a "virtue of the moment", so to speak; just as courage could
be described as a virtue of the moment, since it comes into play
whenever the situation warrants it manifestation. And when the situation
is resolved it yields place to the more perfect and more sober form of
patriotism. The term "political virtue" must needs be clarified a bit. A
"political virtue" is not necessarily a moral virtue. As a matter of fact
it can sometimes constitute an obstacle in the way of moral virtue,
especially when the reasoning behind it is merely one about securing a
political advantage rather than consideration for morals. The considera-
tion here is when it is morally neutral, that is, when it is amoral.
7	 Lepp, Ignace, The Authentic Morality. Translated by Bernard
Murchland, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1985, p.131-135.
By territorialism here I mean a fascination for laying claims to some
territory as a way of asserting own sovereignty. It is territorialism that
is the motivating force for all the other characteristics subsequently
identified.
Recent political developments in the Eastern Bloc countries are rapidly
rendering this distinction out of date.
The substance of Nigeria's non-alignment was a major topic of
discussion in 1969. Because of the Civil War experience, Nigeria was
able to expand ties with the Soviet Union without feeling constrained
by the Western powers. This expansion of ties had the further effect
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of deterring greater interference by Western powers (on the side of
Biafra) and ensuring support from the radical members of the OAU.
(cf. Stremlau, John J., The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil
War. 1967-1970, p.378.
111. The zero-party system has been tried in Nepal, but recent unrests in
that country give the impression that it had failed. What did actually
undermine it was the country's king's undisguised despotism which he
disguised under the name of a zero party while he retained limitless
political and legislative powers for himself alone. Therefore the zero-
party was not given the opportunity to thrive and therefore Nepal's case
could hardly be cited absolutely without qualification.
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12. Aristides, To Rome 9.
13. Nyerere, Julius, President Nyerere Opens Dar es Salaam University
College Campus. 21 August. 1964, Dar es Salaam: Ministry of
Information and Tourism, 1987, p.17.
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15. Andokides, On the Mysteries 82-87, See Rodenwald, p.20.
16. Demosthenes, Against Timocrates 33, Rodenwald, p.21.
17. Henry, Neil, "Nyerere Bows Out With Tanzania in Deep Decline",
The Washington Post, Wednesday, September 26, 1990, p.A21.
18. Nyerere, Julius, Interim Constitution of Tanganyika 1965, Dar es
Salaam, Government Printer, 1967, p.32.
19. See Nellio, John R., A Theory of Ideology: the Tanzanian Example,
Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1982 p.102.
20. One's instincts would send an immediate caution signal here; what
starts off in pursuance of an ideal of reaching out to the grassroots can
later degenerate into a system of governmental control - the secret
police who are government informants against fellow citizens.
Nyerere's experiment never came to that but no one should be so naive
as to rule out the possibility of such a development.
In a tribute to Nyerere as he bowed out finally from the political scene,
an unnamed American official resident in Tanzania said of his impact
on the national life of his country: "Even though there are 120 tribes
here, I also think Tanzania has a larger sense of national identity than
most countries in Africa."(cf Henry, Neil, "Nyerere Bows Out With
121.
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Tanzania in Deep Decline", The Washington Post, Wednesday,
September 26, 1990, p.A21.
22. In December 1962, American Democratic Senator Ellender of the State
of Louisiana at a news conference in Southern Rhodesia, in apparent
defence of white oligarchy in that country said: "The average African
is incapable of leadership except through the assistance of Europeans."
Time Magazine, December 7, 1962 p.22.
123. Nyerere, Julius, The Arusha Declaration. TANU's Policy on Social-
ism and Self-Reliance, Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 1987,
pp.10-11.
24. Henry, Neil, Washington Post, ibid.
25. Dewey, John, "Creative Democracy -- the Task Before Us," The Philo-
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G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1940, pp.220f.; See also, Freeman, Eugene, (Ed),
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Open Court La Salle, 1976, p.102.
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26.	 Adler, op. cit. p.3.
27. Diarchy is a Greek concept first proposed as an ideological option for
Nigeria by Nigeria's former President, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe. It is a
system whereby there would be two wings of government -- the civilian
and the military. Under this arrangement there will be no necessity for
the military to try to overthrow constitutional government, since they
would already be part of it. This over optimistic view is not borne out
by facts since of the six military coups carried out in Nigeria since
independence, only two have been against an elected government. The
rest have been military against military.
128. The General Provisions Part I no 1 of the Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria states as follows: "This Constitution is supreme
and its provisions shall have binding force on all authorities and persons
throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria." Yet in the tumultuous 1966
alone five (Suspension and Modification) Decrees 1, 17 n.3, 50 n.7, 55
n.8, 69 n.10, were promulgated by the military. Later in 1967 the
Repeal and Restoration Decree and the Constitution (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Decree followed. What is more the Military Government
issued in 1970 The Federal Military Government (Supremacy and
Enforcement of Powers) Decree. By this decree, they decisively placed
the Constitutions underfoot and made themselves above every law.
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Igbos and Yorubas as well, since its end result is not cast a slur on any
group but to highlight some views widely held among Nigerians from
practically every part of the country.
131. This anecdote is often repeated for lighthearted amusement and is not
invoked as an appeal to stereotypes.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
MORAL EDUCATION IN NIGERIA:
A MODEL
You have already been told what is right and what the Lord wants of you. Only this, to
do what is right, to love loyalty and to walk humbly with your God.
— MICAH 6:8.
Men enjoy a great number of blessings in consequence of knowing the and incur
a great number of evils, through being deceived in themselves. For they who know
themselves know what is suitable for them and distinguish between what they can do and
what they cannot; and, by doing what they know how to do, procure for themselves what
they need, and are prosperous, and, by abstaining from what they do not know, live
blamelessly, and avoid being unfortunate... they can.., obtain for themselves what is good
and guard against what is evil.
— SOCRATES.
At the end of Chapter Five, the question arose as to which elements of Western
theory are adaptable to the Nigerian situation. Some effort will be made to respond to
the question by proposing a model moral education for Nigeria. A model moral
education programme for Nigeria must be comprehensive, incorporating in the same
package aspects of political, moral and religious education. A discussion on such a pro-
gramme must pay considerable attention, among others, to the school itself, the kind of
teachers required for the work, the type of students and dispositions, and the nature,
content, depth and breadth of the course, the methods required for an effective
programme.
It is the contention of this thesis that for an effective moral education in pluralist
Nigeria, an integrated set of basic values and ethical principles drawn from the moral,
religious and political life of the country and some Western ethical theories must be
sought. Values are either directly transmitted through succeeding generations, (in which
case the school is not required); or they first undergo a process of critical analysis and
perhaps some form of adaptation and modification before being adopted, (in which case
the school is indispensable).
The school has the unique role of generating ideas and introducing a degree of co-
ordinated reflective analysis and theory that are beyond the possibilities of informal
home or denominational approaches.
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By virtue of their professional competence, the educators are able to draw together
from a variety of sources sufficient material for an integrated, but comprehensive
scheme. The more comprehensive the content, the higher the skill required for
integrating it.
An integrated scheme would require a combination of the transmissory approach
and methods of analysis of principles and theories. Since moral education refers to a
serious, structured body of decisional, cognitive and affective sl,fflls meant to accom-
pany human action, educators in such skills should not resort to brainwashing,
conditioning, propaganda, or any such negative approaches, but should adopt the
recognized method of exposition and analysis applied in order fields of learning. They
should, in addition try to live out what they teach.
The students for their part must, in the words of Bernard Lonergan, be "attentive,
intelligent, reasonable and responsible" in pursuing the "perspectival character of many
view points", and should not be caught up in narrow and divisive sectarian viewpoints.
1. The School
A model school should address among others the question of the organizational
structure of the schools, the suitability of the atmosphere for effective learning, the
suitability and competence of the instructors and such factors as morale that enhance
the instructor's performance. The school must possess the required organizational
structure. A. Etzioni has suggested four centres of focus regarding the nature of any
organization, namely:
a) the normative defulition of the institution (its values and norms;
b) its place within the wider framework;
c) the integration of the various groups
d) the ordering of role relationships within the organization.'
G.E. Jensen proposed that attention be focused rather on "the work structure, the
authority structure, the communications structure, the power structure..."2
Both models can be combined in one model for Nigeria, especially if a transition
is to be made from the consideration of the school as a structural organization to one
in terms of a goal orientation. The Etzioni model provides a useful prop for a Nigerian
model, for one can move from the normative definition of the values and norms of the
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school (a), to those of the larger society (b), as well as work for the goal of integra-
tion of the various groups (c), and the ordering of relationships such as instructor-pupil
relationships, pupil-pupil relationships, modes of discipline, etc. It is on the level of (d)
that the Jensenian model comes into play.
The School has an important role in forming the minds of the young to understand
and foster such principles as discipline and goodwill so necessary for building up a
united country. It can produce the desirable intellectual and moral changes, and such
changes in attitudes and dispositions of thought and purpose, as can give society its best
stature.
The great task of societal improvement, regeneration, integration and continuity, is
best accomplished when the underlying principles are well understood and then applied.
The school brings this about by its ability to generate, promote and sustain ideas needful
for human, social and intellectual development. With respect to realizing the goal of
unity and national cohesion, it can provide the relevant civics lessons designed for the
inculcation of some national and civic values like unity, tolerance, and co-operation.
The school sets it as part of its task:
a) to show that there is no necessary opposition between national
values and personal or ethnic values.
b) to foster national feelings and attitudes as alternatives to parochial
ones, and show how national feelings can lead to greater
advantages for the national life.
C) to remove underlying fears by making everyone realize how for
national survival in the modern world, unity is strength, and living
and working together, sharing the fruits of interdependence, are
indispensable.
To the school therefore falls the task of providing the experiences through which
students develop the fullest complement of patterns necessary to the success of the
democratic experiment. Among the patterns are those of home-making; of skilful
production of things and ideals; of appreciation of the good and the beautiful, the true
and the just; of intelligent choice from among alternative and often conflicting moral,
socio-political and economic goals. The school accomplishes its task by providing the
forum and all the human, social and natural sciences needful for the proper discussion
and utilization of the patterns.
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Sometimes, as Etzioni's model shows, the school projects some values which often
include those of the larger society. The teacher's task is to invite and encourage the
pupils to identify with the values so projected, not by simply learning them by rote, but
by trying to understand the reason behind them. Education involves, as John Wilson
points out, "initiating people into various forms of thought and activity in such a way
that they are helped to become more well-informed, understanding, and reasonable"3.
They would then be able to make independent use of these forms of thought as a useful
tool for determining motives, assessing situations and making moral decisions that affect
their lives and those of others. In is in this sense that the activity of teaching can be
regarded as a process of initiation'.
2. The Model Educator
The moral educator is first and foremost a leader. In discussing the characteristics
of a moral educator Harold Loukes gives three models of leaders following Max
Weber's famous three models of leadere. Weber had based his typology on three
prevailing conceptions of authority. There is the traditional type who wields the power
of tradition. Next there is the legal-rational type, resting on the theory of government
by consensus, in which people choose, by rationally devised procedures, those most
fitted to take decisions in particular areas, and whose authority is then limited to those
areas alone. Then there is the charismatic type that arises when current institutionalized
authority gets out of touch with the needs of the people: illustrated in Socrates, Jesus,
Luther, Gandhi, Hitler.6
Each of the three types has a different view about morals, and hence about moral
education. The authoritarian type claims in some form or other to be the arbiter of
morals and would perceive his or her role as that of training the pupils in good moral
habits, self-control, acceptance and adjustment. The legal-rational type is less inclined
to appeal to tradition, or to the emotions, or to the force of his or her own personal-
ity. Rather, he or she operates on the basis acknowledged or acknowledgeable facts and
reason. The charismatic type, for his or her part, believes that good morality grows
spontaneously if only children are not thwarted and distorted. In the view of the
charismatic type, the instinctive life, if it is allowed to strike its roots, will flower in
tenderness, compassion and willing for others. He or she is lively and imaginative,
humorous, warmly affectionate, "on the pupils' wavelength", persuasive, rather than
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coercive. Where the authoritarian teacher would say, "I am telling you", or "Do this
now", the charismatic teacher says "Let's find out", or "Wouldn't it be fun to know"?'
The differences of types are also accompanied by differences of approach. While
the authoritarian sets out to propound the mores and enforce a moral code which the
pupils must acquire, the legal-rational type looks for what is reasonable, opportune,
and possible. The charismatic type for his or her part is a loving person who injects
into the group situation a warm life. He or she might be permissive but challenging,
and creates a climate favourable to growth. The effectiveness or otherwise of any of
the approaches depends on the type of persons they teach and the type of response they
get. Since pupils are not normally pre-sorted according to types and one person's
criteria for classification is often in conflict with another's, neither the authoritarian nor
the legal-rational, nor the charismatic label should, alone by itself, be the overriding
concern in determining the best moral educator.
More importantly, every typology tends to be reductionist, such that people will
tend to strain into another person's behaviour a typology which they had preconceived.
The result is chaos. Above all, while the authoritanan approach might be obnoxious to
some, the permissive happy-go-lucky approach might be intolerable to others. In media
stat virtus, i.e., virtue stands in the middle. It is by this fact that the legal-rational type
has an edge over the other two. The ideal moral educator should, in fact be able to
blend all the three characteristics in him or herself. That means that any human being
so ever can be a moral educator provided that he or she is capable of blending the self-
confidence of the of the authoritarian with the cautious modesty of the legal-rational,
and the effusiveness of the charismatic.
Harold Loukes makes this point in his own contribution to the question. According
to him the primary condition is that such a one "be morally educated in the first place",
and exhibit such human characteristics which might be summarized as humility,
frankness, humaneness. Loukes wants the authoritarian to be tolerant, the conformist to
accept the non-conformist, and the edgy to know what it means for someone else to
suffer:
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I welcome the authoritarian personality so long as he has learnt
to take people seriously, and also the tolerant personality so long
as he has learnt to abide by certain rules and not to tolerate the
intolerable. I welcome the serene conformist who accepts the habit
of the school community as long as he learns to accept as persons
those who don't; and also the edgy neurotic who knows what it is
to suffer, provided he also knows what it is for someone else to
suffer. Let them all come, I say, as long as they have learnt what
I want them to learn.'
The moral educator should have learned to live, by living in a community whose
rules have been open to rational criticism. A good scientist is one who has learnt his
way about the conceptual structure, methods of verification, customary procedures,
even to the point of challenging or modifying those procedures. One will not be
reckoned a good scientist unless he or she can present his or her challenge in accepted
language. In the same way, the moral educator must have learned, and be ready to use,
the language of accepted rule system, and if he or she wants to challenge a rule, he or
she should be able to do so in the language of a rule system. In effect, he or she must
therefore have learnt to support "rules", even when he or she wants to revise particular
rules. He or she must either accept an existing rule or present in the proper place for
decision-making a viable alternative.
A further question arises as to whether the moral educator should be primarily an
intellectual. That could hardly be feasible. In the first place, moral education is not
simply a matter of intellectual prowess, and morality is applicable to us all because of
our common membership of the human society, rather than our intellectual ability to
grasp or propound ethical theories. Therefore, though intellectual abilities are impor-
tant, they should not be the primary concern in deciding the one"s suitability as a moral
educator. It is only ordinary people, who do not place themselves on any special
pedestal, but are disposed to understand others and empathize with them, that can most
effectively perform the task of moral education. It is not the "saints" in the sense Susan
Wolf described in her essay, (see Chapter 5 B:4), or geniuses, or visionaries, unless the
latter have the capacity to be ordinary.
The moral educator will also be a teacher of something other than morals It is
from his or her overall ability both to inspire and educate in that other field that
establishes his or her credentials as a potential moral educator for, some of the most
important moral lessons are learnt in the course of something else.
A good moral educator takes the pupils seriously into account and does not
indoctrinate them by trying to impose his or her own views and judgments. He or she
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presents the material in such a form that the pupils see for themselves rather than learn
by rote, or accept without understanding. He or she works towards pupil-response rather
than pupil-acceptance. In the long run he or she works toward making the pupils his or
her equals who know all he or she knows, equalling him or her in skill, but not
necessarily believing what he or she believes.
The moral educator will sympathize with the pupils' state of mind -- their ignorance,
their difficulties, their fatigue. He or she will teach by rigorously assembling the facts
of the case before allowing judgment to be passed; drawing out from the facts general
propositions, and testing the general propositions against the facts. In doing this the
educator enables his or her pupils to apply to their own studies principles they had
grasped.
As Harold Loukes points out, "a good teacher is (in general) a good teacher" 9. He
or she is therefore aware that there are moral dimensions and implications to anything
he or she does, and would endeavour to lend credibility to his or her teachings by a
witness of life. Plato's Socrates, for example, thinks that character formation is an
important aim of education, and that an expert in educational methods who is also an
expert in human values is required to achieve this. In other words, much more than
the enuntiation of precepts, virtues to be inculcated must come in the form of good
example. The "teacher's" virtue is the chief element in his or her teaching and
emulation is the chief element in the pupils' learning.
L.P. Jacks gives an interesting anecdote that illustrates the importance of the
personal life of the educator in insuring the effectiveness of his or her teaching:
Not long ago I met one of our great school masters -- a veteran
in that high service. 'Where in your time-table do you teach reli-
gion? I asked him. 'We teach it all day long, he answered. 'We
teach it in Arithmetic, by accuracy. We teach it in language, by
learning to say what we mean - "Yea, yea, and nay, nay." We
teach it in history, by humanity. We teach it in geography, by
breadth of mind. We teach it in handicraft, by thoroughness. We
teach it in kindness to animals, by courtesy to servants, by good
manners to one another, and by truthfulness in all things. We
teach it by showing the children that we, their elders, are their
friends and not their enemies.°
The characteristics of a conscientious teacher embodied in this anecdote, admirable
though they may be, are not in themselves, all there is to moral education. In the first
place just about any teacher could claim them for him or herself, since people tend to
assess themselves positively. Secondly, there has to be a standard to determine just how
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truthful, how honest, how virtuous one must be in order to be considered a person of
virtue. Thirdly, the importance of professional competence of the educator is a fact that
can not be overstated.
The teacher is an authority figure, and, as Professor Peters points out, he or she
has to behave as becomes a person who is an authority in his or her field -- a kind of
at-homeness both with his or her subject matter and its moral implications. The
authority here referred to is one of professional competence, which has the effect of
inspiring the students' confidence in the teacher, of enhancing the teacher's self-
confidence, and of increasing the effectiveness of the teaching. The teacher's authority
or professional competence serves at three levels: the personal level, by the way he or
she comports him or herself; the leadership level, by how well he or she understands
and relates with his or her students, and the overall impact he or she makes on their
lives; and the professional level, by his or her grasp of, and approach to, the subject
matter. As a person, he or she is unassuming; as a leader, available; and as a
professional, knowledgeable and resourceful.
On the personal level, professional competence enables the teacher strike a balance
between his or her role as mentor and that as animator. He or she avoids remarks and
cross-references likely to generate ill feeling, cause division among students, disgust for
the subject or dislike for the teacher. As a leader he or she becomes a bridge builder
that would encourage the students to get along well with each other; to take an interest
in each other; to learn each other's language; and to seek to understand and respect each
other's feelings and dispositions. He or she becomes, as a result, an agent of optimism
who, while inspiring the students to view events and developments positively, never
tries to disguise the truth of situations. He or she inspires the students to face up to each
situation as it manifests itself.
As a professional, he or she has, besides personal knowledge of the subject matter,
has the ability to relate one subject to another. The moral educator has, as a profes-
sional, the skill to draw from related disciplines material that would serve in moral
education. What interests the present analysis is the professionalism that enables the
moral educator to draw from religious and political sources. The Nigerian moral
educator should make use of some material provided by the main religious communities
in the country. Such material would include their basic moral teachings", beliefs and
practices, and their implications in the larger community.
The moral educator per se, in some significant ways differs from the religious
educator per se, and both differ from the political educator per se. While it is almost
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impossible to have a religious educator without reference to some religion, the opposite
is the case with respect to moral education. It is even quite possible, as in humanists,
to have a moral educator that rejects any direct reference to any religion. The political
educator could, technically speaking could bypass both morality or religion.
What is relevant in a moral educator, even if he or she has to make use of some
religious material, is not the preaching model but the teaching model. He or she does
not try to persuade and convince, but to guide and enlighten. He or she appeals more
to the reason than to the emotions. The preaching model is founded on the principle of
handing on (transmission), whereas the teaching model proceeds by trying to unravel a
structured body of knowledge and values, in such a way as to facilitate learning. The
preaching model appeals to the emotions, while teaching model appeals to facts. In a
public school situation the teaching model is preferable to the preaching model for,
irrespective of his or her religious persuasion, he or she is better able to carry out moral
education without yielding to the temptation to win people over to his or her own point
of view. Nevertheless, it is impossible to ignore the "power of the podium' s' for,
however non-authoritarian the teacher might try to be, his or her influence still remains
considerable according as the students find his or her lessons interesting. It is a natural
tendency for one to seek to identify with, or assimilate, or appropriate what captures
one's interest.
Teaching, as Carol Markstrom Adams notes, is a "carefully planned and structured
set of conditions which enhance learning"'. Until the educator acquires this concep-
tualization of the nature of teaching, as well as the pedagogical skills necessary to
implement it, his or her instructional activities will fall short of the level of consistency
of success for which he or she strives.
T.F. Green represents this very perceptively in what he calls the teaching continu-
um. 14
 He suggests that we can place various teaching modes on a continuum (AZ) with
the domain of the intelligence at the centre (MN) 15
 (See illustration below). Thus the
farther from the centre, the more removed is the teaching mode from engagement of the
student's practical or speculative reasoning capacity in the teaching-learning process.
That practically says it all:
A	 Z
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The Teaching Continuum
Behaviour.	 Conduct.	 Knowledge.	 Beliefs.
Physical Threat.
	 Conditioning. Instructing. Propagndizing.
Intimidation. Training. Indoctrination. 	 Lying.
M	 N
The Area of Intelligence
The area of intelligence is to be emphasized in that it removes from moral education
any vestiges of brainwashing, indoctrination, or c nditioning, or be construed to border
on the irrational. It is an antidote against sheepish compliance in response to physical
threat or coercion on the one hand, and mental conditioning or propagandizing on the
other.
For an effective use of religious material in the process of moral education, the
educator does not need to become a specialist theologian or social scientist or cultural
anthropologist. All these disciplines have important bearings with the project of moral
education since each adds a further dimension to the question by providing explana-
tions from the doctrinal, demographical, or cultural points of view. In matters of specia-
lization the moral educator's expertise can be compared with the practical expertise of
a general physician whose competence enables him or her to be of service to his or her
community without actually being a specialist in any specific branch of medicine.° On
the other hand, however, it seems that a too narrow specialization might have a delet-
erious effect on the demands of religious education.
Some of the characteristics like the witness of life and some religious commitment,
required of the religious and moral educator do not apply in the case of a political
educator. It is sufficient, for example, that the political educator possess a good
theoretical grasp of the subject matter and the many implications surrounding them and
then proceed to deliver his or her lesson for maximum results. It is a matter of common
experience that the most brilliant political theorists are often not active politicians. The
model political educator is not to be given to noisy quibbling or demagoguery. By the
same token he or she must be moderate in his or her views — no extremist, or
revolutionary, or activist, or radical. Like the moral and religious educator, or for that
matter any educator worth the name, his or her primary objective will not be to win
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Arguments or persuade or convince or to impose his or her own views, but to deepen
the understanding of the issues.
As an educator rather than a mere theorist, he or she must have an eye on the
national objectives of unity and cohesion, and work towards making them meaningful,
desirable to, and achievable at the level of the students. To be able to realize this
objective, he or she must manifest certain important characteristics with respect to style
and overall attitudes --openness, sympathy, friendliness, moderation in the expression
of personal views. He or she must have a thorough knowledge of the various aspects of
Nigeria in its diversity and be able to depict a fairly accurate but interesting image of
the country to the students in the course of his or her lessons.
3. The Students
The student's first obligation is to try to grasp as closely as possible the contents
of his or her texts, their meanings and interconnections. Application, if need be, follows
later. In trying to discover or establish the "perspectival character of many viewpoints,
both religious, (moral) and scholarly,"" the student must employ the four "transcende-
ntal precepts" as enunciated by Bernard Lonergan to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable,
and responsible." Thus the basic distinctions between academic and religious or moral
judgments, rooted in the distinction between scholarship and faith, still obtain without
necessarily obscuring each other.
They must be genuinely interested in attaining as precise a knowledge of the issues
as they can and accord due respect to everyone and every legitimate institution. In
addition, they must be willing to conduct their lives in an ordered way, and live
accommodatingly with their neighbours irrespective of any differences of background or
perception. In their dealings with other people, they should avoid all derogatory appeal
to stereotypes on any basis whatever, whether that of State of origin, or religious
affiliation or social status."
As they grow up equipped with improved knowledge and better insight about their
country, the young adults have the task and opportunity to re-evaluate previous
adolescent and pre-adolescent ideals and thereby avoid distortions that might lead either
to cynicism or to fanaticism. They gradually develop an inner strength that enables
them to endure whatever is necessary in order to operate in full autonomy.
A good product results both from the skill of the craftsman and the quality of the
material used. In moral education the skill of the educator must be able to be met with
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by a corresponding responsiveness and co-operation on the part of the student. The goal
of moral education which is the formation of character, and the skill for achieving it
must complement each other, for none could ever be fully effective without the other.
Donald Vandenberg describes the eventual result of such a co-operation on a young
person:
His operative values become those of honesty, reliability, faithful-
ness.... He has a character and acts in the way conventional
morality prescribes, but he does this authentically, ie., without
being conscious of it (without undue self-consciousness), without
trying to impose his values on others, without (seeking) justifica-
tion, without excuse(s)...m
4. The Content
A model moral education for Nigeria should have at least three components to it
namely, a) moral codes which would include the traditional Nigerian moral code and
modern ethical principles and theories; b) the moral aspects of religion; and c) the
ethical aspects of the political life especially as envisaged in the Constitution and other
national sources.
Traditional Nigerian moral code already been discussed at some length in the first
three sections of Chapter Three, and a variety of ethical theories have been discussed
in section 2 of Chapter Five. As has been seen in Chapter One, the setting was non-
curricular for the obvious reason that the traditional Nigerian society had no organized
school system in the Western and contemporary sense. The effort at this point is to try
to bring the content of traditional moral code and practice into the classroom, to try and
correlate them with such moral questions as that of validity, responsibility, and
autonomy, dealt with in contemporary moral discourse.
As John Wilson points outn, there are certain facts about the nature of human beings
which can be used as a basis for the primary rules of morality. Such facts are the sense
of the holy, the sacredness of life, the preference to order rather than chaos, the sense
of freedom and autonomy. These facts are self-evident to pure reason even for those
who do not believe in revelation.
This is a comfort to those who have no religious affiliation. It is also quite consistent
with the ICantian idea of the Moral Law which the pure practical reason provides for
itself without any hindrance from, or reference to, any other object beyond itself. The
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facts referred to by Professor Wilson point along the path which must be followed if
we are to find 'higher generalizations' about man, which may be true universally. 22 This
path leads towards the frontiers of the unknown -- the area once cultivated by meta-
physicians — which still shows itself in moments of deeper experience.
a. Traditional Moral Code
A quick glance through the traditional Nigerian moral code and through the list of
Gyara and Sherra offences would reveal that it set out the responsibility of the
individual for maintaining, or at least not disrupting, the interpersonal and social
relationships. Such disruptions can occur through engaging in anti-social activities like
theft, vandalism or murder. One could also be upsetting the cosmic order either by
being actively engaged in, or being accessory to, such activities and occurrences as are
perceived to be disruptive of the cosmic order of the universe. The various instructions
provide examples of affirmative action which far outweigh the appearance of negativity
in the content of the moral code. While providing direct instructions for living the good
life they also provide the criteria for judging human action. The following chart provides
a quick summary of the content of the traditional moral code as shown in Chapter
Three:
Various	 Traditional	 Gyara	 Sherra	 Affirmative
Offences	 Moral Code	 Offences	 Offences	 Action
Theft etc
	
1,7,9,14.	 2,3.	 2,3,7.	 All of sec-
Vandalism	 13,15,20.	 8.	 tion C:a-d
Murder	 2,5,6,15.
	 —	 4?,6.	 of Chapter
Personal	 3,4,10,18.
	
1?,4.	 4,5.	 3 deals with
Indiscretion	 affirmative
disrupting	 action in
social har-	 21,22,23,24.
	 —	 —	 promoting
mony	 family
Disrupting	 and social
the cosmic	 harmony.
order
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b. The Ethical Aspect of Religion'
The ethical aspect of religion will not be just a matter of erudition with respect to
religious truths. It is meant to have an impact on the lives of persons who acquire it.
Its true nature therefore demands more than factual curricular learning. Ethical themes
in the three major religious leanings of Nigerians — Traditional Religion, Islam, and
Christianity` — will provide important material for moral discourse in a classroom
setting.
It should cater to the diverse interests, backgrounds and abilities represented in the
student population, and overcome the tension that frequently arises among the various
ecclesiastical groups. Such tensions are occasioned and fuelled by negative speculations
about each other. It is by providing accurate information about the real facts of each
religion that the religious education programme can solve the problem of interreligious
tensions.
From Traditional Religion the most overhanging ethical element is found in the
principle and application of bfO-na-dga (i.e. Ofii and Ws) which is a commitment to
the ideals and principles of the good life.
From Islam there are direct moral teachings in the Koran and other sources. The
Ramadan fast as a practice, and almsgiving as a sign of a true believer are also ethical
aspects of note. Almsgiving is not exclusive to Islam, but it is in Islam that it is
institutionalized as an aspect of routine Islamic piety.
From Christianity there are the direct teachings of Jesus on brotherhood and
universal love, the demand for the truth in-built in the religion itself, the law of kindness
enuntiated by Jesus.
An outline of content drawing on the ethical aspect of religion will be given here.
A fuller account of a scheme for integrated religious education is given in Appendix D
below.
Besides the gap in the knowledge and understanding of other religions, the average
Nigerian student has no more than a vague knowledge of his or her own religion. What
a	 A programme for religious education will be dealt with more fully
in Appendix D below.
b This listing is according to the chronological order of their
influence in Nigeria and not necessarily according to the order of
importance.
201
little knowledge he or she possesses usually consists in some vague loyalty to some
ecclesiastical group, a number of learned prejudices chiefly against other communions,
a few quaint moral taboos, no more than infantile notions about God, and a few
devotional techniques. The religious education programme should fill up the gaps in
knowledge both of the student's own religion and those of others around him or her.
Such knowledge will clear the webs of misunderstanding and speculation and pave the
way for understanding and mutual co-operation.
bp
 From Traditional Religion
Of6-na-Ogir: Principle and Application
From Traditional Religion, there are such themes as Of6-na-Ogil, which form the
back-bone of morality in traditional Nigerian society. Through it a member of the
community X-rays his life in the light of the moral principles operative in the society
and identifies with the side of goodness while denouncing the side of evil.
The Of6 is a short stick, a kind of staff. Of6 is made from the branch of the bf6
tree Detarium elastica" and becomes effective after consecration. Among the Igbos
every family head and any other elder who has the ow title must also possesses an bf6
for it is the symbol of ritual,' political,25 and religious authority. It symbolizes the
truthfulness and righteousness expected to proceed out of the mouths of judges, priests
and kings. Modupe Odudoye correlates the bf6 with the rod of office reflected by the
Hebrew term mat-teh 'oz of Ezekiel 19:14b; and with the Yoruba te which means to
press or lean on; te bkpei which means to lean on a stand; and 'oz which means strong
he regards as cognate with the Igbo ow, the highest civic title among the Igbo. 27 It is
then regarded as the abode of a spirit, especially of the ancestral spirits. Of6 sticks are
consecrated and handed down from generation to generation.
The concept and symbolism of bf6 cuts across a wide cross-section of Nigeria and
beyond. The Igbo word bf6 has cognate in the Urhobo opho, a 'covenant'; the Yoruba
bfb, an 'incantation'; from the Oyo Yoruba verb jb, `to utter'; (or from the Ijebu
Yoruba ft, to say'); the Ikale bfb; the Itsekiri bfb 'word, matter'. When the bfibf6,
that is, the 'bf6-holder', places his bf6 on the ground, he is seeking guidance and
direction. The solemn utterances he makes, the ideals and principles of the good life he
invokes are called 04, the act of invocation itself being referred to as (gr-Ogil.
A devout bf6-holder says his daily prayers by 0-60 with his bf6 held to the
ground, and seals every affirmation by striking the ground with it. What the bfibf6 says
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striking the lineage bf6 on the ground is always a solemn declaration and not a personal
opinion. As Victor Uchendu notes, what is declared upon the bf6 becomes a decision
of the family uttered through the bil4f6 -- a law binding on all the family members:
Once a decision has been thus acclaimed into law, it is given a
"ritual binder" by the bf6 holders, who invoke this formula: "This
lwri [law] is in accordance with our custom and must be obeyed
and respected. Those who refuse to obey the law, may bf6 kill
them." Each time the bf6 is struck on the ground (usually four
times), the assembly assents with !ha ("Let it be so.")28
Of6 and Ogil are so closely bound together that you could hardly talk of one without
the other. Their overhanging principle and point of reference is the traditional moral
code. There are in addition traditional values which, while not being religious as such,
are very central in any meaningful social, moral and religious discourse in Africa.
Central among the values is the great premium on the primacy of life over every other
thing:
1. That life is the greatest and most important thing in the whole
world?
2. That human life, notwithstanding the idiosyncrasies that charac-
terize every individual existence, is sacred and of inestimable
worth.
3. That the individual is inextricably bound with the community, and
the good or happiness or misery of the individual is a function of
the good or happiness or misery of the community and vice versa.
4. That, as a consequence, everyone owes everyone else solidarity,
support and concern in matters related to his or her welfare.
5. That in paying this debt of solidarity and concern for others, the
way of understanding, openness, honesty and tolerance is the best
of all.
The prayer life of a practitioner of Traditional Religion often involves a mirroring
of one's conduct against the traditional moral code or bminala. It is referred to as (ill-
6gii, which in content is the declaration of his stand for life in all its worth, for
uprightness of life; and his deprecation of wickedness. Anyone who sets himself against
the life of another should be deserving of the curses uttered.
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In practice, a member of the Traditional society would make his daily examination
of conscience by the process of (A-60. In a community setting, the bfibf6s or bf6-
holders (always male), perform the (fil-Ogist on behalf of the community as lists of
desiderata of personal, inter-personal and communal uprightness are enunciated and
their opposites denounced by sharply striking their bf6s on the ground as each strophe
is mentioned. Izu Onyeocha captures a scene of (fist-Ogil in his play, A Title of Honour,
where Ogbulca, the hero of the play, pours out his heart on waking up suddenly from
a troubled sleep:
Ogbuka: (Sneezing violently) Aaaatsssh! Aaatsssh!! Puah!...
Puah!... What a day! That I would begin a new day shadowed by
evil men. Whoever they are, my hands are clean...
Life to everyone, and death to no one, great or small, male
or female, old or young, rich or poor. Whoever denies life to
another, may death and disaster overtake him.
May the rivers stay on, and the fish as well. May the rivers
never dry up so the fish won't perish. A perk for the kite, a perk
for the eagle, and if anyone of them blocks the other's right to
perch may his wings break off. The good will meet with goodness,
and the evil will meet with doom.
Peace and prosperity to all who strive, safety to all who
travel, progeny to all who crave them, and whoever wants to
frustrate others' good aspirations, may his hands be pierced by
thorns.
Whoever is (unjustly) angry on seeing me, may his anger
be prolonged for ever. Whoever wants to see me dead, may I live
to attend his funeral. Whoever remembers his dead only upon
seeing me, may his dead be his company. The one to trip and fall
is the chaser after new-hatched chicken, the young chicken will
scamper to safety.
If hunters learn to shoot without missing, the swallow flies
without perching. Wherever I perceive that my life is threatened
I never walk, but run. If death goes for the young, I will identify
with the old, and if it goes for the old, I will identify with the
young.
Whoever overpowers a child in order to rob him could
never rob him of the ability to cry. The oppressor of orphans,
the despoiler of widows, must never lie peacefully in his grave.
I killed no one, I harmed no one, I robbed no one of his
property. What I am not guilty of, may it never haunt me. When
one is innocent of any wrong-doing, could he be made to pay a
penalty?
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132. From Islam
Discussing the moral teachings of Islam about the good life well will reveal the fact
that moral goodness begins with belief in God, but must be made manifest through a
series of commitments and the practice of certain social virtues. An interesting question
to ask is perhaps if Islamic ethic is disinterested or whether it stands on utilitarian
principles.
i. Moral Teachings
The Koran ii. 172, gives a description of the righteous person as
one who believes in God, and the last day, and the angels, and
the Book, and the prophets; and who gives wealth for the love of
God to kindred, and orphans, and the poor, and the wayfarer, and
the beggars, and those in captivity, and who is steadfast in prayer,
and gives alms; and those who are sure of their covenant when
they make a covenant; and the patient in poverty, and in distress,
and in time of violence.
Among the Druse Muslims, there are recognized seven great duties which form the
reference points for determining the morality and piety or otherwise of a believer's
action. These include: 1) Truth in speech (towards one another only)c; 2) mutual
protection; 3) rejection of all other religions; 4) separation from all who are in error;
5) belief in the unity of God; 6) resignation to His will; and 7) obedience to his com-
mands.
As regards general moral duties, the Koran is explicit. Parents are to be kindly
treated, especially in old age, spoken to respectfully, deferred to humbly. Only if they
desire to draw their children away to idolatry, they must not be obeyed. A murderer
It is a common trait in Islam that non-Muslims do not enjoy the
same statutory rights as Muslims. In Chapter One, Alhaji
Abubalcar Gumi's categorical statement about Muslims not
accepting a Christian ruler is a case in point, (See his statement
quoted in the section 10 of Chapter One on Nigeria's Present
Predicament). In this instance non-Muslims are not even entitled
to know the truth, and any untruth told them has no negative
moral consequences. When viewed with close attention, the seven
great duties can be seen as the justificatory background to most of
the attitudes — sometimes hostile — some Islamic sects adopt
towards people of other religions. This can present a problem in
a pluralist society, especially if the Muslims insist on an inflexible
interpretation of the duties.
205
is accounted worthy of hell: "Whosoever slayeth a believe? purposely, his reward is
hell." "It is incumbent on you to exercise vengeance for murder. ii. 173.
With regard to theft, when property is taken out of proper custody in a secret
manner, is punishable by the amputation of a hand, according to v.42: "If a man or
woman steal, cut off their hands."
As to offenses against chastity, the Koran is severe; immoral persons whose guilt
is proved are to receive a hundred stripes; guilty persons, if married, were at first shut
up in their houses (iv. 19); later they were stoned to death.
Practically unlimited right of concubinage was permitted, both by Mohammed's
example and by Koranic precept, especially if the women involved were seized in
military campaigns. Thus, "Unlawful to you are married women, except such as your
right hand possesses," i.e. those taken in war, or slaves (iv.28); but free Muslim women
might not be taken as concubines.
On marriage, while not allowing to men generally the same license as to the Prophet
himself, the Koran permits marriage with up to four wives (iv.27). Marriage with a
grown-up woman must be subject to her positive consent, and silence is considered as
consent.
ii. The Ramadan Fast
The Ramadan fast, which occurs in the ninth month of the Islamic year, is expressly
enjoined in ii. 179-184. The fast is prescribed "that ye may fear God for certain days."
Those who are ill or on a journey are excused, but they must fast the same number of
other days. The fast is to be kept by day only; and eating and drinking are allowed after
dark until the earliest dawn. The first observation of the new moon of the month is to
be the beginning of the fast.
Almsgiving
The duty of almsgiving is often enjoined in the Koran. Zakat, or the legal alms,
literally purification, expresses a portion of property given as a sanctification of the
rest. It is paid separately upon different kinds of property that have been at least one
year in possession of an adult; but not upon the necessaries of life, slaves employed in
service, books, craftsmen's tools, etc.
d	 The corollary is that to slay a non-[Islamic] believer is not quite
as grievous and does not carry with it the same consequences.
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133 . From Christianity
A great deal of 'Christian' moral discourse whether in theology or in any other field
is based directly or indirectly on the biblical teachings or reflections on it. The Old
Testament provided the Decalogue upon which most moral judgment among Christians
is based. In the New Testament, Jesus said he came not to destroy but to fulfill the
(moral) laws of the Old Testament. He gave a 'new commandment' of love; preached
mercy and forgiveness; challenged the people to 'learn from' his meekness and humility,
and said he was 'the way, the truth and the life'. Christian moral teaching is three-
dimensional by involving at the same time precepts of inspired injunctions from the Old
Testament, teachings initiated by Christ, and the good examples that his life achieved.
i. Common Brotherhood and Universal Love
Jesus taught the common brotherhood of all humankind (St Matthew 23:8). This
brotherhood consists not merely in the mutual attachment sometimes seen between
brothers in ancient society, not the loving affection of a David and a Jonathan, (cf. I
Samuel 19:1-7), and all such which could be inspired by mutual appreciation of good
qualities, clannish regard by community of kindred, associations, habits, interests.
Rather, Jesus showed an unheard-of love to those most unlike him -- the publicans and
sinners like Zacchaeus, (St Luke 19:2-10); the woman taken in adultery, (St John
8:4,5); the woman who was a sinner, (St Luke 7:36-50); the thief at the crucifixion,
(St Luke 23:39-43).
Jesus' Sermon on the Mount emphasizes a completely new order of relationships
where poverty of spirit, meekness, mercy, peacefulness, singleness of heart, and
uprightness are exalted above their opposites (St Matthew Chapters 5-7; St Luke
Chapter 6). And St Paul's first Letter to the Corinthians is an ode on love as patient,
kind, unselfish, outgoing, and interested in the truth (I Cor 13).
ii. The Demand for the Truth
Christ placed great emphasis on the truth and urged his followers, "If you continue
in my word, then you are my disciples indeed; you shall come to know the truth, and
the truth shall make you free." (St John 8:31,32). He carried the domain of truth into
the most inward thought, everywhere where the world cannot follow us by insisting that
"there is nothing hidden that shall not be manifested," (St Mark 4:22). It is aldn to what
the psalmist wrote in Psalm 51: "Indeed you love truth in the heart, then in the secret
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of my heart teach me wisdom." An important lesson from the demand for the truth is
that no criticism by reasonable methods, with a pure desire to attain truth, is to be
discountenanced by a true follower of Christ.
iii. The Law of Kindness
Christ discountenanced revenge (St Matthew 5:38-41), and substituted a supreme
law of kindness. Fellow humans are to be treated as a loving Father would treat his
loved and erring children (cf. the Parable of the Prodigal Son, St Luke 15:11-31); our
neighbour is whoever is in need of our help, and whom we can really help (St Matthew
25:34-40); we should love our enemies and do good to them that hate us (St Luke 6:27-
35); we should treat others the way in which we would like others to treat us (St
Matthew 7:12). These precepts, as recorded, were given broadly by Jesus, without a
full analysis of circumstances and instances, that being left to the individual to work out
as circumstances arise.
c. From the Political Life
What interests moral education is the ethics of the political life whereby the
government is charged with the responsibility to run an honest and effective govern-
ment; to uphold the ideals for which the country stands; and to protect those rights
which the constitution guarantees to citizens. On the part of individual citizens, it is
the responsibility to perform all the duties placed on them by the fact of their citizen-
ship of the country and respect the rights of everyone as guaranteed by the constitu-
tions of the land.
The fundamental rights of individual persons are defined in Chapter IV of the
Constitution to include, the right to life, which provides that no one may be deprived
intentionally of his or her life except in the execution of the sentence of a court in
respect to a criminal offence; the right to the dignity of the human person, which
prohibits the subjection of anyone to torture, slavery, forced labour; the right to
personal liberty whereby no one may be deprived of such liberty save in the execution
of a court order. Other rights guaranteed by the constitution include the right to a fair
hearing in matters relating to the determination of one's rights or obligations whether
by government or any other authority; the right to private and family life, freedom of
thought, conscience and religion; freedom of expression and the press; peaceful
assembly and association; freedom of movement; and freedom from discrimination.
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The first duty imposed on the government by the constitution is the duty "to conform
to, observe and apply the provisions of (Chapter II) of the constitution" (Chapter 11.13),
which reminds the government to bear in mind that:
a) sovereignty belongs to the people of Nigeria from whom the
government derives its power and authority;
b) the security and welfare of the people is the primary purpose of
government;
c) the participation by the people in their government shall be in
accordance with the constitutions.
The Constitution outlines the personal and individual rights of citizens and provides
that the economy be run "in such a manner as to secure the maximum welfare, freedom
and happiness of every citizen on the basis of social justice and equality of status and
opportunity" (16.1a). With a social order founded on the declared ideals of Freedom,
Equality and Justice (17.1), the constitution guarantees to every citizen equality of
rights, freedoms and opportunities before the law; declares the independence,
impartiality and integrity of the courts of law and easy accessibility to them; acknowl-
edges the sanctity of the human person; and enjoins the government to be humane in its
actions (II.3a-g). Article 18 provides for equality of educational opportunities which
include a) free, compulsory and universal primary education; b) free secondary educa-
tion; c) free university education; and d) free adult literacy programme.
The government is to ensure that all citizens have the opportunity to secure adequate
means of livelihood. With regard to the work place, the constitution provides that the
conditions of work should be "just and humane, with facilities for leisure and for social,
religious and cultural life"; and that health, safety and welfare of all persons in employ-
ment be safeguarded. It also insists that equal pay should be received for equal work
such that no one is discriminated against on the basis of sex or any other ground.
Finally, children, young persons and the aged are protected against moral and material
neglect.
5. Methods
In considering the methods of moral education it is important to take into account
the fact that the various ages of the students make certain methods more effective than
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others. This point is further developed in sections b and c below. But before then it is
important to set down principles that must be borne in mind in any programme of moral
education. These include the avoidance of negative approaches of brainwashing,
propaganda and conditioning; the adoption of positive constructive methods of descrip-
tion and analysis which are applicable in other fields of education; and the application
of elements of traditional Nigerian methods that have proved effective in the traditional
setup.
a. Eschewing Negative Approaches
Moral education should not be associated with such negative practices as brain-
washing, and propagandizing but with a variety of methods including plain teaching in
the academic sense, and the use of stories. While plain academic teaching will produce
intellectuals who may or may not necessarily emerge as moral, brainwashing will
produce clones incapable of independent and autonomous judgment of the real issues,
and propaganda, which is by definition an unfair invasion of the mind aimed at distract-
ing or dissipating the recipient's independent judgment, is likely to produce a morally
timid and unbalanced character.
Propagandizing is a way of exaggeration, a prevarication with respect to certain
facts a distorted form of which is meant to serve the secret interests of the propagan-
dist. It can produce compliance, but such compliance will not be based on genuine,
autonomous understanding.
Conditioning can result from physical, psychological or emotional constraint and
produces compliance without rational decision on the part of the one conditioned. It
produces compliance out of fear and without any choice. As Rousseau points out, 32 to
yield to a strong man is an act of necessity, not of will. At most it is a result of the
dictate of prudence.
The goal of moral education is not simply to ensure that people act in some pre-
determined way. It is the internalization of moral principles and a commitment to moral
values. Through it one comes to link one's personal values with some kind of intrinsic
reward which is more satisfying than any other.
In plain teaching appeal is made to the intellect, the reason and the desire or need
to know, and the emotions play but a secondary role. In propaganda the emotions are
invoked above all else. It plays on such emotions as fear, anger, pride, the sense of
shame, sense of self-respect, nationalism. Lindley Fraser reflecting on the nature of
propaganda suggests that all human instincts have at one time or another provided prop-
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agandists with a means of influencing or trying to influence the behaviour of their
targets.33
Brainwashing is a method often employed for getting the mind to accept certain
bodies of propositions that serve the interest of some political or ideological cause,
irrespective of whether or not the subject or victim, if left to choose, would have
identified with them.
In religious circles brainwashing is a very important factor in most induced conver-
sions, but there is no conclusive evidence that all religious conversions result from
brainwashing. Some critics of religion have the favourite pastime of considering the
methods of religious proselytism as equivalent to brainwashing. It is a rather sweeping
kind of criticism, since it presupposes that one who is converted to some religion has
absolutely no judgmental input, and no personal conviction, but simply irrationally drifts
in without understanding. Such critics will have a hard time explaining the factors at
work in brainwashers themselves or the purpose of brainwashing in the first place.
In politics it is frequently used by tyrants to compel compliance in situations that
would otherwise have been met with nothing but objection and opposition. Most regimes
that apply it are usually doubtful of their own legitimacy and would hang on to power
by crushing the spirit of the citizens. Thus in China the fear of continued civil war or
foreign intervention convinced the communist leaders that they had to use shock tactics
to convert the masses.
The fear of brainwashing arises from its effect of totally subduing the human mind
and conditioning it to respond to external stimuli in a way already envisaged by the
operator as though the human being were a machine. The Russian physiologist and
Nobel laureate Ivan Petrovich Pavlov (1849-1936) discovered that a dog could be
conditioned to hate what he previously loved, and love what he previously hated. This
is the basis of brain-washing: that by appropriate conditioning, it was believed, a human
being could be turned into whatever the psychologist desired. m Those who apply such
methods describe them euphemistically as a process of re-education.
Propagandizing is often closely associated with brainwashing. As Cora Marie
Dubitsky rightly points out's
 propaganda's dark spot is not for the fact that it is
frequently associated with lies and the distortion of the truth. Rather it is the omission
of the truth in order to avoid its challenges. Its appeal lies in the fact that it saves time.
Genuine education, which by definition is associated with leading, guiding, bringing
forth, rearing, and nurturing, should not be associated with brainwashing and propa-
ganda. It should not have anything to do with propaganda and brainwashing, which
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invade and ultimately prey upon their target's personal autonomy. The educator must
apply the same rigorous methods and tools applied in formal education — the method of
exposition, critical analysis, and practical application. The initial stage of the pro-
gramme should consist of an excursus through the various political, ethical and religious
systems the students are meant to study. At the second stage of critical analysis they
will be able to ask the right types of questions about validity and relevance of specific
aspects in certain systems. The final stage of practical application will enable them to
pick and choose intelligently what is appropriate from what is merely possible. The
capacity for discriminating choice among political, ethical and religious systems is the
crucial difference between a well-informed, balanced personality and a mere ideological
guinea pig who is a mere product of indoctrination and brainwashing. On this capacity
lies the true moral basis for patriotism in contrast with mere sanguine activism,
character in contrast with conditioned response, and faith in contrast with neurosis.
b. Using Descriptive-Analytic Approaches
Because of the variety of sources which may not be easy for all the students to
digest, an initial phase would comprise in an expos& of each source material as it
comes without raising difficult questions of textual or conceptual analysis. It is a stage
of understanding and exploration where discussion is of paramount importance. From
the contributions of discussants students are able to fill up little gaps of details and make
their understanding more comprehensive. A transition will then be made to the more
challenging aspect of matching one principle against another, one concept against
another. The nature and pace of such a transition will depend on the age of the students
and their level of intellectual development, the importance of the subject matter with
regard to the felt needs of the moment, and how successfully the students went through
the earlier stage, for it does not make sense to proceed to a higher level without first
consolidating the foundation.
c. Applying a Special Nigerian Touch
The extensive use of stories, illustrations, proverbs, riddles and other brain-teasers
and symbolic actions gave traditional moral education such effectiveness as to commend
them for adaptation in a classroom context. The use of the interactive method ensured
the maximum participation among those present, with each participant (i.e. student)
having something to contribute towards the learning process. It is clearly preferable to
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the tendency, even in contemporary situations to make rules, to enuntiate isolated ethical
theories, or to seek to project a particular point of view as a model for all.
The use of fictional characters is another effective device which ensures that (the
moral) issues rather than persons are the points of focus. Thus in Nigerian folklore
Tortoise illustrates wisdom, Lion courage, Billy Goat craftiness and Sheep foolishness.
It is thus sufficient to tell a short story depicting any of the animals in activities that
depict the characteristic being manifested at the moment. For example, when someone
has been the careless cause of something whose unpleasant consequences he or she is
suffering, the usual mode of rebuke would be something like: "Sheep wet her sleeping-
place and had to stand all night."
In Western literature the giants and dwarfs of Jonathan Swift's Gulliver's Travels,
the animal characters of Orwell's Animal Faint and the Pilgrim of John Bunyan's
Pilgrim's Progress are fictional characters meant to depict human tendencies and their
attendant moral and other consequences.
Professor Donatus Nwoga recounts the highly significant symbolic actions of
masquerades in a certain festival:
Among the masquerade gallery during the Uzo iyi festival of 1973,
there was a set of ugly masquerades called Ntoromc{fo or "pot-
belly".
They came from two or three sections of the town and they
appeared to be in competition to decide which one would be the
most outrageously ugly. The mask face was most significantly
indicative of a leprous, eaten-up face with the nose lost, the mouth
largely rotten, the gawkily-formed, exposed teeth half-destroyed;
the tongue lolling
out.
In the middle of the figure was a grossly distended stomach
below which were hanging, outside the clothes, pendulous over-
sized genitals. Each was a really homble figure that spoke
through its nose, unashamedly trying to court the prettiest girls
that came to watch the festival. Ultimately, it turned out that the
mask had a historical background, being a representation of some-
body who had contracted decay through sexual excess. More sig-
nificantly, however, the masquerade was presented as a periodic
reification of the concept of punishment for excess.36
d. Counselling: A Necessary Companion To Moral Education
Counselling provides an important supplement to both religious and moral educa-
tion. The student's religious and moral needs are not always entirely met in the
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classroom either because of his or her unique circumstance, or the way in which the
material is treated. Counselling shows the student how certain religious or moral
principles can be applied in his or her own specific circumstances. A counselling session
provides the student with additional personal help in clearing confusions, in dealing with
some intimate questions that overlap between morality and religion — questions about
sexuality, guilt, personal habits, and doubts that would be either embarrassing or self
deprecating to discuss in public. A state of confusion or guilt, a feeling of being
persecuted or misunderstood, can have a devastating effect on a student. Through
counselling, the student becomes better informed and better equipped.
There are also personal emotional problems that require difficult moral decisions --
abortion, divorce, serious illness, failure, personal or family tragedy. Counselling
enables the student give his or her own side of the story especially where he or she
feels he or she is not being fairly treated. In a given case affecting the student or others,
the counsellor has the opportunity to expand the larger implications, which the student
was unaware of at the moment of action, and to advise him or her on how to handle the
situation.
6. The Basis of Integrated Religious Education
Before establishing the course content for an integrated religious education in
Nigeria, some important points need to be made about the teacher and some extra
features of the course with respect to the educator, the one being educated, and the
course content. There are some marked differences between the religious educator per
se and the moral educator per se. While a moral educator need not hold any religious
belief in order to have credibility, it my contention that religious belief is essential in
a religious educator. It is also my contention that religious education must be comple-
mented with religious praxis or risk being superficial. The course content will consist
in items of belief and practice found in the various religions, especially those which have
an impact outside the given religion. (See section 3 below).
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7. The Religious Educator
The religious educator need not necessarily be a highly specialized professional
theologian, social scientist or cultural anthropologist. All these disciplines have
important bearings in the scheme of religious education since each adds a further
dimension to the question by providing explanations from the doctrinal, demographical,
or cultural points of view. In matters of specialization the religious educator's expertise
is comparable with the practical expertise of a general physician whose competence
enables him or her to be of service to his or her community without actually being a
specialist in any specific branch of medicine!' On the other hand, however, it seems
that a too narrow specialization might have a deleterious effect on the demands of
religious education. As Corn Marie Dubitslcy forcefully points out, being immersed in
the intricacies of the theological (and other) specialties without first developing a solid
foundation in the faith on the first (non-speculative) level can have a deleterious effect
on religious education: "We can acquire in theology a very great skill in talking and
perhaps not have really understood from the depths of existence what we are really
talking about. "39 It is quite possible that the professional religious educator can be adept
at quoting the proper authorities and still be unable to articulate personal convictions.
8. Religious Education and Praxis
It seems indispensable that in addition to academic and professional qualification, the
religious educator should possess a solid religious commitment. It seems hardly possible
to teach anything, religion included, without coming from a particular bias, whether it
is expressed or admitted or not. Besides, not embracing a position is, in fact, taking a
position. 39 When we study religion comparatively we advocate a kind of religious
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pluralism in which multiple truths stand side by side without force or impact on life.
Religion cannot be done justice to by adopting a value-free approach which has the
effect of making a faith decision irrelevant. But where the religious educator has some
religious commitment the religious perspective which he or she gives would be natural
rather than artificial, and his or her credibility is easier to establish. The best science
teacher does not merely unleash a string of scientific facts but is able to bring them to
life through practical laboratory experiments. The same analogy would apply in the case
of religious education, where best educator should not simply unleash a barrage of
religious facts, but should be able to correlate all the facts without getting too narrowly
involved in his or her own religious viewpoints.
As already noted earlier, in traditional Nigerian society, children were not excluded
from religious ceremonies. They had the opportunity to watch and even take some
limited part in the preparation of sacrifices. They could stand at the fringe to listen to
the prayers and invocations and afterwards seek to re-enact what they had seen and
heard as exactly as they could. They became little priests, little fortune-tellers, little
worshippers. For that reason, religious education must also ensure that while the stu-
dents are being furnished with facts about religion, access to religious practice should
not be denied them. This access can be provided either separately according to the
various religious persuasions, or all together ecumenically. The one has the advantage
of providing an intensity of religious experience among homogenous believers, while the
other has the advantage of creating opportunity for mutual contact. Whether the one or
the other, there should be opportunity for both, at least periodically.
Things learnt in class are enhanced with practice. One cannot, for example, conceive
of physical education without physical exercise (workouts), nor moral education without
morality. Religious education without religion or religious practice is rather incomplete.
The religious educator must also be mindful of the increasingly secular environment of
216
the public schools both professing his or her own religion and in designing a pro-
gramme of religious education. It is in this ability to detach him or herself that
professional skill and competence comes in. Therefore, in principle no attempt should
be made at imposing any religious beliefs and practices on students. By the same token
no attempt should be made at suppressing the religious beliefs and/or practices of stu-
dents where they already exist. They should have the opportunity to practise their
religion unhindered. To positively prohibit religious practices is as much an infraction
of the basic rights of religious believers as to promote some religious belief is to a non-
believer. It is tantamount to an antireligious campaign and a violation of the freedom of
conscience and of expression.
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Appendix A: Nigerian National Anthem I (1960-1977)
Nigeria, we hail thee,
our own dear native land
Though tribe and tongue may differ
In brotherhood we stand,
Nigerians all, and proud to serve
our sovereign Motherland.
Our flag shall be a symbol,
that truth and justice reign.
In peace or battle honoured
And this we count as gain;
To hand unto our children
A banner without stain.
0 God of all creation,
Grant this our one request:
Help us to build a nation
where no man is oppressed
And so with peace and plenty
Nigeria may be blest.
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Appendix B: Nigerian National Anthem (Current)
Arise, 0 compatriots, Nigeria's call obey!
To serve our fatherland
With love and strength and faith.
The labour of our heroes past
shall never be in vain.
To serve with heart and might
One nation bound in freedom, peace and unity.
Oh God of creation, direct our noble cause,
Guide all our leaders right
Help our youth the truth to know.
In love and honesty to grow
And living just and true,
Great, lofty heights attain
To build a nation where peace and justice shall reign.
Appendix C: The National Pledge
I pledge to Nigeria, my country,
To be faithful, loyal and honest.
To serve Nigeria with all my strength,
To defend her unity
And uphold her integrity.
So, help me God.
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Appendix D: Content of An Integrated Religious Education
for Nigeria
The content of an integrated religious education will consist in the basic beliefs,
teachings and practices of Traditional Religion, Islam and Christianity, since they are often cited
by the r various adherents as the reason behind some of their actions even in non-religious
circumstances. The common factors will then be sought and correlated to each other.
1. Traditional Religion
a. The Basic Beliefs
The traditional belief system has been put together by Chief K.O.K. Onyioha under the
auspices of the Godian Religion which is none other than Traditional Religion being
rediscovered and of which he is the chief protagonist. The membership of the Godian Religion
have set out a basic creed which summarizes their system of belief.'
i. The Godian Creed
1. I believe in the Almighty God, Creator of Heaven and
Earth, as my source of inspiration, strength and as my protector.
2. I believe in the universal brotherhood of man under the
fatherhood of one God; love your neighbour as you love your-
self; do unto others as you would want others do unto you; thou
shall not kill; thou shall not steal; thou shall not commit adultery;
thou shall not lie; and in respect and obedience to elders, just
laws, and in retributive justice.
3. I believe that every human being, consciously or uncon-
sciously, looks up to something him as his source of inspiration,
and that "something" is the Almighty God.
4. I believe that the Almighty God made the world a paradise
of happiness for humanity but that man has made the world a hell
for himself by too much quarrels with his fellow man over
methods of God-worship.
5. I believe the Kingdom of Heaven on earth shall come when
man learns to quarrel no more with his fellow man on the excuse
of difference in methods of God-worship.
6. I believe that religious concepts are inspired by man's
desire to offer thanks to God for His goodness to humanity.
7. I believe that every human being has his own way
organized or unorganized, systematized or unsystematized, of
expressing the necessary gratitude to God and that in this fact
every human being satisfies the purpose of religion or God-
worship.
8. I believe that there is no sense in quarrelling with my
fellow man over his religious doctrine, belief or methods of God-
worship that differ from my own manner of satisfying the common
purpose of thanksgiving to the Almighty.
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9. I believe that to base association of man with man, nation
with nation, on the ground of common religion and faith, is sheer
folly.
10. I believe that every man should have the right to worship
God in the way he understands best, without bitterness.
11. I believe that any attempt to force man directly or
indirectly to accept any particular faith, religious doctrine or
method of God-worship rumples social harmony.
12. I believe that organized religious bodies as they are known
in the world today, though the fundamental principles underlying
their purposes are good, have, by each in its way canvassing to
have all men embrace its doctrines, aroused unhealthy competition
and mutual jealousy among themselves and blown the world into
a tumultuous asylum of warring religious factions.
13. I believe that if the universal brotherhood of man under the
fatherhood of God shall be a reality, if the Kingdom of God shall
come, the traditional African attitude of live and let live in all
matters of religion is the indispensable catalyst.
14. I believe that deification of man has given source to the
formation of the many religious organizations now competing and
quarrelling with one another, each in frantic attempts to get
everybody to accept and hallow the man it has deified as the only
son, holy prophet, and only medium through whom God's mercy
and blessings should be invoked.
15. I believe that the practice of deification of man shall
continue to be the source of disharmony in matters of God-
worship unless it is stopped.
16. I believe that to deify any person born of woman or to
accept and hallow anyone so deified is conspiracy against social
harmony and sinful contempt for the very sanctity of God.
17. I believe that to end deification of man and hang religion
directly on God Himself is to end proliferation of religions and
religious quarrels and return peace among men.
18. I believe that the Creed of the Godian Religion represents
a new religious civilization which needs to be propagated to save
human society from total destruction.
ii. Belief in a Supreme Being
In Traditional Religion, there is belief in a Supreme Being described as creator, eternal,
self-subsisting and omniscient! The Supreme Being is called C'hukwu among the Igbos;
Olodumare among the Yorubas; Ubangzji among the Hausas; Soko among the Nupes and
Gbaris; Abasi among the Efiks and Ibibios, to name but a few. It is the Supreme Spirit who
sends and sustains everything — the sun, the rain, the weather, and never does harm to
anyone. 3
 In bidding a loved one good night, the Yoruba usually adds "Olorun jiwa o", which
literally means "May the Supreme God wake us up." The Gwari in the Northern part of
Nigeria also have a similar good night greeting: "Sheko We nyi," which means, "May God
awaken us tomorrow."
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Among the Yonibas and some parts of Northern Nigeria, God's transcendence is
emphasized, while his immanence is obscured by reason of the socio-political set-up which
discourages direct approach of the king by his subjects. The opposite is the case among the
Igbos by reason of a lateral, rather than a pyramidal socio-political structure.
The Supreme Being has minor spirits and deities to act as his ministers and as
intermediaries for humans. There are also ancestral spirits who keep the link between the spirit
world and the physical. There are, finally, evil spirits out to work mischief and harm. Wicked
people invoke them to harm their enemies. These mischievous spirits can however be warded
off by use of charms and amulets specially rendered potent for the purpose.
In traditional religion the Supreme Being is also regarded as a judge. As judge he is the
final disposer of things he controls human destiny, and each will receive from him as he
deserves. He punishes people "for any breach of taboo or for ritual offenses, but it is
Olodumare who judges human character".
iii. The Earth-Goddess
The Earth is a mystical power of which everybody stands in awe, because of its
prohibitions and its punishments. The earth forbids bloodshed and so is a sanction of solidarity
for the community.
Among the Yoruba, the earth had a powerful cult, and was associated with smallpox as
its "arm or sanction us. The "small pox juju" was prohibited in Nigeria in 1917, and the cult has
gone into retirement only to be seen in villages hidden under other cults.
The earth deity Ala, (Ale or Ane) is the most important public and private divinity of
the Igbos of Nigeria. It is more important than any of the sky gods. Ala is often seen in the
wooden and clay images in which the Igbo people delight. With a child on her knees and
sometimes a crescent moon near her she has been "compared to the Egyptian /sis with horns,
or even with some Italian madonnas"6.
Ala is the owner of all men and women. She is also responsible for public morality and
offenses against the law are crimes against Ala who makes the law and by whom oaths are
sworn. So she is often called "the unseen president of society". 7 The Ala shrine is usually
simple: a tree with a pottery dish in which offerings are placed.
iv. Water Deities
Most communities in Nigeria have cults of rivers and most rivers bear the names of
deities. Njaba, Ulasi, Uzaku, Onuma, Onugbo, Ngara, Melia are all the names of revered
local deities. The Yoruba storm god has rivers for wives, one of whom is the river Niger. The
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Yoruba sea-god, Olokun, is represented by one of the famous Ife bronzes found many miles
inland. The delta areas of Nigeria have elaborate cults to water deities, usually female. The
Oguta people refer fondly to the Lady of the Lake.
v. Cult to the Sun and the Moon
Some of the Igbo people have shrines of the sun, who is the child of the Supreme God.
The symbol of the god in a branch of a tree planted outside a dwelling-hut, and sometimes a
pottery dish in front of it is said to represent the sun's disk. Some Yoruba mothers bring their
children out of the hut a week after birth and "show" the moon to them saying: "Look at the
moon, httle one, we bless you at the coming of the new moon. When you see the moon you
see riches, prosperity and long life."' Then they would throw water on the roof and allowed to
flow upon the baby.
When an Igbo sees the new moon he says, holding up his hands, "New moon, protect
me as the last moon protected me." Some Northern tribes hold a baby up to the rising sun,
three times for a body and four for a girl.
vi. Storm Gods
Gods of the storm are divinities in full right in many parts of Nigeria. They have
temples, priests and regular worship. The Igbos and Yorubas pay such attention to the storm,
lightening, thunder, and thunderbolt. In many places the storm gods have the greatest and most
powerful temples, and their priests are recognized as leaders before most others. The kind of
awe with which they are held can be appreciated when on thinks of the endemic violent storms
which occur in those areas.
The Yoruba god Shango the god of lightening and thunder, is worshipped along with
his wives, who are notable rivers, and with the rainbow and thunderclap which are his
attendants. 9
 He is called "Fighter with Stone", or "The Stone-Thrower". In his temples are to
be seen stones that are probably ancient instruments. Shang° is not only a storm god, but also
a deified hero, believed to have been the fourth King of Oyo, the ancient Yoruba capital'''.
Most Igbo villages have a shrine of the god of lightening Amachoha, associated with retributive
justice which no culprit supposedly ever escapes.
b. Basic Practices
In Traditional Religion there is a wide range of observances and festivities for a variety
of purposes. There are celebrations for every phase of life including birth, naming, initiation,
marriage, title-taking, death. There are some annual and seasonal celebrations such as harvest
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or the new year, each following its own established pattern with specific fiscal, disciplinary and
social demands. Divination, which usually consists in consulting fortune-tellers, is an integral
part of Traditional Religion, and through it the will of the deities are ascertained prior to, in
the course of, and at the end of any action of any considerable consequence. The time and fre-
quency of consultation depends entirely on the discretion of the individual practitioner.
2. Islamic Religion
a. The Basic Teachings
The five principal elements of Islam as enjoined in the Koran are: (1) Belief in the one
God, and in Mohammed as His prophet; (2) Reciting the daily prayers; (3) Giving the legal
alms; (4) Observing the fast of Ramadan; (5) Making a pilgrimage to Mecca once during life.
The creed Kelimah as such does not occur in the Koran; but the first part of it, "there is no
god but Allah (or God)", is in the Koran xlviii.29; but the whole often occurs in the Traditions
about Mohammed.
b. Basic Beliefs
i. The Supreme God
There is a short passage in the Koran which, in the words of G.T. Bettany, "answers
to the Lord's Prayer": It runs thus:
In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. Praise
belongs to God, the Lord of the worlds, the Merciful, the
Compassionate, the Ruler of the day of judgment. Thee we
worship and Thee we ask for aid. Direct us in the right way, the
way of those to whom Thou art gracious, not of those Thou art
angry with, nor of those who err".
According to the Koran, "Allah is eternal and everlasting, one and indivisible, not
endued with form, nor circumscribed by limit or measure; comprehending all things, but
comprehended of nothing." Concerning the nature of God it is expressly stated that, "No
vision taketh in Him, but He taketh in all vision; He is the subtle, the all-informed. He has
created men, in order that they should worship Him."" He is represented sometimes as creating
both evil and good, and as creating evil spirits and men for hell: "God misleadeth whom He
will, and guideth whom He will"".
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The Koran represents God as attended by angels, pure beings created from fire, neither
eating nor drinking, nor having sexes. They ask forgiveness for the dwellers upon earth. Two
angels are assigned to each human being, standing on his right and on his left, and recording
all his actions. One angel, Rhazwan (goodwill), presides over paradise, and another, Malik
over hell. Several Archangels are named: Gabriel, Michael, Israfel (who is to sound the last
trumpet), and Azrael, the Angel of death.
ii. About Idols
Idols and idolatry form a prominent subject of denunciation in the Koran. Following the
destruction of Meccan idols, the nothingness of idols is brought out in iv.51: "Verily God will
not forgive the union of other gods with Himself.., and he who uniteth gods with God hath
devised a great wickedness." Idolaters were then strictly forbidden to enter the sacred temple
at Mecca. The forgiveness of idolaters might not be prayed for, even by their kin. In spite of
his denunciation of idolatry, Mohammed still retained the Black Stone as an object of
reverence, and also several rites, such as the "runnings to and fro, • "stonings of pillars," which
were connected with previous idolatrous worship.
Ten idols of the ancient Arabs are mentioned in the Koran, vis., Al Jibl and Al-Taghut,
Al-Lat, Al-Uzza, Manat, Wadd, Suwa, Yaghus, Yaug, and Nasr. The first two were idols of
the Koreish, Al-Lat was the idol at Tai, Al-Uzza was identified with Venus, but was
worshipped under animal forms, as the Lion-god (Yaghus), the vulture-god (Nasr), the Horse-
god (Yaug). Habhah was a large sacred stone on which camels were sacrificed; and the remark-
able Black Stone of Mecca was another object of intense reverence. In the Kaaba at Mecca
there were images representing Abraham and Ishmael, each carrying divining arrows in his
hand''.
iii. About Jesus
Jesus is variously referred to as a Divine being, but not the Son of God, for "God could
not take to Himself a Son." Yet the miraculous conception of Jesus, the annunciation of the
Virgin Mary, and the sinlessness of Jesus are taught. Jesus is descnbed as the greatest miracle-
worker of all the prophets, and there is an account of his calling a furnished table down from
heaven, to become a recurring festival and sign.16
iv. About Heaven and the Parousia
The descriptions of the Muslim paradise of heaven are famous for the sensual delights
depicted; but they are not so elaborate and sensual in the Koran as in the traditional sayings of
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the Prophet. It is commonly said that there are eight different heavens; namely, the Garden of
Eternity, the Abode of Peace, the Abode of Rest, the Gardens of Eden, the Gardens of Refuge,
the Gardens of Delight, the Gardens of the Most High, and Gardens of Paradise; but they are
nowhere mentioned at once, and may be taken as different descriptions of the same place.
The Koran talks of the reward of the just:
Their reward for their patience shall be paradise and silken robes,
reclining therein on bridal couches; naught shall they know of the
sun or piercing cold; its shades shall close over them, and low
shall its fruits hang down; and vessels of silver and goblets like
flagons shall be borne round among them. (1xxvi.12).
It also talks of rivers of water that corrupt not; rivers of milk, whose taste changeth not;
and rivers of wine, delicious to those who drink it; and rivers of clarified honey...(xlvii.16,
17).
v. About Hell
Hell is most frequently referred to as "the Fire", also Gehennum. It is said to have
seven portals and seven divisions: Gehenna, the purgatory for all Muslims (xix.72); Laza, the
flaming fire; Hutamah, the raging fire that splits everything to pieces; Sair, the broiling fire;
Sagar, the scorching fire; Jahim, the fierce fire; and Hawiyeh, the abyss.
The Koran talks also of the last judgment variously as the day of standing up, of
separation, of reckoning, of awakening, of judgment, the encompassing day, and the hour.
There are some apocalyptic passages :
Thinketh man that we shall not reunite his bones? Ay, his very
finger tips are we able evenly to replace... When the eye shall be
dazzled, when the moon shall be darkened, and the sun and the
moon shall be together, On that day man shall cry, Where is there
a place to flee to? But in vain; there is no refuge: with thy Lord
on that day shall be the sole asylum. On that day shall man be told
of all that he hath done first and last: yea, a man shall be the eye-
witness against himself. (bow).
vi. On Predestination
Predestination is one of the primary teachings of the Koran — that nothing can happen
to us but what God has fixed. God misleads whom he will. None can die except by His
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decree. Many are decreed to err and to enter hell. These doctrines have led to a paralysing
fatalism among Muslims.
c. Basic Practices
i. Prayer
Prayer is often enjoined in the Koran, but the five daily prayer-times are not mentioned
in any one passage. It simply said: "Glorify God when it is evening, and at morning, — and to
Him be praise in the heavens and earth, — and at afternoon and at noontide."
ii. The Holy Pilgrimage
The holy pilgrimage or Hail to Mecca is thus commanded:
Proclaim to the peoples a pilgrimage. Let them come to thee on
the foot and on every fleet camel, arriving by every deep defile.
that they may bear witness of its benefits to them, and make
mention of God's name on the appointed days over the brute
beasts with which He hath supplied them for sustenance: and let
them pay their vows and circuit the ancient house. xxii.28.
3. The Christian Religion
a. Basic Beliefs
A summary of the Christian belief is found in the creed, which is the Christian
declaration of faith. A number of versions exist, like the Apostles' creed and the Athanasian
creed, but the Nicene creed seems to create the fewest problems for most Christians of all
denominations:
i. The Nicene Creed
We believe in one God,
the Father, the Almighty,
maker of heaven and earth,
of all that is, seen and unseen.
We believe in one Lord, Jesus Christ,
the only Son of God,
eternally begotten of the Father,
God from God, Light from Light,
true God from true God,
begotten, not made,
of one Being with the Father.
Through him all things were made.
For us men and for our salvation
230
he came down from heaven:
by the power of the Holy Spirit
he became incarnate from the Virgin Mary,
and was made man.
For our sake he was crucified under Pontius Pilate;
he suffered death and was buried.
On the third day he rose again
in accordance with the Scriptures;
he ascended into heaven
and is seated at the right hand of the Father.
He will come again in Glory to judge the living and the dead,
and his kingdom will have no end.
We believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the giver of life,
who proceeds from the father and the Son.
With the Father and the Son he is worshipped and glorified.
He has spoken through the Prophets.
We believe in one holy catholic and apostolic Church.
We acknowledge one baptism for the forgiveness of sins.
We look for the resurrection of the dead,
and the life of the world to come. Amen.
Belief Centred on the Life and Teaching of Christ
The Christian religion is centred on the person, teaching and ministry of Jesus Christ
of the New Testament, whom Christians believe is God's only-begotten Son, true God and true
human, co-equal with God, and coming down to earth in human form to save human kind from
sin. At the end of his ministry on earth he commissioned his followers, the Church, to continue
his work on earth leaving them specific instructions on certain areas of conduct.
Most founders of religions before Christ came belonged rather to the upper or dominant
classes. Otherwise they would have had no possibility influencing people to become their
followers. Jesus was born into a lowly background, came from no important centre, had not
studied under any notable teacher, and was a mere artisan -- following one of the occupations
demanding minimum skill in a small town. His coming forward to teach in itself constituted a
most striking innovation, and could only have been possible if, as was the case, he had
something special to offer by way of innovative teaching and miracles.
b. The Teachings of Christ
Attempts have been made, often successfully, to establish some parallels between the
teachings of Jesus and those of great teachers of earlier times like Socrates, Confucius or the
Buddha. The onginality of his teachings lies not so much in saying what no one else had ever
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said as in making them come so much alive as to seem to have been specially designed for
the moment and circumstance in which they were uttered. Christ was also original in his
character and mode of life which were in perfect consonance with his teaching.
i. The Fatherhood of God
Unique also to the Christian religion is Jesus' teaching on the Fatherhood of God and
the common brotherhood of all humankind, (cf. St John 20:17, 21). (Judaism teaches God's
Fatherhood, but not to include all humankind). Jesus pictured God as the Father -- unseen, (cf.
St John 5:37), yet ever watching the actions of His children, considering, not the outward act
only, but the inward motive, the strength of effort, the difficulties overcome by each one.
Future Life
In another direction Jesus exalted greatly the ideal of the supreme Being by his teaching
about immortality and the dispensation of future happiness and punishment. He largely dwarfed
the predominant influence of events in this life, whether favourable or painful, by bringing into
prominence the future judgment and redress of temporal inequalities (Lk 6:24-26). The belief
that a future judgment is to take place, at which the condition of humankind will be determined
according to conduct in this life, has undoubtedly exercised an enormous influence, both in
producing converts to Christianity and in elevating their moral tone.
Faith Required For Special Divine Favours
It may be said that faith was not a teaching of Jesus by which he was distinguished from
many other religious teachers; for they have required their pupils to believe in their teaching
and doctrines, and to practise them. But in one respect his teaching about faith had a
peculiarity. He impressed on his hearers and those who petitioned certain spintual favours or
cures that salvation, forgiveness, healing, or the special boon needed could be obtained by
faith without special works in most cases.
iv. Salvation from Sin
Part of the mission Jesus came into the world to accomplish was to relieve suffering
humanity from physical, mental and psychological diseases. He said of himself: "I came that
they may have live, and have it to the fullest (St John 10.10). He accomplished this goal
through his healing ministry. His deep impulse and desire to deliver humans from the evils
which degraded their conduct and thought, was ever prominent. By a multitude of methods he
sought to make humans realise their state of alienation from God, their need of reconciliation,
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purification, and forgiveness. The realisation of the truth about themselves was the first step to
rectification. Often it was accomplished by a very short interview, almost by a look on the
pure face which by contrast revealed the impurity elsewhere. Then he would &len say: "Your
sins are forgiven." When at the end he was crucified and died, his death is believed as the
culmination of his mission of salvation of humankind from sin.
c. Christian Practices and Observances
In Christianity the day of the resurrection is kept free from menial engagements except
in emergencies. Most Christians observe Sunday as the day of rest, but there are some who,
basing their arguments on the Decalogue as found in the Book of Exodus, think the observance
should be the Sabbath and not the Sunday. Other Christian feasts include Christmas which
commemorates the birth of Jesus on December 25; Good Friday, which commemorates his
passion and death; Easter, which commemorates his resurrection; Ascension vihich marks his
return to heaven after his resurrection; and Pentecost, which is the fulfilment of his promise to
send the Holy Spirit on believers after his Ascension.
i. Christian Pilgrimage
Christians have the practice of going on pilgrimage to any of the places connected with
the life and ministry of Christ on earth especially Jerusalem and other parts of Palestine, Rome,
which is the seat of the Catholic Church.
In addition, Christians have the practice of prayer, fasting and almsgiving, especially during the
periods of Lent during which they commemorate the suffering and death of Jesus. There is also
the practice of confession of sins to God in order to obtain purification. While in the Catholic
Church and some parts of the Anglican Communion the priest hears the confession of penitents
and pronounces absolution as Christ's minister and representative, other Christian denomina-
tions have the practice of direct confession to God for the sake of forgiveness of sins.
ii. The Sacraments
The Christian daily life is sustained by the sacraments which are signs of inward grace
which are believed to have been instituted by Jesus as a means of sanctification for those who
apply them. Opinions are divided among the different denominations as to the number of the
sacraments. Some acknowledge as few as three, others as many as mne. Baptism, confirmation,
and the Eucharist seem to be acknowledged by most Christian denominations as sacraments.
The most important Christian symbol is the cross, which is the instrument on which the
Saviour was crucified. It is an object of great reverence among Christians and some groups
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make it the focal point in their place of worship and some ornaments are fashioned in the form
of the cross so that wearers can be identified with it more frequently in their daily wear.
4. A General Scheme Incorporating Material from the Three Religions
A scheme for a more detailed study of the three religions can be g ven in the following
outline which contains other details not directly connected with moral education. The aspects
of structure and specific religious practices have not appeared in the quick description above,
but are here included to enable the students or teachers expand their knowledge if and when
they so desire. The outline, which is divided into four sections offers at a glance a view of
each religious tradition:
a. General Introduction
i) The concept of God and the supernatural in general, in Chris-
tianity, Islam, and Traditional Religion.
ii) The concept of the world and man's place in it.
iii) The meaning of the good life, of sin, suffering and happiness.
iv) Elements of worship, prayer, sacrifice, salvation.
v) Inspiration.
vi) Biblical and non-biblical Religion.
b. Traditional Religion
i) Traditional cosmogony: God, man, sky, sea, earth, minor deities,
ancestors.
ii) Concept of the good life: bfO na Ott (principle), justice, probity
of life, sanctity of life, sense of the sacred.
in)
	 Sense of the Holy: Taboos, Totem animals, sacred penods.
iv) Sacred symbols: 6f6 (object), ikinga, umune, chi.
v) Elements of Worship and Sacrifice: priesthood, divination, sacred
observances.
vi) Concept of Family and Society: the Ancestors as Living-Dead.
C. Islam
i) Strict Monotheism: Dislike for images and representations of the
deity.
ii) Rejection of concept of God as Father, God of justice more than
of Mercy, Rejection of the Trinity.
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iii) Common Heritage with Christianity.
iv) Prophet Mohammed as God's special Messenger, Koran received directly
from God.
v) Jesus, prophet not saviour, not divine, not "Son of God".
vi) The Good life as strict obedience to divine injunctions in the Koran.
vii) Islamic Piety: The 114, the Ramadan fast, Islamic Holy Places
at Mecca and Medina.
d. Christianity
i) Judaism, a common ancestor to Christianity and Islam.
ii) The Hebrew Bible as common source book.
iii) God of Justice is also God of love and mercy.
iv) The Triune God, the Incarnation and Salvation through Christ.
v) The Schisms, Reformation and after.
vi) Protestantism: authority based on the Bible alone.
vii) The Church, the Pope as Visible Head (rejected by Protestants).
viii) Christian Moral Life: the Decalogue, the Beatitudes.
ix) The Sacramental life.
In addition, the possibility of religious practice must be encouraged for it offers the
students the opportunity not only to grow in the religion in which they were brought up, but
also to interact ecumenically with people of other faiths.
235
Notes
1. See Onyioha, K.O.K., African Godianism: (A Revolutionary Religion For
Mankind Through Direct Communication with God), Owem, New York,
London: Conch Magazine Limited (Pubhshers), 1980.
2. Imasogie, Osadolor, African Traditional Religion, Ibadan: Ibadan University
Press, 1982, p.33.
3. Arinze, Francis, Sacrifice in Ibo Religion, Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1970,
p.10.
4. Idowu, Bolaji, Olodumare: God in Yoruba Belief, London: Longmans Green and
Co. Ltd, 1986, p.42.
5. Parrinder, Edward Geoffrey, African Traditional Religion, Westport Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, 1976, p.47.
6. op. cit. p.49.
7. ibid.
8. ibid. p.45.
9. ibid. p.47.
10. ibid.
11. Bettany, G.T., "The Koran and its Teachings", Encyclopedia of World Religions,
New York: Dorset Press, 1988, p.527.
12. ibid. p.528.
13. The Koran vi. 101.
14. The Koran xxxv.9.
15. See Bettany, G.T., Encyclopedia of World Religions, New York . Dorset Press,
1988, p.502.
16. ibid. p.531.
236
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Nigeria
Achebe, C. The Trouble with Nigeria. London: Heinemann Educational Books
Ltd, 1983.
Afonja, S., & Pearce, T.O., (Ed), Social Change in Nigeria, Essex: Longman
Group Ltd, 1986.
Akpan, N.U., The Struggle for Secession. 1966-1970. London: Frank Cass and
Company Ltd, 1971.
Awa, E.O., Issues in Federalism. Benin: Ethiope Publishing Corporation, 1976.
Awolowo, 0., Path to Nigerian Greatness. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing
Company Ltd, 1981.
	
. Thoughts on Nigerian Constitution. London: Oxford University
Press, 1966.
Azikiwe, N., Zik: A Selection From the Speeches of Nnamdi Azildwe, London:
Cambridge University Press, 1961.
Buchanan, K.M. & Pugh, J.C., Nigeria and Its Peoples, London: University of
London Press Ltd, 1964.
Coleman, J.S., Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, Berkeley and Los Angeles.
University of California Press, 1958.
Constitution of the Federal Republic of ifgeria. Lagos. A Daily Times
Publication, 1979.
Crowder, M., The Story of Nigeria. London: Faber and Faber, 1966.
Delano, I.O., The Soul of Nigeria. London: T. Werner Laurie Ltd, 1937.
English, M.C., An Outline of Nigerian H'story, London and Beccles: William
Clowes and Sons Ltd, 1959.
Essien-Ibok, A., (Ed), Towards a Progressive Nigeria. Kano: Triumph
Publishing Company Ltd, 1983.
Eyandele, E.A., Nigerian Historical Studies, London: Frank Cass Ltd, 1979.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree. 
1966, Official Gazette, No.57, Vol 53, May 24, 1966.
237
Federal Government of Nigeria, Nigeria 1966, Lagos: The Government Printer,
1967.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, Reports of the Constitution Drafting Committee,
Lagos: Times Press Ltd, 1976.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, The Banking Obi gations (Eastern States) Decree,
Lagos: The Government Printer, 1970.
Forde, D., (Ed), African Worlds. (Studies in the Cosmological Ideas and Social
Values of African Peoples), London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1960
Ifechukwu, J.A.O., Formula for Political Stabi ity in Nigeria, Lagos: Goldland
Business Company Ltd, 1986.
Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: July 1967-January 1970,
London: Oxford University Press, 1971.
Morel, E.D., Nigeria: Its Peoples and its Problems. London: Smith, Elder
Company, 1911.
Nwabueze, B.O., The Igbos in the Context of Modern Government and Politics
in Nigeria: A Call for Self-Examination and Self-Correction, 1985 Ahiajolcu
Lecture, Owerri: Ministry of Information, Culture, Youth and Sports (Culture
Division), 1985.
Nwankwo, A., Civi ianized Soldiers. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing
Company Ltd, 1984.
Okoye, M., A Letter To Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe. Enugu: Fourth Dimension
Publishing Company Ltd, 1979.
Olcpalcu, J., (Ed), Nigeria: Dilemma of Nationhood % New York: The Third
Press, Greenwood Publishing Company, 1982.
Peil, M., Nigerian Politics: the People's View. London: Cassell 8c Company
Ltd, 1976.
Rimi, M.A., ,Struggle for Redemption, Zaria: Northern Nigeria Publishing
Company Ltd, 1981.
Sanda, B., The Problem With Nigeria, Benin Ethiope Publishing Company,
1986.
Stremlau, J.J., The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, Princeton
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971.
The Nigerian Handbook (Tenth Edition ) Lagos: Government Printer, 1933.
238
Uwechue, R., Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War (A Call to Realism). 
London: 0.I.T.H. International Publishers Ltd, 1969.
Williams, H., Nigeria Free. London: Robert Hale Ltd, 1962.
2. Education, Nigerian Education
Adesina, S., Aldnyemi, K., Ajayi, K., (Ed), Nigerian Education: Trends and 
Issues. Ife: University of Ife Press Ltd, 1983.
Adler, M.J., The Paideia Proposal: (An Educational Manifesto). New York:
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987.
Akusoba, E.U., "The Teacher Outside the Classroom", Foundations of
Education, Edited by B.O. Ukeje, Benin City: Ethiope Publishing Corporation,
1979.
Alkah, H., "A Note on Arabic Teaching in Northern Nigeria," in Kano Studies,
no.3 (June 1967).
Bell, B.I., Crisis in Education, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc.,
1969.
Cooke, C.M., "Church, State and Education: The Eastern Nigeria Experience,
1950-1967", Christianity in Independent Africa, Edited by E.F. Luke et al,
London: Rex Collings, 1978.
Etioni, E., "The Organizational Structure of 'Closed' Educational Institutions",
Harvard Educational Review, Vol 27, 1957.
Fafunwa, B.A., History of Education in Nigeria. London: George Allen &
Unwin Ltd, 1974.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, National Policy on Education, Lagos: Federal
Ministry of Education, 1977.
Government of the East Central State, The East Central State Policy on Public
Education, Enugu: Ministry of Education, 1970.
Green, T.F., "Topology of the Teaching Concept" in Concepts of Teaching: 
Philosophical Essays. Edited by C.J. Macmillan and T.W. Nelson, Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1968.
Gutmann A., Democratic Education, Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1987.
Hake, J.M., Child-Rearing Practices in Northern Nigeria. Ibadan: Ibadan
University Press, 1972.
239
Hutchins, R.M., Freedom. Education and the Fund. New York Meridian Books,
1956.
Ifemeje, C.C., "Evolution of Nigerian Education I", Foundations of Education,
Edited by B 0. Ukeje, Benin City. Ethiope Publishing Corporation, 1979.
Ikejiani, 0., (Ed), Nigerian Education, Ikeja: Longmans of Nigeria, 1964.
Kelly, W.A., Educational Psychology, (Fourth Edition) Milwaukee: The Bruce
Publishing Company, 1956.
Loukes, H., "What Sort of Teachers Are Needed", Moral Education, Vol 1,
No 3, December 1969, pp.27-31.
Murray, A.V., The School in the Bush, London, New York, Toronto. Langmans
Green and Company, 1929.
National Policy on Education (Revised Edition). Lagos: Federal Government
Press, 1981.
Nigerian Educational Research Council, Current Trends in Nigerian Educational
Research, Ibadan: Conference Centre, University of Ibadan, 1985.
Nwagwu, N.A., "The State Take-Over of Schools in Nigeria: A Controversy",
The Journal of Educational Administration, Vol 17, May 1979.
Obanya, P.A.I., (Ed), Education and the Nigerian Society. Ibadan. Ibadan
University Press, 1981.
Peters, R.S., Education as Initiation. London: George G. Harrap & Company
Ltd, 1964.
Rousseau, J.-J., Emile of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Selected, translated and
Interpreted by William Boyd, London: Heinemann Publishing Company, 1986.
The American Association of School Administrators, The Expanding Role of
Education (Twenty-Sixth Yearbook) Washington, D.C., 1981.
Ukeje, B.O., Foundations of Education. Benin City: Ethiope Publishing
Corporation, 1979.
Vandenberg, D., Being and Education, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1971.
Vidler, A., (Ed) Soundings, Cambridge University Press, 1962.
240
3. Moral and Religious Education, Moral Development
Aiken, H.D.' "Moral Philosophy and Education" in Theories of Value and
Problems of Education. Edited by P.G. Smith, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1980.
Carpenter, F.C., "ReLig ous Education Vs Moral Education", Moral Education
Vol 2, No. 1, 1970, pp.29-37.
Childs, J.L., Education and Morals. New York: Science &I tions, John Wiley
& Sons, Inc., 1967.
Cohn, R.L., "Professing Religion in the Classroom", Reigion and Intellectual
Life, Fall 1989 vol VII, No.1, pp. 103-117.
Dubitsky, C.M., "Religious Education: Profession and Academic Discipline" in
Religious Education, Vol 84 no 2, Spring 1989 pp.273-282.
Durka, G., "Modeling Religious Education for the Future", in The Religious
Education We Need. Piswalca Indiana: Religious Education Press Inc., 1977.
Erikson, E., Childhood and Society, 2nd Edition, New York: Norton Publishers,
1963.
	 . Insight and Responsibility, New York: Norton Publishers, 1964.
Hall, R.T. & Davis, J.U., Moral Education in Theory and Practice, Buffalo,
New York: Prometheus Books, 1975.
Haydon, G., "Collective Moral Philosophy and Education for Pluralism" in
Journal of Philosophy of Education. Vol 20 No. 1, 1986.
Hennessy, T.C., (Ed), Value and Moral Ed cation: Schools and Teachers. New
York, Ramsey, Toronto: Paulist Press, 1979.
Horton, J., & Mendus, S., (Ed) Aspects of Toleration, Methuen, London and
New York: Methuen and Co Ltd, 1985.
Kohlberg, L., Moral Education: Interdisciplinary Approaches, Edited by C.M.
Beck, B.S. Cnttenden & E.V. Sullivan, New York Newman Publishing
Company, 1971.
	 . "Stages of Moral Development As A Basis For Moral Education",
Moral Development. Moral Ed cation and Kohlberg, Edited by Brenda Munsey,
Birmingham Ala.: Religious Education Press, 1980.
Lee, J M., The Religious Education We Need, Mishwaka, Indiana: Religious
Education Press Inc. 1977.
Lord, E., & Bailey, C., A Reader in Religious Moral Education. London: SCM
Press, 1973.
241
Loukes, H., "RE = ME", Moral Education, Vol 2, No 1, March 1970, pp.21-
27.
Macy, C. (Ed), Let's Teach Them Right, London: Pemberton Publishing
Company Ltd, 1969.
Moral and Religious Education in County Schools % A Report to the Social
Morality Council, London: The Social Morality Council, 1970.
Nduka, O.A. & Iheoma, E.O., (Ed), New Perspectives in Moral Education. 
Lagos: Evans Brothers (Nigeria Publishers) Ltd, 1983.
Okere, T.O., "The Role of Religion in Moral Education", in New 
Perspectives in Moral Education. Edited by O.A. Nduka and E.O. Iheoma,
Lagos: Evans Publishers, 1983.
Parent, N., "Four Challenges of Adult Religious Education", Origins. January
5, 1989 vol 18 No 30.
Peters, R.S., Ethics and Education. Beck, New York: Macmillan Publishing
Company, 1988.
Piaget, J., The Moral Judgment of the Child, New York: Collier, 1962.
	
. Origins of Intelligence in Children, New York: International
Universities Press, 1952.
Smith, J.W.D., Religious Education in a Secular Setting. London: SCM Press,
1969.
Wilson, J., and Rankin, J., "An Approach to Religious Education and A Reply",
Moral Education, Vol 2 No 1, March 1970.
4. Moral Philosophy
Aiken, H.D., "On the Concept of Moral Principle," in The Isenberg Memorial
Lecture Series. 1965-1966, East Lansing. Michigan State University Press, 1969.
Amadi, E., Ethics in Nigerian Culture. lbadan: Heinemann Educational Books,
(Nigeria) Ltd, 1982.
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics. Translated, with introduction and notes, by
Martin Ostwald, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987.
Cua, A.S., "Morality and the Paradigmatic Individual" American Philosophical
Ouarterly, Vol 6 no 4, October 1969.
242
	• Dimensions of Moral Creativity: Paradigms. Principles. and Ideals,
College Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978.
	
• "The Status of Principles in Confucian Ethics", in Journal of
Chinese Philosophy. (forthcoming) 1990.
Dechert, C., "A Pluralist World Order," New Dynamics in Ethical Thinking,
Edited by George F. McLean, Lancaster, Pennsylvania: Concorde Pubhshing
Company, 1974.
Finley, J., 8c Pennock, M., Christian Morality and You. Notre Dame Indiana:
Ave Maria Press, 1977.
Fletcher, J., Situation Ethics. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986.
Gaffney, J., Moral Ouestions. New York, Paramus, Toronto: Paulist Press,
1987.
Hart, H.L.A., Law. Liberty and Morality. London: Oxford University Press,
1986.
Kant, I., Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, Translated by
T.K. Abbott, New York: Prometheus Books, 1987.
	
. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Translated by H.J.
Paton, New York, Macmillan Publishmg Company, 1987.
Lehmann, P., Ethics in a Christian Context, New York: Washington Square
Press Inc., 1960.
Leiser, B.M., Custom. Law, and Morality. New York: Anchor Books,
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1989.
Lepp, I., The Authentic Morality. Translated by Bernard Murchland, New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1985.
Leys, W.A.R., "Political and Moral Pluralism," The Abdication of Phi osophy,
Edited by Eugene Freeman, Illino s: Open Court La Salle, 1976.
Mabbotl, J.D., An Introduction to Ethics, London: Hutchinson University
Library, 1986.
MacIntyre, A., After Virtue. London: Gerald Duckworth & Company Ltd, 1985.
Marck, V. der, & Willem, H M. Toward A Christian Ethic, Translated from
the Dutch by Denis J. Benett, Shannon Ireland: Ecclesia Press, 1984.
McLean, G.F., (Ed), New Dynamics in Ethical Thinking, Lancaster
Pennsylvania: Concorde Publishing Company, 1984.
243
Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism. On Liberty. and Cons derations on Representative
Government, Edited by H.B. Acton, London: J.M Dent & Sons Ltd, 1989.
Peters, R.S., 12eason and Compassion, London and Boston: Routeledge & Kegan
Paul, 1973.
Phillips, R.B., "Authenticity or Morality", in The Virtues, Edited by Robert C.
Kruschwitz Sc. Robert C. Roberts, Belmont California: Wadsworth Publishing
Company, 1987.
Porter, B F., The Good Life: Alternatives in Ethics, New York: Macmillan
Publishing Company inc., 1980.
Rader, M, Ethics and the Human Community, New York: Holt, Rinehard &
Winston, 1964.
Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice. London: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Ryle, G., "On Forgetting tte D fference Between Right and Wrong" in Essays
in Moral Philosophy, Edited by A.I. Melden, Seattle. University of Washington
Press, 1958.
Walsh, W.H., Hegelian Ethics, New York, Paramus, Toronto: Paulist Press,
1969.
Williams, B., Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1985.
	 . Moral Luck (Philosophical Papers 1973-1980). Cambridge, London,
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Wolf, S., "Moral Saints", Journal of Philosophy. 79 August 1982.
Wolff, R.P., et al, A Critique of Pure Tolerance. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.
Wright, D., The Psychology of Moral Behaviour. Middlesex: Penguin Books
Ltd, 1987.
5. Religion
Adams, C M., "Religious Minonty and Adolescents,* Religious Education, vol
84, no 3, Summer 1989, pp.427-439.
Ade Adegbola, E.A , (Ed ) Trad tional ReFgion in West Africa, Ibadan, Nigeria:
Daystar Press, 1983.
Adigwe, M.A., Nigeria Jo ns the Organ sation of Islamic Conference. OIC,
Onitsha, Nigeria: Archdiocesan Secretariat, Catholic Archdiocese of Nigeria,
1987.
244
Amucheazi, E.C., (Ed), Readings in Social Sciences (Issues in National
Development), Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980.
Arinze, F., Sacrifice in lbo Religion, lbadan: lbadan University Press, 1970.
Bengu, S.M.E., Chasing Gods Not Our Own. Natal, Republic of South Africa:
Shuter & Shooter Pietermaritzburg, 1975.
Bonhoeffer, D., Letters and Papers From Prison. London: Fontana Publishers,
1987.
Buber, M., Between Man and Man. Translated and Introduced by Robert G.
Smith, London: Collins, The Fontana Library, Third Impression, 1974.
Clarke, P. B., Islam in Modern Nigeria. Grunewald, Kaiser: Druckhaus
Darmstadt, 1984.
Coulson, J., (Ed), Theology and the University. London: Darton, Longman &
Todd, 1965.
Cragg, K., Muhammad and the Christian. New York: Orbis Books London:
Darton, Longman and Todd, 1984.
Hoffner, E., The True Believer. New York: Mentor Books, 1988.
Idowu, B., Olodumare: God in Yoruba Belief, London: Longmans Green and
Co. Ltd, 1986.
Ilogu, E., Christianity and lbo Culture. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986.
Imasogie, 0., African Traditional Religion, lbadan: lbadan University Press,
1982.
Mbiti, J.S., New Testament Eschatology in an African Background. London:
Oxford University Press, 1986.
Naqavi, A.M., Islam and Nationalism. Translated by Alaedin Pazargadi,
Teheran: Islamic Propagation Organization, 1984.
Neuhaus, R., "Two Civil Religions" in Religion and Society Report. vol 6 no
2, February 1989.
Odudoye, M., "Potent Speech", Traditional Religion in West Africa, Edited by
E.A. Ade Adegboke, lbadan: Daystar Press, 1983.
Onyioha, K.O.K., African Godianism: (A Revolutionary Rel gion For Mankind
Through Direct Communication With God), Owerri, New York, London: Conch
Magazine Limited (Publishers), 1980.
245
Parrinder, E.G., African Traditional Religion, Westport Connecticut: Greenwood
Press, 1976.
Robinson, R., The Atheist's Values. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.
Shaw, D.W.D., Who is God?, London, SCM Press Ltd, 1970
Shlapentolch, V., "Gorbachev Gets Religion," The Washington Post
Sunday, March 4, 1990.
St Augustine, The City of God. Translated by Marcus Dods, New York: The
Modern Library, 1988.
Umejesi, I.O. "Recent Contributions of Nigeria's Three Main Religions to the
Concept of Toleration" An unpublished article, March 1988.
Usman, Y.B., The Manipulation of Religion in Nigeria. 1977-1987. Kaduna:
Vanguard Printers & Publishers Ltd, 1987.
Watt, W.M., Islam and Christianity Today, London: Routeledge & Kegan Paul,
1983.
World Council of Churches, Christian Presence and Witness in Relation to 
Muslim Neighbours. (A Conference: Mombasa, Kenya, 1979), Geneva: World
Council Of Churches.
6. Socio-Cultural
Bohannan, P., Africa and Africans. New York: The Natural History Press,
1964.
Downs, J.F., Cultures in Crisis. London:Collier-Macmillan Ltd, 1972.
Isichei, E., A History of the Igbo People,. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan
Press Ltd, 1976.
Iwe, N.S.S., Socio-Ethical Issues in Nigeria,. New York: Peter Lang Publishing,
Inc., 1987.
Kambalame, J., et al, Our African Way of Life, Translated by Cullen Young
& Hastings Banda, United Society for Christian Literature, London and Redhill:
Luttenvorth Press, 1946.
Krishna, G., "The True Aim of Yoga", The Psychic. February 1973.
Minogue, M. & Molloy, J., (Ed), African Aims and Attitudes. London: Oxford
University Press, 1974.
Munonye, J., Obi, London: Heinemann Publishers, 1987.
246
Nadel, S.F., The Black Byzantium. London: Oxford University Press, 1981.
Nwala, T.U., Changing Morals and Social Development in Nigeria. Enugu:
Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1984.
Nwapa, F., au, London, Heinemann Publishers, 1987.
Nwoga, D.I., NIca Na Nzere: The Focus of Igbo World View. Ahiajoku Lecture
Series, 1984, Owerri: Ministry of Information, Culture, Youth and Sports, 1984.
Nzimiro, I., Studies in Ibo Political Systems, London: Frank Cass, 1972.
Onyeocha, I.M., A Title of Honour, A Play Produced for the National Television
Authority (NTA Channel 8) Enugu, 1984.
	 . I.M., Enjoy Your Youth. Enugu: Claretian Publications, 1987.
Ottenberg, S.& P., (Ed), Culture and Societies of Africa, New York: Random
House, 1960.
Piers, G., and Singer, M.B., Shame and Guilt: A Psychoanalytic and Cultural
Study, New York: W. Norton & Co., 1971.
Radhalcrishnan, S., The Hindu View of Life. New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1926.
Robinson, A.L. et al, (Ed), Black Studies in the University (A Symposium. New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987.
Roche, G.C., The Bewildered Society. New York: Arlington House, 1984.
Simpson, G., & Yinger, J.M., Racial and Cultural Minorities. New York:
Harper and Row, 1985.
Smith, E.W., Knowing the African. London and Redhill: United Society for
Christian Literature, 1946.
Smith, E.W., The Golden Stool. (Some Aspects of the Conflict of 	 Cultures
in Modern Africa), London: Edinburgh House Press, 1927.
Soyinka, W., The Interpreters, London: Heinemann Publishers, 1987.
Uchendu, V.C., "Concubinage Among Ngwa Igbo of Southern Nigeria", Africa,
vol XXXV no.2, April 1965, pp.187-197.
	 . The Igbo of South-Eastern Nigeria, New York, Chicago, London:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985.
Westenholme, G., & O'Connor M., (Ed),  Man and Africa. London: J.& A.
Churchill Ltd, 1965.
247
7. Political
Abraham, W.E., The Mind of Africa, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962.
Bascom, W.R. & Herskovits, M.J. (Ed), Continuity and Change in African
Cultures % Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1959.
Browlie, I., (Ed.), Basic Documents of Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1971.
Carr, E.H., Nationalism and After, London: Macmillan and Company, 1955.
Dewey, J., "Creative Democracy -- the Task Before Us," The Philosophy of
the Common Man: Essays in Honour of John Dewey to Celebrate His Eightieth
Birthday, Ed. by Sidney Rather, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1940.
Fanon, F., Black Skin. White Masks. Translated by Charles Lam Marlanann,
New York: Grove Press Inc. 1982.
Fraser, L., Propaganda. London: Oxford University Press, 1957.
Fredland, R.A., Africa Faces the World. Indianapolis: Indiana University,
Purdue University at Indianapolis, 1980.
Halle, L.J., The Ideological Imagination,, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1985.
Henry, N., "Nyerere Bows Out With Tanzania in Deep Decline"' The
Washington Post, Wednesday, September 26, 1990.
Hobbes, T., Leviathan. London: Oxford University Press, 1985.
Machiavelli, N., The Prince. Translated with an Introduction by George Bull,
Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1983.
Mazrui, A.A., World Culture and the Black Experience. Seattle & London:
University of Washington Press, 1987.
McCall, D.F., Africa in Time-Perspective,, Boston, Legon: Boston University
Press; Ghana University Press, 1984.
Nellio, J.R., A Theory of Ideology: The Tanzanian Example, Nairobi: Oxford
University Press, 1982.
Nozick, R., Anarchy. State and Utopia, London: Oxford Basil Blackwell and
Company, 1987.
Nyerere, J., Interim Constitution of Tanganyika. 1965. Dar es Salaam:
Government Printer, 1967.
248
	• The Arusha Declaration: TANU's Policy on Soc alism and Self-
Reliance. Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1987.
	 • President Nyerere Opens Dar es Salaam Un versity College
Campus. 21 August. 1964. Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Information and Tourism,
1987.
Okoye, M., African Responses. Devon Ilfracombe: Arthur H Stockwell Ltd,
1964.
Plamenatz, J., Ideology. New York, Washington, London: Praeger Publishers,
1986.
Roche, G.C., Legacy of Freedom: New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House,
1981.
Rodewald, C., Democracy: Ideas and Realities. Dent, London, Hackert, Toronto:
J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1975.
Rousseau, J.-J., The First and Second Discourses, Ed. with introduction and
notes by Roger D. Masters, Translated by Roger D. and Judith R. Masters,
New York: St Martin's Press, 1964.
	 . Of the Social Contract, London: Oxford University Press, 1985.
Sithole, N., African Nationalism. London: Oxford University Press, 1959.
Slovo, J., Has Socialism Failed, A South African Communist Party Pamphlet,
London: Inlcululeko Publications, 1990.
Strauss, L., The Argument and the Action of Plato's Laws, Chicago and London:
The University of Chicago Press, 1987.
Wey, S.O., & Osagie, E., An Ideology for Social Development. Lagos:
Academy Press Ltd, (no date).
8. General Background Philosophy
Abbagnano, N., "Humanism", The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy Vol 3&4, New
York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. & The Free Press, 1972, pp.69-72.
Aquinas, T. The Pocket Aquinas. Edited by Vernon J. Bourke, New York:
Washington Square Press, 1986.
Descartes, R., The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Translated by John
Cottingham, et al, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Freeman, E., (Ed.), The Abdication of Philosophy: Philosophy and the Public
Good, Minois: Open Court La Salle, 1976.
249
Heidegger, M., Being and Time, Translated by John Macquarrie & Edward
Robinson, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1986.
Jaspers, K., The Great Philosophers. New York: Harcourt, Bruce and World,
1962.
Korner, S., Kant. Middlesex: Penguin Books Inc., 1988.
Lamont, C., "Naturalist Humanism" in The Humanist. September-October,
1971.
Locke, J., An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Edited with an
introduction by A.D. Woozely, A Mendian Book, New York: New American
Library, 1986.
Lunn, A., & Lean, G., The Cult of Softness. London: Blanford Press, 1965.
McKeon, R., (Ed), The Basic Works of Aristotle. New York: Random House,
1988.
Melling, D., Understanding Plato. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press,
1987.
Plato, The Laws of Plato,. Translated with notes and an interpretative essay by
Thomas L. Pangle, New York: Basic Books Inc. Publishers, 1988.
	 . Plato's Statesman, Translated by J.B. Skemp, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1988.
Ross, W.D.,(Ed), Aristotle: Selections. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1988.
Sargent, W., The Battle for the Mind. New York: Pan Books, 1959.
Taylor, A.E., Aristotle, Dover Publications, Inc. 1955.
Titus, H.H., Living Issues in Philosophy4th Edition), New York: American
Book Company, 1984.
9. Encyclopaediae and Dictionaries
Book of the Year 1989, Chicago: Encyclopaedia
989.
International Edition Vol 20, New York: Grolier
Encyclopaedia Britannica
Britannica Incorporated, 1
Encyclopedia Americana,
Incorporated, 1987.
250
Bettany, G.T., Encyclopaedia of World Religions, New York: Dorset Press,
1988.
Barrow, R., and Milburn, G., A Critical Dictionary of Educational Concepts,
New York: St Martin's Press, 1986.
Barrett, D.B., (Ed), World Christian Encyclopaedia" A Comparative Study of
Churches and Religions in the Modern World AD 1900-2000, Oxford, London:
Oxford University Press, 1986.
